The anatomy of a terrible last possession
Coach Cal has never been known as an Xs & Os guy — that was full display on the last play of the Kentucky-Kansas State game
Kentucky head coach John Calipari is a Hall of Fame coach. He’s an amazing recruiter, a master motivator and a good developer of talent — put simply, he’s one of the best college basketball coaches of all time.
However, like every coach (except Brad Stevens), Coach Cal has a weakness — his in-game decision-making. By “in-game decision-making”, I’m taking about rotations and drawing up plays. Unfortunately for Kentucky, Coach Cal’s weakness reared its ugly head in the 61–58 upset loss to Kansas State in the Sweet Sixteen.
While it’s easy to harp on a coach for his rotations in hindsight (e.g., why did PJ Washington play all 40 minutes?), that’s not what this article is going to focus on. Instead, we’re going to take a look at the most important play Coach Cal drew up — the final play of Kentucky’s season.
In case you forget how this game ended:
Now, let’s break down the final play down.
7.7 seconds remaining
Kentucky rebounds a missed free throw, down 3 points. Coach Cal had three options: (i) call an immediate timeout, preserve the maximum amount of time, but have to go the length of the floor and also make it easier for Kansas State to foul; (ii) get the ball across the mid-court as quickly as possible and call a timeout to draw up a last second play for a 3-pointer; or (iii) don’t call timeout, try to catch the defense scrambling and trust your players to get a good shot off before the buzzer.
Which option did Coach Cal elect? Somehow, he choose a 4th option . . . call a timeout before your player crosses mid-court.
6.6 seconds remaining
This was a problematic decision because it meant that Kentucky would have to inbound from mid-court (where your inbound play options are limited) as opposed to the hashmark in the front-court (where you could actually draw-up plays for an open 3-pointer). Like this:
5.4 seconds remaining
Kentucky elects to inbound the ball in the backcourt. There’s time for a quick-hitter play with two options, but you have to be cognizant of the defense trying to foul and send you to the line instead of defending the 3-pointer. Thus, you normally want to draw-up a play where the first option comes open almost immediately.
With the ball in the backcourt and only 5.4 seconds left, it was surprising that Kansas State did not try to foul. Then again, Washington was killing them on the boards, so that likely factored into the decision not to foul.
4.6 seconds remaining
As Shai Gilgeous-Alexander crosses the timeline, the inbounder (Quade Green) clears out to the opposite corner — a peculiar move because Green had made two of the Wildcats’ three 3-pointers, and it effectively took Green out of the play.
Why not have him run to the strong-side corner and spot up? Why not have him set a quick flat screen for Gilgeous-Alexander to force the defense to switch or help? Why not pass it to Gilgeous-Alexander on the move and have Green trail behind him? Teams always forget about the inbounder trailing the play — just ask North Carolina.
While this is happening, Kevin Knox begins to move from the block — it looks like he’s either going to screen the ball or run his man off of the double pin-down screen Washington and Wenyen Gabriel are setting at the top of the key, and flare out to the 3-point line.
3.3 seconds remaining
Knox runs his man off the double pin-down, but doesn’t flare out for a 3-pointer and doesn’t look for the ball — he’s actually a decoy on the play and setting a screen for Gabriel. This type of long-developing misdirection is appropriate during the normal flow of the game when time is not a factor.
But time is a factor here — there are 3.3 seconds remaining and Kentucky only has two players outside the 3-point line and neither are in a position to shoot. Making matters worse, the guy Kentucky is running a play for (Gabriel) hasn’t even received his screen and has five other players within a foot of him.
My question here is why have Knox set that screen? Why not just have Knox flare out and be ready for a shot and have Gabriel flash to the ball? You could still have Gabriel be the primary option, but you’d at least have Knox spotting up as a secondary option. Plus, with the top of the key as congested as it was, a Gabriel flash would have been just as effective as a Knox screen.
1.7 seconds remaining
Gabriel finally gets his screen, but isn’t open. No one is open. In fact, two guys are inside the 3-point line and another is in the opposite corner with no chance of receiving a pass. Therefore, Gilgeous-Alexander is forced to create a shot off the dribble.
Now, some might say that having Gilgeous-Alexander create his own shot was the play all along. That the Knox-Gabriel action was just off-the-ball misdirection to deter any help defense on Gilgeous-Alexander’s man. I have a tough time believing that for a number of reasons: (i) Gilgeous-Alexander was 2/9 from the field and had missed his only 3-point attempt at that point; (ii) the off-the-ball action seemed too specific and too close to the ball to have been a diversion; and, simply (iii) you just don’t run an isolation play to get an open 3-pointer unless you have someone who can create a very high percentage shot off the dribble like Steph Curry or James Harden.
0.9 seconds remaining
Forced to create his own shot, Gilgeous-Alexander rises up and fires one off the backboard, nearly banking the shot in. The screenshot makes it seem like Gilgeous-Alexander got a clean look because he jumped so high, but in real time, it was not the type of shot you hope for with the season on the line.
With such a talented team, Kentucky had no business losing this game to an inferior opponent like Kansas State. Some of the blame can be attributed to Kentucky’s young, inexperienced roster. The failure to execute a play with the season on the line, however, was all on Coach Calipari.
Thanks for reading. For more of Pat Heery’s work, check out The Has Been Sports Blog.
