I support the nuclear deal. I do so in relative terms. The core question is other than the nuclear deal, what is the alternative? This is the most important question in international relations, at its core a game of strategy and aligning choices and interests.
My support is predicated on our ability to strictly monitor and enforce the deal’s parameters. Our monitoring and enforcement must be as strong in year seven as it is in year one. If there is a benefit to loud opposition, it is that President Obama and SecState Kerry have etched their name in stone on this deal. When powerful people are personally invested in a specific outcome, there’s a much stronger chance of success. But monitoring and enforcement will be challenging.
To understand this deal, context is important. Iran and the United States have a shared history. In our shared history, there are a few things to remember: for good reason, we do not ‘trust’ Iran. So what? We should not inherently ‘trust’ any country; we should constantly test and verify our alliances. But should Iran ‘trust’ us? Probably not. In the ’50s, on behalf of corporate oil interests, we helped overthrow their democratically elected government. After 9/11, we worked with Iran before naming them part of the Axis of Evil. We then invaded their neighbor and openly talked about regime change in Iran. If you were Iranian, would you ‘trust’ the United States?
Iran is a complicated country and, especially since 1979, international issue. They are a historic and worldly civilization. As Henry Kissinger noted, they must decide whether they want to be a country (like the once-secular Persian population) or a cause (like the hard-line mullahs).
President Obama and his team put together a rock-solid sanctions profile on Iran. But the sanctions were specifically tailored to the nuclear issue, not Iran’s support for terrorism or Assad. If we walked away from the deal, it would be difficult to keep China and Russia on the sanctions hook.
I’ve heard two interesting theories on Iranian intent — first, Iran never intended to be a nuclear state; they built up a nuclear infrastructure entirely to engage the west. This theory is interesting because, under President Bush, we engaged Iran when they had 300 centrifuges; we told them to get lost, while invading Iraq; and are now having a similar conversation when they have 20,000 centrifuges. Leverage matters. Second, Iran is coming to the table for one reason: ISIS, their potentially existential enemy. Iran needs resources to fight ISIS, full stop. Any nuclear intent is a distant thought. On ISIS, Iran and the United States are well aligned — just as we are in Afghanistan.
My last thought is that most commentary is conflating the nuclear issue with other issues — notably terrorism — we have with Iran. This is a mistake. We can do two things — hold their nuclear program static (or, preferably, roll back) and, at the same time, aggressively engage them on Syria, state-sponsored terrorism, Sunni-Shia proxy wars, and other issues of strategic interest. This may seem obvious but it is not. Nations do not have friends; they have partners. Strategic partners are fluid, depending on the issue. Iran can be a partner in the fight against ISIS and on the nuclear issue — and an enemy on every other issue. I’m confident that we can manage this competing dynamic.
Originally published at brendanhartdotcom.wordpress.com on July 15, 2015.
