ISIS and Iran
I wrote this five months ago. Since Iranian generals are dying in Syria, it seems like a good time to republish.
Over the weekend, the Army’s Delta Force — arguably the most special of our special forces — killed a high-level ISIS commander, Abu Sayyaf, and captured his wife. Operating out of Syria, Sayyaf was purportedly ISIS’s moneyman (some have compared Sayyaf to “Al Capone’s accountant”). American officials claim that Sayyaf’s killing shows an improving reach into Syria, and will be a heavy blow to ISIS. I’m not convinced. As we have seen over a decade-plus, we cannot kill our way to victory. When one goes down, another takes his place. The replacement is often more ruthless and less predictable than the terminated.
Another significant event happened over the weekend. ISIS took over Ramadi, a strategically important city in the heavily contested Anbar Province. The loss of Ramadi is especially painful because, with Fallujah, the heaviest fighting — and losses — for American forces during the Iraq war took place there. Its symbolism is important.
The loss of Ramadi will surface many of the most interesting regional dynamics. From the NYT:
With defeat looming in Ramadi on Sunday afternoon, the Anbar Provincial Council met in Baghdad and voted to ask Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to send Shiite fighters to rescue Anbar, a largely Sunni province. In response, Mr. Abadi issued a statement calling for the militias, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces and including several powerful Shiite forces supported by Iran, to be ready to fight. Some of the Shiite irregular units, which were formed last summer after Shiite clerics put out a call to arms, are more firmly under the command of the government, while others answer to Iran.
The involvement of the militias in Anbar had been opposed by the United States, which leads an international coalition that has been carrying out airstrikes in support of Iraqi forces. American officials had worried that the militias could inflame sectarian tensions in the province and ultimately make it harder to pacify.
As they considered asking for the militias’ assistance, Anbar officials met over the weekend with the American ambassador to Iraq, Stuart E. Jones, to ascertain the United States’ position on the issue. According to officials, Mr. Jones told the Anbar delegation that the United States would continue its air campaign, provided that the militias were under the command of Mr. Abadi, and not Iranian advisers, and that the militias were properly organized to avoid American bombing runs.
This is the situation: ISIS (Sunni) is making material advances in Syria and Iraq, both client states of Iran (Shia). Because the American leaders are unwilling to put ‘boots on the ground’ — a position I support — we are relying on a roster of conventional (Peshmerga) and unconventional (militia) forces to battle ISIS. We support these ground forces with air power and, presumably, surveillance and reconnaissance.
But make no mistake: we are unofficially supporting Iranian-trained and -led ground forces in their fight against ISIS. The Iranian forces we are now supporting are roughly the same ones that targeted American troops in Iraq.
The recent spat between the United States and the GCC, the confederation of Persian Gulf Sunni states, complicates the issue. The GCC nations, led by Saudi Arabia, are worried that the Americans are implicitly accepting an emerging Iranian hegemony. Starting with the nuclear negotiations, they contend, American officials are responding weakly to the rapid ascension of Iran. According to some officials, the GCC promises to match Iran’s enrichment capabilities — a thinly veiled threat of a nuclear arms race in the world’s most dangerous region.
Iran seems to be winning on two fronts: the acceptance of its nuclear program and its ability to fight ISIS. But looks can be deceiving.
Iran is on the wrong side of the Syrian civil war. It is resourcing a Syrian government that is massacring its people — so far, more than 200,000 have died in Syria. The Iranian-backed regime has used chemical weapons against civilians. Regardless of timing, this is an unsustainable position. Syria will weaken Iran.
On the nuclear issue, President Obama is betting that a combination of intrusive inspections and the opening up of Iranian markets will box in the radical clerics’ influence and, through increased connectivity, empower a generation of Iranians. It’s a big bet.
If President Obama is right, Iran — a historically significant country — may transition from a “cause to a nation.” If President Obama is wrong, and Iran continues on its current path, the consequences — an emboldened military power, outside of the formal international order, with increasing nuclear capabilities — are severe.
As Secretary Baker said, we are in the middle of a chaotic period.
