Structural Impediments To reviving Somalia’s Security Forces
MOGADISHU, Somalia — For over a decade, successive Somali governments and the international community have been earnestly trying to revive Somalia’s security forces as part of a broader effort to stabilize the country following the collapse of the state in 1991.
Billions of dollars were spent on training and equipping tens of thousands of military, police and intelligence personnel so that they could liberate their country from the grip of the militant group al-Shabaab, contribute to its stabilization and enforce the rule of law.
Nearly 15 years later, neither of these objectives is fully realized, and the country’s security forces remain perpetually weak, deeply fractured and increasingly politicized.
Somali security forces were originally slated to take over core security responsibility from the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by the end of 2021.
Somali security forces were originally slated to take over core security responsibility from the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by the end of 2021.
According to an elaborate stabilization plan, crafted by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the goalpost is now moved to 2023. The “able, accountable, affordable and acceptable” security force that was envisioned by the London Security Pact of 2017 is not in sight.
The nation’s security forces are still reliant on external assistance for financing, training, equipment and operational capability.
Central to this failure is a convergence of factors, notably political irreconcilability among Somalia’s cantankerous political elite who has failed, quite spectacularly, to find a common ground on the outstanding statebuilding issues such as the architecture of the security forces.
Politicization of the security forces is rampant and leaders of the FGS and federal member states tend to prioritize regime security over national security.
One of the most profound challenges bedeviling Somalia’s security forces is misgovernance by their political leaders. From frequent changes of the top commanders for personal or partisan reasons, to corruption and the failure to institutionalize and professionalize the various security forces, successive governments have failed to meet their own targets.
Instead of fighting al-Shabaab and enforcing the rule of law, many of the country’s disparate security forces are subjected enforcing the law of the ruling elite, deepening the mistrust that many Somalis and international partners harbor about Somali security forces.
Although commendable progress had been made over the past few years in the fight against corruption through the purging of ‘ghost soldiers’ and the introduction of biometric registration and electronic salary payments, the underlying corruptive cultures remain entrenched.
Officers are promoted through nepotism and clan affiliation to buy off loyalties and consolidate power, destroying the morale of the security forces. High turnover of the top brass is also destabilizing the security forces and weakening command and control, resulting in poor accountability.
Read full report… HERE
