A Nuclear Disaster Looming in the U.S…

Billions Wasted on Failed Plutonium Disposition Plan

In the early 1990’s as the Cold War was drawing to a close and talks of nuclear arms reductions was taking shape, Washington and Moscow began negotiations on how to dispose of the tons of plutonium formerly housed in thousands of nuclear bombs. In September 1998 each side agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). Combined, this represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The agreement was designed to ease concerns about the possible theft or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provides four general requirements regarding the disposition of nuclear materials; the weapons should be made unusable making the nuclear arms reductions irreversible, the disposition should eliminate risks of theft and trafficking, it should promote a monitoring regime to ensure complete destruction, and be economically sound.

The original agreement, signed in September 2000, allowed the two parties to use two methods for the plutonium disposition; either convert it to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear power reactors or immobilize it and dispose of it in a way that would preclude its use in nuclear weapons. The cheapest and easiest method was to immobilize the radioactive material by encasing it in molten glass and burying it. However, the Russians considered the plutonium a valuable resource that could be converted into civilian energy and preferred the MOX alternative. The agreement stipulated each side would turn a minimum of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into MOX that could be combined with uranium for use in commercial reactors. While the United States initially intended to pursue both the immobilization and MOX fuel alternatives it was considered too costly and instead decided solely on the MOX fuel approach.

To implement the PMDA in the United States the Department of Energy (DOE) decided to convert an old plutonium production factory at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. The facility would provide a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable to be made into MOX fuel. When operational, the facility will be capable of turning 3.5 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel assemblies each year.

The contracted construction company based the U.S. design on successful processing facilities operating in France since 1992. These facilities currently produce MOX fuel for 30 European nuclear reactors. The DOE initially estimated it would cost about $1 billion to convert the plant. Construction began in August 2007, with an expected completion date of 2016. The facility would be the first-of-its-kind in the U.S and was the first major nuclear construction project authorized by Nuclear Regulatory Commission in over 20 years.

The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility will blend plutonium oxide (PuO2) with uranium oxide (UO2) powder to make a mixed oxide powder. The MOX powder is made into small pellets about the size of a pencil eraser. The pellets are pressed into shape, baked at high temperatures and ground to the required dimensions of approximately 1/3 inch in diameter and 4/10 inch in length.

The concept was tested by using French MOX fuel in one of the largest nuclear power companies in the U.S. during the period from 2005 to 2008. The test proved successful and everything was going according to plan. However, Almost seven years after construction began, the MOX plant is only 60 percent complete with a sunk cost of about $5 billion so far. Current estimates indicate it will cost an additional $6 billion to $7 billion to finish, plus an additional $20 billion or so to turn the plutonium into fuel over 15 years. The original operating cost estimates were approximately $183 million per year or $3 billion over the projected life span. Justification for the operating costs was based on non-proliferation grounds and the fact that the costs would be offset by revenue obtained from the sale of the fuel assemblies to U.S. energy companies.

In addition to the significant cost overruns of construction, there are also challenges in getting nuclear power plants on board to use the re-purposed fuel. Although MOX fuel has been routinely used in Europe, it has enough differences from the conventional uranium fuel currently used by U.S. nuclear plants that it would require separate NRC licensing and special handling. Two utilities that had previously planned to use the MOX fuel are no longer involved in the project and the DOE currently has no agreements in place with any U.S. power plant. The selection of reactors is important, because MOX fuel assemblies must be fabricated to fit particular reactors. Additional business factors for the power plants include a questionable steady supply of the plutonium fuel assemblies and the price of uranium, the most common nuclear fuel, has since fallen by about 70 percent, giving other utilities even less incentive to buy the costlier MOX fuel.

Due to the construction delays and increased costs as well as the five-fold increase in operating costs the 2015 budget request released in March by the DOE announced it will place the MOX project on “cold standby,” effectively mothballing the project for the foreseeable future. The MOX plant is the latest blunder for the Department of Energy, which has a reputation for mismanaging big, complicated projects, particularly those related to nuclear energy.

The Obama administration has expressed commitment to honoring the PDMA agreement by exploring other ways to dispose of the plutonium. The DOE is reviewing four alternatives to the MOX program and among them are fast reactors which were approved under the agreement for Russia’s program but the U.S. doesn't currently have. Another option is mixing it with other waste products to make the nuclear material unusable for weapon production. A potential third option is to bury the waste kilometers underground. In addition there are now 13 tons of weapons-grade plutonium sitting at the Savannah River Site that the DOE must transport and store at another facility generating yet additional costs. Any new program will likely cost added billions to develop and operate.

So while Russia has already processed their first batches of MOX fuel and distributed them to their nuclear power reactor, the U.S. is now on hold wondering what the next steps will be. This will leave the U.S. in default on the 2000 bilateral agreement and will require going back to the table with Russia to renegotiate the agreement.