A Timeless Lesson for all Strategists: The Indirect Approach
Human history has recorded countless technological achievements, such as the wheel, gunpowder, the combustion engine, powered flight, the computer and the Internet — some of these advancements have led to rapid change and on occasion, those changes have been disruptive. However, through it all, the inner workings of the human mind stands as a relative constant. In that regard, strategies that focus on human psychology are timeless. In any field of conflict, it makes sense to prepare for likely threats and to craft strategies to counter those threats. However, the simple and direct approach might not be best strategic choice.
20th century English historian B. H. Liddell Hart championed the indirect approach in his book titled, not surprisingly, “Strategy: The Indirect Approach.” Hart’s book takes the reader on an intriguing journey through military history. Hart’s logic to avoid costly direct assaults is sound and his reasoning was likely heavily influenced by the bloodbath of trench warfare in WWI.
One of the key strategic maxims in Hart’s book was to put the enemy commander on the “horns of a dilemma.” The deception campaign employed by the Allied forces prior to the Normandy invasion in 1944 provides a fine example of this concept. There were a number of points on the continent that the Allies could choose for their amphibious landing. The German army really could not effectively cover them all. Disinformation convinced the Germans that a non-existent Allied army under Patton was going to deliver the main attack. When the actual landing took place on the Normandy Peninsula, Hitler and the German High Command held back their armored reserves in the Normandy area, as well as the Pas de Calais region, because they still believed the massive Normandy invasion was a feint. The threat of another invasion force placed the Germans on the “horns of a dilemma” and resulted in a successful Allied invasion; the first step on the road to Berlin. Note here that the victory was a battlefield victory, but much of the victory came in large part from manipulating the enemy’s minds.
The 1991 Gulf War provides a fantastic example of psychological dislocation of an enemy combined with a physical indirect approach that led to a lopsided total defeat of the Iraqi army. First, the Iraqi army in Kuwait was attrited by a sustained and heavy bombing campaign. Note that the choice to use a massive air campaign is a direct approach. The Allied forces had a massive advantage in the air campaign and there was little need to use the indirect approach to minimize casualties here. However, the Allied command ultimately combined the bombing campaign with propaganda to reduce their enemy’s will to fight. Furthermore, the propaganda, and the presence of a large naval amphibious force, worked to convince the Iraqis that the Allied forces would launch an amphibious invasion to outflank their frontline positions. A large number of Iraqi reserves were placed to counter the expected invasion. All the while the actual plan for the ground campaign was to launch a massive armored flanking move to the West of the Iraqi lines, through the desert. When that attack came, surprise was total. Combined with the dislocation of Iraqi morale by the bombing campaign, deception and propaganda, the physical indirect approach through the desert resulted in a catastrophic defeat of the Iraqi army in less than 100 hours after the ground campaign started. The indirect approach provided success with very modest casualties for such a massive engagement.
Hart also gave some pointers at things the strategist should avoid. He recommended avoiding an attack at a point where the enemy was on guard for that attack and he also suggested avoiding the repetition of a failed attack, or failed line of attack. The battles in the trenches in WWI illustrate this point. Time and again, huge numbers of troops were thrown at dug-in enemy forces. The attackers were held up by barbed wire and obstacles and were mowed down by machine guns. In these attacks, the enemy was on guard and repetition of the same tactics met similar negative results. It took new tactics and the invention of the tank to restore some mobility to the WWI battlefield, but it was the collapse of German morale that actually led to victory in that conflict.
Hart’s comments on strategy still have validity today. In the struggle against Islamist terror groups such as al Qaeda, the direct approach seems to have been unsuccessful. The invasions of Iraq and the Afghanistan have led to protracted struggles, but fell short of total victory. The enemy continues to pursue a guerilla war and is sapping American treasure and morale. The terrorist campaign has mentally manipulated our leadership and the American citizenry. It seems we now have a view of the terrorist threat that is all out of proportion to reality. The drone campaign and the judicious use of special forces seems more cost-effective, both in terms of lives and money. However, none of these methods have addressed the root problems of terrorism. Somehow, America and its allies need to discredit and delegitimize the terrorists’ ideology. Much of that effort won’t involve combat forces. In fact, drones and invasions probably serve to strengthen the terrorist forces through recruitment and to legitimize their ideology. Interestingly, Hart’s maxims addressed this situation as well. The strategist should always keep his objective in mind. If the long-term objective is to defeat al Qaeda and its offshoots (and ISIS should probably be included in that category) and if our current strategy has not met with success, then it is probably time to change our strategy and look for new ways to dislocate and defeat our enemy. The answer might not be a military one. The real solution might actually involve economic aid, diplomacy, and messaging to finally vanquish the real foe; al Qaeda the idea.
