Applying CompStat to Homeland Security: Creating Accountability
The effective sharing of information is critical to the success of our U.S. homeland security efforts. Failures in this area can have devastating consequences. Nowhere was this more pointedly illustrated than during the events leading up to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. During the days and weeks following 9/11, it became increasingly evident that the Nation’s various intelligence organizations had failed to identify, share, and piece together several key pieces of intelligence information that arguably could have prevented the attacks. The most notable example was the discovery that the CIA had information linking one of the hi-jackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar, to al-Qaida many months before he entered the U.S. in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. The CIA admitted to having failed to place al-Mihdhar on the Watch List that would have prevented him from entering the Country.
In the wake of 9/11, it has become increasingly apparent that there was a clear need to improve information sharing among the various agencies involved in U.S. homeland security efforts. In fact, while investigating the circumstances surrounding 9/11, the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees noted that “one of the most significant problems examined during the open hearings was the lack of information sharing between agencies.” The 9/11 Commission later echoed these same concerns in their final report, concluding that “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis- to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots- is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.” In discussing the various missed opportunities to connect the 9/11 dots, the 9/11 Commission Report also cites a lack of effective management within counter-terrorism agencies, leading to a general absence in accountability for ensuring that critical intelligence information is shared.
Based on these findings, enormous amounts of financial, human, and technological recourses have been allocated by the government in order to enhance information sharing among federal, state, and local homeland security entities. To this end, there are now more than a dozen homeland security related information-sharing systems, including a network of over 70 fusion centers across the US, and numerous public and private agencies distributing regular homeland security related bulletins, alerts, and up-dates. While some progress has been made, a recent examination conducted by the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) determined that major challenges in our Nation’s homeland security information-sharing initiatives remain. The DNI’s conclusions are supported by the fact that several post 9/11 incidents of terrorism can be associated with various breakdowns in intelligence sharing. Examples included the November 5, 2009 attack at a Fort Hood military base perpetrated by Major Nidal Hasan that killed 13 and injured 30 U.S. Soldiers; the December 25, 2009 attempted suicide bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Nigerian national Umar Farouck AbudlMutallab; and the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers that killed 3 and injured 264.
Following the botched Christmas Day jetliner bombing in 2009, President Obama outlined the various intelligence failures that likely prevented the government from discovering the would-be underwear bomber, Abudl Mutallab. In a statement to the Associated Press, the President declared that timely, accurate and properly integrated intelligence were the Nation’s first line of defense against terrorism and he made clear his intentions to hold intelligences agencies and the people within them accountable whenever they fail to perform their responsibilities. To this end, the President ordered several key reforms, including the creation of a system that would ensure that key intelligence reports are more widely distributed among those within the intelligence community, the overhaul of DNI intelligence analysis efforts, and the immediate establishment of key lines of responsibility, coupled with regularly scheduled accountability reviews.
The intelligence reforms directed by the President, however, have yet to be accomplished and will require a drastic change in DHS’s organizational philosophy. What is needed is an entirely new managerial practice that systematically promotes interagency collaboration, information sharing, intelligence analysis, and, most importantly, individual accountability. In the search for such a practice, homeland security professionals would do well to cull through the smart-practices that have been employed successfully by other professions. One such practice, known as CompStat, can be found in the police profession and could be applied readily to homeland security. The CompStat process represents a strategic management model used by a majority of large law enforcement agencies found within the U.S. First, implemented in 1994 by the New York City Police Department, CompStat has been credited with dramatically reducing community crime rates, while significantly improving managerial accountability within the agencies it is applied.
The CompStat process enhances the ability of police agencies to systematically and rapidly identify emerging threats, create effective response strategies, and deploy resources needed to mitigate the hazard, thus preventing similar occurrences in the future. It does this by employing overlapping strategies designed to promote the analysis and rapid dissemination of accurate and useful criminal intelligence and by maintaining a very clear structure of accountability. This is generally accomplished by holding regularly scheduled joint meetings with key management officials from throughout the department. These meetings are data-driven and the open sharing of information is expected in order to ensure that relevant intelligence is made available in a timely, usable format, to all those who may have a need. Internal accountability is obtained by holding key managers directly accountable for being aware of what is happening within their areas of responsibility, sharing key information with other managers, and collaborating with external groups, including the sharing of physical resources, to achieve measurable results.
Homeland security has very similar objectives and would benefit greatly from the adoption of a proven and practical managerial strategy such as CompStat. While the policing version of CompStat is focused on short-term results relating to general crime at the local level and CompStat within the realm of homeland security would be focused on long-term results relating to terrorism at the international level, the same fundamental techniques would still apply to both disciplines. That is, while the physical CompStat meetings and processes would undoubtedly differ, the need to effectively analyze and disseminate critical intelligence in an appropriate and timely manner, while holding managers accountable, would remain the same whether carried out in a police or homeland security setting.
The CompStat process is a viable option for helping to secure our national against terrorists. It has proven extremely effective in fighting crime and the same strategies that make it so effective in reducing crime could be applied to homeland security and the war on terrorism. In fact, CompStat, with its focus on shared intelligence, statistical analysis, and strict leadership accountability, represents a proven managerial strategy that appears tailor made for counter-terrorism operations. It is adaptable, has the real potential to increase the dissemination of intelligence that is so critical to effective homeland security operational, and is well suited to addressing the many challenges currently facing our Nation’s homeland security agencies.
