Buffer Zone Protection Grants Are Working

Making our key urban infrastructures safer

AyAyRon
Homeland Security
Published in
5 min readJul 19, 2014

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After 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Infrastructure Protection directorate instituted a collaborative infrastructure protection grant program called the Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP). For the purposes of this grant program, a buffer zone is considered the adjoining area surrounding Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) as determined by DHS and local law enforcement.

The program requires local law enforcement and first responders to collaborate with other state and local government agencies and private entities which govern CIKR throughout their areas of operation. This collaboration is essential to the success of the program, since local law enforcement and first responders do not own or control the CIKR that the BZPP contemplates. Further, the local agencies receiving the grant funds typically do not own or manage the buffer zone property either. Effective BZPP investments enable these homeland security collaborations to succeed in bolstering infrastructure security.

The specific locations funded by the grant nationwide are typically restricted information due to the sensitive protection measures undertaken to improve security. Yet, there are some publicly discussed examples that can be mentioned here. In Seattle, recent buffer zone protection program funding permitted the Seattle Police Department to install four cameras on the property of the Columbia Center. Al Qaeda listed this 77-story building as a desirable target for the 9/11 attacks.

In this instance, the plan requires collaboration between the property management, Seattle Department of transportation, and the Seattle police. Funding for the cameras will pass through directly to the Columbia Center building management. They will own the cameras upon completion of the grant. What is unique about these cameras is their mounting to public utility street poles looking back at the building. Typically, this is not permitted because private building owner can only place cameras on their own building looking outward, which is a disadvantage to good perimeter security. The city’s Department of Transportation will collaborate with the police department and the building management to approve and install the cameras on public property. Once completed, this project allowed the building security to monitor the cameras and share criminal or potential terrorism-related information with the Seattle police.

In another example, the Ohio State University police used Buffer Zone Protection Program grant funding to enhance the security of their stadium during public events. They purchased portable vehicle barriers and other equipment as part of their all-hazards Public Safety Game Day Operations Plan. This plan involved collaboration with the operators of the stadium events, the local police department, department of transportation, and the public. It further required collaboration with DHS in obtaining funds and administering the grant’s funds during the period of performance.

In examining the two examples above, several key factors contribute to the success of these BZPP collaborations. They are essential to achieving the program goal of improving infrastructure protection in the areas surrounding CIKR. First of all, the BZPP works under the principles of networked government, an orientation that is more efficient than typical bureaucratic government. Networked government includes public, private, and semi-public organizations. In networked government, the public’s work is paid for by the government even though the work is not performed by people who work for the government. The government accomplishes this by enforcing the process of local law enforcement identifying vulnerable infrastructure during the grant application process, then awarding the funding to a local agency for implementation, which passes funding through to private entities to accomplish the planned improvements or measures.

In the case of the Columbia Center, the grant was awarded to the city of Seattle after it identified a vulnerable site and applied for BZPP funding. Ultimately, the funding passed through to the property management of the building for payment to a private company of their choosing to purchase and install the cameras on public property.

A second factor that contributes to a BZPP’s collaborative success is Inter-organizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC), known as the capability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes. In the Ohio State University example, they had a need to collaborate with the stadium officials and the local transportation and law enforcement agencies to create a safer environment for events. The university took protection measures to mitigate vehicles approaching the stadium which presented a potential explosive or noxious hazard.

The funding requirements in place for utilizing the BZPP grant created the necessary synergy and structural flexibility required for inter-organizational collaboration. Applying agencies submitted their collaboration plans at the time of identification of the vulnerability assessment which was a consideration for funding. This created an incentive and reward system that increased the ICC for the collaboration. The various resource investments made via the BZPP funding benefited each member of the collaboration, including DHS as sponsor, once the improvements to buffer zone security were accomplished.

A third success factor in BZPP collaborations are the leveraged lateral mechanisms. Lateral mechanisms chiefly include the social capital that is gained through existing social capital from community relationships between law enforcement and private entities typically responsible for CIKR. Social capital from lateral mechanisms is typically not borne from memorandums of understanding. Rather, “Collaboration is attained through a personal touch, a handshake and a smile.” DHS is able to be more effective by leveraging the local relationships that already exist. Seattle police likely has a good relationship due to the known vulnerabilities that already exist after the known threats from the original 9/11 plan when it emerged. Thus, the BZPP grant funding is perfectly suited to serve that lateral mechanism.

These critical success factors mattered, because collaboration is prerequisite to the success of protecting CIKR using BZPP funds. Networked government, ICC, and lateral mechanisms are key factors to ensuring grant funds are properly invested. The Government Accountability Office in July 2009, criticized another DHS grant program for failure to assess how regional collaborative efforts built preparedness capabilities. The report questioned the government’s return on investment due to the lack of assessment metrics.

However, in the case of the BZPP, the initial funding approval requires local law enforcement agencies and other first responders to demonstrate ICC through incentives and rewards. It allows local applicant agencies to develop or exercise lateral mechanisms through social capital built previously out of necessity as an outgrowth of their ICC. Each award promotes networked government by function of how the funds are awarded and passed through for private expenditure where appropriate.

Together, these factors have succeeded in demonstrating return on investment for DHS, and Congress continues to appropriate funding for BZPP due to excellent results.

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