Days of Infamy
Many surprise attacks bear striking resemblance to one another. There are few today who are old enough to remember the 9/11 attacks who don’t remember where they were, or what they were doing, when they first heard the news of that calamitous day. The visceral reaction of many was, “Never again!” or “How could this have happened?” Seventy-four years ago, our parents, grandparents or even great-grand parents must have felt those same sentiments, when they first heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But the parallels run deeper than the emotional reactions of those witnesses to history. Parallels in intelligence issues also exist.
Eric Dahl’s book, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, cites a lack of precise tactical intelligence indicating an attack on the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the unwillingness of decision makers to believe in the Japanese ability to attack so far from their homeland. These two facts doomed more than 1,400 American servicemen. Dahl makes similar observations regarding the 9/11 attacks. Despite mountains of strategic intelligence collection over many years, tactical-level warning was unavailable. Similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was also unwillingness on the part of decision makers to believe in the enemy’s capacity to attack America, especially in the unique manner employed. These two facts led to a death toll twice that of the Day of Infamy.
Traditional thinking about the dual calamities of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 puts the blame squarely on decision makers who ignored or misunderstood the signs of danger. But Dahl’s contention is there was a failure to collect data pertinent to tactical-level issues, despite there being a large amount of strategic intelligence. Without the specifics of actionable, tactical intelligence, the intelligence available was too general to be of operational value. Decision makers unwilling to believe in the capabilities of their enemies to strike at America in a meaningful way compounded this problem.
Today, more than ever, tactical level intelligence must be more of a collection priority, especially on the domestic front where terrorism is concerned. Dahl’s theory of preventive action posits that in order for intelligence to be actionable and usable in preventing surprise attacks, it must provide precise, tactical-level warning, and it must be combined with a high level of receptivity on the part of policymakers, who will decide how and whether to use it.
This is no easy task in government. Political dynamics frequently drive priorities of the intelligence community, which can lead to over focusing on strategic intelligence and concentration on failures after things go wrong. In many instances, the path of least resistance for elected officials is to blame the intelligence community for failing after the fact. Instead of focusing on perceived failures, focusing on successful intelligence operations, identifying what made them work well, and improving on those abilities improves our nation’s ability to thwart surprise attacks. This also enables better decision-making for government leaders.
Many parallels exist between Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks. The way people in the United States felt and the action they took after both attacks were very similar. Terrorism is becoming a more prevalent problem today than ever in the United States, so it’s important to stand watch over our interests by maintaining a proper balance between strategic and tactical intelligence. By maintaining this balance, we honor those who were lost in both Days of Infamy, and we recommit ourselves each day to ensuring that we do all we can to prevent future surprise attacks.
Bob Leverone and MikeNCM are contributors to the Homeland Security (HS) Vortex which is a platform where insiders from the policy, law enforcement, fire service and emergency management fields converge to discuss issues related to Homeland Security.
Follow HS Vortex on Twitter and Facebook
Follow MikeNCM on Twitter @StormTrooper378
