Forgive & Forgotten - Part II

An In-Depth Look at the American/Iranian Prisoner Swap

Plugged-In
Homeland Security
5 min readFeb 9, 2016

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On January 16th “plugged-in” reported on the prisoner swap between the U.S. and Iran. Shortly thereafter we began to highlight the criminal histories of those Iranians that were released in exchange for our four Americans. The first article titled “Forgive and Forget” drew attention to the onetime prominent NASA contractor Nader Madanlo.

Madanlo was two years into his eight year prison sentence when he was granted a pardon and released. He, like the others was arrested for conspiring to covertly supply goods and/or services to Iran, contrary to law. As with the first article, this installment will feature a second individual who was charged with similar crimes as Madanlo and was also pardoned for his crimes.

In what President Obama is calling a one-time gesture, the pardon of Arash Ghahrem was part and parcel of the January prisoner swap. Iranian born Ghahrem immigrated to the U.S. in 2007 and resided in Staten Island New York where he was gainfully employed in the maritime industry. Ghahrem started his career in the marine industry in Iran, where he received a degree in marine engineering. It was during this time Ghahrem made acquaintances that he would most likely later come to regret.

After moving to the U.S., Ghahrem worked as a marine engineer for various shipping companies. Later in 2012, Ghahrem decided to make an occupational change and tried his hand at the smuggling business. Ghahrem would come to regret this decision as well. Court records indicate that he was contacted by, Koorush Taherkhani, a fellow university dorm mate from Iran. Taherkhani had created TIG Marine Engineering, a company based in Dubai. Unfortunately, Taherkhani and his company had problems with marine supplies.

Taherkhani, knowing he had a friend in the U.S., reached out to Ghahrem and asked if he would help procure equipment from the U.S. That’s when Ghahrem decided to get into the smuggling business.

At the behest of Taherkhani, Ghahreman obtained requests for quotes for numerous items. According to prosecutors, these items included pump stations, semiconductors, pressure transmitters, boat engines, and valves, but the shopping list didn’t stop there. Of all the parts that Ghahrem was asked to procure by Taherkhani, the riskiest of items were the NAVIGAT 2100 and 50 Y-690 electron tubes. Not only were these items considered sensitive U.S. technology, they were the parts that eventually got Ghahrem and the CEO of TIG Marine Engineering, Ergun Yildiz, thrown into federal lockup.

For those who don’t have a degree in marine engineering, the 50 Y-690 electron tubes were designed for military airborne radar, while the NAVIGAT 2100 are gyrocompasses used for swift boat navigation. To put the use of the NAVIGAT 2100 into perspective, the indictment notes that the use of the NAVIGAT 2100 would be like putting a Mercedes engine in a tricycle. Evidently, when Ghahrem attempted to explain to the U.S. supplier what he intended to do with the NAVIGAT 2100 he underestimated the exact size of the vessel it was designed to be used with. This would be one of many rookie mistakes Ghahrem would make.

Unbeknownst to Ghahrem, his lack of knowledge concerning the aforementioned parts raised red flags with suppliers who would later call federal authorities. At the requests of agents from U.S. Homeland Security Investigations and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, suppliers contacted Ghahrem and informed him that if he was still interested in the NAVIGAT 2100 he could contact their alternate supplier. Ghahrem did just that, but instead of reaching out to an alternate supplier he reached out to undercover agents who were posing as NAVIGAT 2100 suppliers. Ghahrem must have bought it hook, line, and sinker, because he spoke with agents for six months, almost on the daily basis (over 200 emails, 100 phone calls and hundreds of text messages). These conversations ended up being business negotiations where undercover agents appealed to Ghahrem’s sense of greed. Ghahrem and his fellow conspirators from TIG Marine Engineering thought they had found an unscrupulous U.S. supplier who was willing to break the law and supply limitless goods and technology from the U.S. I guess Ghahrem never heard the old adage “if it looks too good to be true then it probably is”.

The undercover operation ultimately culminated in the arrest of Ghahrem and Yildiz. Unfortunately, for agents, Ghahrem’s college mate was unable to attend the party and remains in Iran under U.S. indictment. During judicial proceedings Ghahrem more or less indicated that the whole ordeal was a misunderstanding. Yildiz on the other hand saw the writing on the wall and took a plea and was sentenced to approximately two years. Ghahrem didn’t fare as well; he ended up going to trial and received a little over of six years for his criminal misgivings. During the trial the jury was offered both physical and electronic evidence including the communication between Ghahrem, Yildiz, and Taherkhani. Prosecutors made it obvious that not only were they aware they were committing a crime by transshipping goods to Iran; they were also going to great measures to cover their tracks. With that being said, how likely is it that the Department of Justice, if given the chance to prosecute Taherkhani will actually effect the prosecution seeing as they just released a key witness? By default, should we consider Taherkhani to be the eighth Iranian pardoned? When it was all said and done, it turned out that Ghahrem served about the same amount of time as Yildiz, although Yildiz was the only one of the two that publically accepted responsibility for his actions.

Submitted by members of Team plugged-in.

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