Holiday Travel:
Should You be Worried About an #ActiveShooter at the Airport?
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, critical infrastructure and key resources are the backbone of our nation’s economy, security, and health. One key component of critical infrastructure is the security of our nation’s airports from mass casualty incidents such as an active shooter scenario. With over 450 commercial airports, in addition to the 19,000 airports, heliports, and landing strips, represented by local, state, and federal authorities, protection of these soft targets from a mass casualty incident remains a wicked-complex problem. Particularly challenging, from a security perspective, are the areas within proximity of ticketing areas and curbside drop-offs.
A conglomerate of layered security encloses these facilities, with the outermost perimeter of security comprised of local, state, and airport authority law enforcement agencies. Those entities overlap with the federal core security apparatus, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), whose mandate is to protect the nation’s transportation system to facilitate the free movement of people and commerce.
49 CFR 1542 states that every airport is required to have an airport security plan (ASP). However, while the security of the airport is reliant on the TSA, as well as local and state law enforcement, coordination is spotty between these entities when it pertains to addressing a mass casualty incident with multiple jurisdictional boundaries and impacts. Additionally, coordination levels vary greatly from airport to airport and are dependent on local political dynamics and existing relationships. Passenger and cargo throughput are widely accepted as performance metrics in the transportation sector. This is important to recognize as should a multi-location mass casualty incident occur, the airports would likely close immediately and for an undetermined amount of time.
A worst-case scenario for the transportation sector would be multiple, coinciding mass casualty incidents at several airports perpetrated by a terrorist organization. As observed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, such an event would assuredly shutdown the airports, effectively ceasing the flow of commerce throughout this segment of the transportation sector infrastructure.
Examining the issue from a grassroots level, airports throughout the United States adhere to TSA-regulated ASPs. Adherence to these ASPs requires a certain level of law enforcement staffing and required response times at security checkpoints. In response to these requirements, local authorities have inundated TSA’s Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program with requests for funding since the early 2000’s. In an effort to strengthen the overall security infrastructure, TSA has provided funding upon which local airports have become increasingly dependent for staffing. As a result, over the past several years, funding streams provided by TSA have decreased significantly across the airport law enforcement domain. With more takers, there is less funding per capita to go around despite the TSA requirements listed within the ASPs.
The Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) shooter is an example of a normal accident that might have been avoided with a more robust security posture integrating intergovernmental and private sector stakeholder coordination. During the day of the shooting, according to the LAX Airport Police Department, there were only two police officers assigned to Terminal 3 where the shooting took place. The response to the shooting facilitated a normal correction in the security system in the form of increased training, tabletop exercises, and other collaborative events throughout the country. However, as time passes and supplemental federal funding decreases, the system will reach a tipping point where it cannot absorb a major incident, such as multiple coordinated terrorist attacks on major airports. This failure, combined with a high-degree of inter-dependency among major hub airports, could spell a major economic and security failure, not to mention undermine public confidence in the airline industry.
Overall, the potential for a coordinated, multiple active shooter incident in an airport is assessed to be minimal. According to the New York Police Department, in 98% of active shooter cases, the shooter acts alone. The soft nature of targets, and high return in consequence, represents an extreme value theory target for terrorist groups. Extreme value theory (EVT) is a study of extreme statistical deviations from the median of probability distributions. Airport mass casualty incidents are representative of EVT. From this perspective, as much effort as possible should be placed toward target hardening, without inhibiting commerce or needlessly infringing on the privacy of air travelers.
Coordination between federal, state and local airport stakeholders is critical to hardening the soft areas of airports, as well as for the recovery from a mass casualty incident, regardless of cause. In addition to intergovernmental coordination, it is imperative to incorporate private sector stakeholders into planning and response measures. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, in approximately 75% of active shooter cases, the shooter is acquainted with at least one of the victims. Including private sector partners in the security enterprise is a force multiplier that can assist in mitigating the risk associated with these types of incidents. Mitigation recommendations may include:
1. Provide additional financial resources to local stakeholders for mass casualty incident response;
2. Depart from the traditional airport security plan, a one-size-fits-all approach, in favor of scalable guidelines that can be adopted by local authorities for security measures, leaving maximum flexibility for local governments to address these types of issues;
3. Improve local intelligence and awareness by training for, and advocating, a community policing approach within airports and at the outer edges of layered security;
4. Leverage technology such as improved closed-circuit television and data storage capabilities, facial recognition, and recurrent watch listing vetting systems for local airport authorities to clear low-risk employees;
5. Leverage overt and covert TSA law enforcement personnel resources toward checkpoints and throughout the airport security system that can respond to emergencies and law enforcement matters in coordination with local law enforcement departments;
6. Freeing up local law enforcement officers from security checkpoint posts to patrol their own high-risk areas within airports;
7. Adopt a Victim Initiated Response and Automated Lockdown System (VIRAL) where egress can occur, without allowing uncleared individuals to access critical areas of the airport, such as concourses.
Mass casualty incidents will continue to be an issue for every nation, including our own. In the airport environment, collaboration from all airport stakeholders, including private sector partners, is imperative to allow for a speedy response, resolution and recovery from these types of incidents. Revisions to ASPs; conducting full-scale airport exercises; improved joint training; and leveraging technology to enhance security should be among the key areas of focus and future investment.
MikeNCM is a contributor to the Homeland Security (HS) Vortex which is a platform where insiders from the policy, law enforcement, fire service and emergency management fields converge to discuss issues related to Homeland Security.
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