Left of Boom: The Fire/EMS Role in Terrorism Prevention

Terrorism Pre-incident Indicators & Fire / EMS Responders

Shortly after 6 p.m., on a warm spring evening in the nation’s largest city, the fire alarm sounded in the downtown Manhattan quarters of Engine 54 and Ladder 4. The dispatcher alerted the FDNY’s “Times Square” companies of a potential car fire. Situated in a busy corridor of the city, the experienced members of these fire companies were no strangers to fires, car accidents, emergency medical calls and rescue work throughout the bustling lower Manhattan area, responding to thousands of ‘routine’ emergencies every year.[i] As they would soon learn, however, this night in May of 2010 would soon develop from a simple car fire response into something much more complex.

What the firefighters that evening did not know — what they could not know — as they left their quarters, was that Faisal Shahzad, an immigrant from Pakistan living in Connecticut, had rigged his 1993 Nissan Pathfinder to serve as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). He parked the SUV on a street near the Times Square theater district, an area that attracts thousands of pedestrians and travelers, especially on a warm Saturday night. After parking the vehicle, he lit the mobile bomb, and ran from the scene. The device ignited, but failed to explode.[ii]

The firefighter noted that the light, white, wispy smoke and sparks visible through the slightly tinted windows were inconsistent with the presentation of typical vehicle fires.[iii] Coupling their experience and training, the alert members correctly assumed that this incident had indicators of an act of terrorism. The FDNY staged units close enough to maintain a safety perimeter, and waited for the arrival of the NYPD Bomb Squad Unit.

After rendering the vehicle safe, an inspection and investigation determined that the pathfinder was loaded with three 20-gallon propane tanks; a metal container with M-88 fireworks; 250 pounds of urea-based fertilizer, more M-88s in a metal locker; two gasoline cans with additional M-88s; and two alarm clocks.[iv] NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly noted that the bomb “would have caused casualties, a significant fireball.”[v] Additionally, experts state that the bomb would have likely sprayed shrapnel throughout the crowded area, and killed or wounded many people.[vi]

On October 5, 2010, Shahzad was sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty to a 10-count indictment in June, including charges of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting an act of terrorism.[vii]

AT A CROSSROADS

Over the last quarter-century, contemporary demands in public safety have required America’s firefighters to assume new duties necessitating novel training and innovative response procedures.[viii] These new duties have exposed frontline first responders to additional dangers not associated with fire suppression duties.[ix]

The Fire Service is again at a crossroads. Specific events, including the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, have forced the Fire Service to critically examine and define its role within the encompassing landscape that is homeland security.[x] Terrorism, both domestic and international, has never been, nor should it ever be, the primary focus of a Fire and Rescue agency. However, as modern media popularizes the actions and motivations behind legitimate and copycat terrorism, the opportunity for additional attacks increases. Current projections, in line with historical patterns, show that terrorism will increase at a rate of roughly 15 percent per year, worldwide.[xi] As expected, this will most likely include an increase in attacks on symbolic targets, key assets, and critical infrastructure.[xii]

THE CASE FOR PRE-INCIDENT INDICATOR TRAINING (PIIs)

Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum. The events in Times Square, September 11th, 2001, the 1995 Sarin attack of the Tokyo subway system, or the Oklahoma City Federal Building did not suddenly materialize in an instant, causing untold damages. Small and large-scale plans, while capable of being carried out by relatively small factions, require planning. Planning to perform terrorist acts requires several measures similar to the deterrence of such acts. These actions include intelligence and information gathering, reconnaissance, logistics, and appropriation of materials. Fire and EMS responders can observe many of these preparatory activities if they are alert to potential clues or warning signs.

These preparatory events are called Pre-Incident Indicators (PIIs), and they occur in the space “left of boom”, meaning prior to the moment of detonation. While it is normal to think that Fire and EMS services typically operate “right of boom” in the aftermath of an attack, PIIs (when observed and reported) can be a proactive measure, working to reveal developing threats.

Developed for the U.S. Department of Justice by a study conducted at the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College at the University of Arkansas, these indicators can be utilized in determining or indicating the potential for terrorist activity in the area.[xiii] Recognition of common PIIs may be coincidences or may be the pieces of a larger plot. Prior to a terrorist attack, PIIs, if recognized as such, can be reported and acted upon to disrupt, deflect, deter or stop a terrorist incident. They can reveal the presence of members of a terrorist group, identify a recognizable pattern of terrorist group activity, or in the stages immanent to an event, can be acted upon to limit the impact of terrorist actions.

Broken into three groups large groups, PIIs include:

I. Group Related Indicators — Including ongoing campaigns of a certain nature, protests against the treatment of a group member (i.e., events following capture, trial, or death of a group member), names, dates, and corresponding commemorative actions, and visible group preparations for activity.

II. Target Related Indicators — Including specific collection or threats against a target, actions by the target that places it in the target spectrum and, prior activity directed against the target.

III. Incident Related Indicators — Including tips from outside sources, prior surveillance of the target/victim on threat list, equipment or uniforms stolen, etc.

Specific examples from the above three categories include:

· Suspicious persons or vehicles being observed in the same location on multiple occasions, or personnel observed near a potential target using or carrying video, still camera, or other observation equipment.

· Suspicious persons showing an interest in, or photographing security systems and positions, the width of the streets and the direction they run leading to the facility, available transportation to the facility, the area, physical layout, and setting of the facility, or the location of security personnel centers (police stations, etc.) and nearby government agencies.

· Persons exhibiting behavior that appears to denote planning for terrorist activity, such as mapping out routes, playing out scenarios, monitoring key facilities, and timing traffic flow or signals, stockpile suspicious materials or abandoning potential containers for explosives such as vehicles or suitcases, or possessing large amounts of cash for no apparent reason.

Findings from data collected from the American Terrorism Study (maintained by the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center) support the importance of Pre-Incident Indicator training and recognition. The study revealed that unlike traditional trends observed within most crime statistics, terrorists are significantly more cautious, engage in substantial planning activities, and commit ancillary and preparatory surveillance in advance of a terrorist incident.[xiv]

A spatial analysis of data gathered by the Terrorism Research Center was supported further by revealing that terrorists typically live relatively close to the incident target. Nearly one-half of the terrorists resided within 30 miles of the target location.[xv] Similarly, approximately one-half of the terrorists engaged in their planning and preparatory activities within this distance of their residences.[xvi]

The implications of these findings for local first responder agencies are extremely important. While terrorists may think globally, they act locally. Preventative efforts should focus upon local events and persons as the primary source of information about terrorist activities.[xvii]

PIIs are among the most tangible of all terrorist efforts and are therefore more visible throughout the course of normal firefighting operations. The seemingly minor information extracted from PIIs can amount to critical intelligence when firefighters, medics and front line supervisory officers have access to an analytical information database to report their findings.

Public Perception

There are some that argue that if Fire & EMS efforts in the area of information collection are increased — even if said collection occurred during normal operating circumstances — there is potential for negative repercussion against the fire service. In a recent interview, speaking about communities with already strained law enforcement connections, Mike German, a former FBI agent who now serves as the national security policy counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), said, “Do we want them to fear the fire department as well as the police?”[xviii]

Unfortunately, this recent need for progression in preincident awareness training is unavoidable. As firefighters continue to respond to unknown incidents, and are subsequently becoming targets of malicious incidents, they must accept an active role in safeguarding themselves and the public.[xix], [xx], [xxi], [xxii], [xxiii] “It’s the evolution of the fire service,” said Bob Khan, the former Fire Chief of Phoenix, which has created an information-sharing arrangement between the fire service and law enforcement through terrorism liaison officers.[xxiv] “With firefighters on the front lines, the fire service needs to know about the information and intelligence that could somehow affect what they do,” said Gregory Cade, who (as former head of the U.S. Fire Administration) served as the nation’s top fire chief.[xxv]

As the actions represent a necessary shift away from the traditional fire department model, a considerable amount of forethought and weight must be present in designing the operating guidelines for departments to assume this new task. Clear, defined roles, action flow charts, limitations and responsibilities must all be outlined and ahered to. Also, this addition to operational parameters and any subsequent training must be recognized and received by senior fire commissioners as an obligatory measure in today’s world.

Finally, a strong public information campaign would be helpful in limiting any potential criticism of the new agenda. By emphasizing the positive measures involved, the commitment to the public and the desire to better protect civilians, responders, and their property, a solid messaging and branding campaign can be established.

Conclusion

It is an inescapable reality that the Fire Service must definitively establish itself as a partner in efforts related to homeland security. As large-impact incidents such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters have demonstrated, the conventional model of public safety organizations serving as single-issue entities is obsolete. Responders from all disciplines are partaking in actions that would once be considered beyond their traditional roles. Police officers are training in HAZMAT capacities, firefighters are assisting public health officials with mass medical care, and paramedics armed with side arms are serving warrants with tactical teams. [xxvi], [xxvii], [xxviii] All agencies charged with service and protection to the public must work diligently, across organizational lines in order to ensure the highest level of safety and security.

By renovating existing operational methods, like situational awareness, to encompass homeland security training and resources, Fire and Rescue organizations will have enhanced capabilities in the event of an incident. Through contemporary functions, such as PII recognition training for all Rescue organizations can provide law enforcement with passive information and possibility assist in preventing an attack prior to its occurrence.

While no strategy for preventing a terrorist attack is infallible, the Fire Service is capable of augmenting resources in this arena through relatively minor changes, thus improving the probability of a positive outcome.

Greggory J. Favre, MS is a Captain with the St. Louis Fire Department and an executive member of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. Assigned to the Fire Chief’s Command Staff, he responsible for homeland security, special operations, and strategic planning initiatives across multiple bureaus. You can follow him on Twitter: @Gregg Favre

He is part of The White Hat Syndicate, a Medium account launched on October 26 that publishes thought-provoking articles about cutting-edge homeland security topics. The six authors come from a diverse array of professional and personal backgrounds: legal, fire, environmental health, federal transportation security, and law enforcement.

The Syndicate invites you to engage us in conversation, either here on Medium or via Twitter. We look forward to the discussion.

Opinions expressed in this essay are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy of his employer, professional associations, the United States Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

[i] Fire Department, City of New York — Annual Report. p. 24 Fire Department of New York — Annual Report 2008–2009. Annual, New York: City of New York, 2009.

[ii] Kazan, John. “Terror Awareness Pays Off At Times Square Bomb Incidnet.” Fire Engineering Magazine, January 1, 2011.

[iii] Kazan, John. “Terror Awareness Pays Off At Times Square Bomb Incidnet.” Fire Engineering Magazine, January 1, 2011.

[iv] Pelofsky, Jeremy, and James Vicini. “From parking a car bomb to catching a plane.” Thomson Reuters, US Edition, May 4, 2010.

[v] Winter, Jana. Anatomy of a Bomb: An Inexpensive and Deadly Mishmash of Ingredients. May 6, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/05/03/anatomy-bomb/ (accessed September 22, 2014).

[vi] Markon, Jerry, and Spencer S Hsu. U.S. citizen from Pakistan arrested in Times Square bomb case. May 4, 2010. Washington Post.

[vii] Bray, Chad. “Times Square Bomber Gets Life Sentence.” The Wall Street Journal, Ocotber 5, 2010.

[viii] Norman, John. Fire Department Special Operations. Tulsa, Oklahoma: PenWell Corporation, 2009.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Christen, Hank, and Paul Maniscalco. Homeland Security: Principles & Practice of Terrorism Response. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2011.

[xi] United States Department of Justice. Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts. Training Guide, Washington D.C.: Department of Justice, 2005.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Smith, Damphouse and Roberts, Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct, 2006

[xiv] Smith, Brent. “Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Activities.” National Institute of Justice (Department of Justice), no. No 260 (July 2008).

[xv] Ibid

[xvi] Ibid

[xvii] Blatus, Richard. Altering the Mission Statement . MA Thesis, Center For Homeland Defense and Security , The United States Naval Postgradaute School , Monterey: The United States Naval Postgradaute School , 2008.

[xviii] Sillivan, Eileen. “Ethical Questions Arise as Firefighters& EMTs Join Counterterrorist Ranks.” Journal of Emergency Medical Services (PennWell Corporation), November 2007.

[xix] Gannett News Service. Police Continue Investigation Of Ambushed Firefighters. December 24, 2012. http://www.wfmynews2.com/news/article/260486/57/Webster-Shooting-Victims-Mourned

[xx] Kilgore News Herald. Man who attacked Texas firefighters with rifle indicted. October

27, 2014. http://www.firerescue1.com/fire-attack/articles/2010126-Man-who-attacked-Texas-firefighters-with-rifle-indicted/ (accessed October 27, 2014).

[xxi] Associated Press. Firefighter Shot to Death While Responding to Fire Near St. Louis. July 21, 2008. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/07/21/firefighter-shot-to-death-while-responding-to-fire-near-st-louis/

[xxii] NBC News Affliate — KSDK. The latest on the murder of Firefighter Leonard Riggins, St. Louis Fire Department. November 6, 2008. http://www.statter911.com/2008/11/06/the-latest-on-the-murder-of-firefighter-leonard-riggins-st-louis-fire-department/.

[xxiii] Wong, Lonnie. Sacramento Firefighters Physically Attacked. May 21, 2013. http://fox40.com/2013/05/21/sacramento-firefighters-physically-attacked/.

[xxiv] Sullivan, John. Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counterterrorism Intelligence. Conference Report, CASIS 20th Anniversary International Conference, Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, Montreal, Quebec, Canada: CASIS, 2005, 11.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Laska, Paul. “Enter the hot zone.” Lew Enfrocement Technology, April 11, 2012.

[xxvii] El Dorado Hills Fire Department. Blood Pressure Check. n.d. http://www.edhfire.com/public-services/blood-pressure (accessed 16 2014, October).

[xxviii] Schereiber, Sara. “Medics With Guns.” Law Enforcement Technology, October 2009.