Nuclear Policies and Posturing:
Current Trends and Implications for the Reignited Cold War
At the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia initiated an umbrella program collectively known as “cooperative threat reduction” that sought to use American funds and expertise to help Moscow destroy long-range missiles and secure nuclear material in Russia as well as several former Soviet states. Over the past 13 years, that cooperation has expanded in both size and scope. However, the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine threatens to erode much of the progress made as talk of a return to Cold War style politics heats up. Even as the global community is recognizing nuclear terrorism as a significant and growing international threat, the efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia have stalled.
Historically, Russia has proven difficult when it comes to providing access to facilities and information regarding their nuclear facilities to inspectors leaving large holes in the U.S. ability to improve security for the nuclear materials at those facilities. The latest developments in the Crimea and Ukraine will only serve to complicate further efforts to secure and reduce nuclear materials.
Yet, in spite of the challenges, the Department of Energy recently completed the secret removal of enough highly enriched uranium from Ukraine to make nine nuclear bombs. Some of the nuclear material came from parts of the country now wracked by violence and lawlessness. The six shipments, which took years of behind-the-scenes coordination, were executed with help from Russia, who also agreed to safely dispose of the material.
Overall, the United States has overseen the removal of nuclear material from 27 countries over the past two decades. Since 2009 alone, it has undertaken removal of a total of 5,060 kilograms of highly enriched uranium in a dozen countries, enough to produce more than 200 atomic bombs.
There are four primary nuclear agreements and treaty’s designed to control, secure and eliminate nuclear materials that are impacted by the recent Russian aggression; the Nunn-Lugar Act that funded Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement, and the New START Treaty.
For over twenty years, the United States has appropriated via the Nunn-Lugar Act over $13 billion in nuclear threat reduction and non-proliferation programs through DOD, DOE and State Department threat reduction and non-proliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. This agreement expired in June of last year and the Russian government has shown no interest in renewing the agreement. This is in spite of the $1 billion in annual funds provided to enhance the security measures of facilities storing nuclear materials and to reduce unneeded stockpiles of these materials. Even though the agreement was not renewed, the Obama Administration has continued to fund the program although at lower rates. So far, security enhancements on 1,500 buildings are underway comprising only 18 percent of the 85,000 buildings identified as needing major improvements.
In addition to the Nunn-Lugar funding, the U.S has also provided billions in funding over the past 14 years to assist Russia in the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium under the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PDMA). Weapon grade plutonium disposition is more complicated than uranium from a technical point of view and demands substantial financial expenses to accomplish. Russia announced a change in their nuclear energy strategy in 2007, change its preferred disposition strategy by burning up the plutonium in fast neutron reactors. The PMDA protocol was revised and signed on April 13, 2010 by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
The significant challenge to this change involves the peculiarities surrounding weapon grade plutonium disposition in fast neutron reactors. Foremost is the possibility of actually producing more plutonium than it consumes and whose quality may even surpass that of the weapons plutonium. The dramatic changes in Russian behavior and resulting strained relationships will no doubt affect the critical elements of monitoring and on-site inspections to ensure compliance the plutonium reduction agreement. Thorough this agreement, the U.S. not only funded a sophisticated Russian nuclear energy program but also enabled the production of high weapons-grade plutonium.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate through verifiable means all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The treaty was signed into force in December 1987 and had an unlimited duration. The treaty was distinguished by an unprecedented, intrusive inspection regime, however, it was determined that Russia violated its obligations under the treaty by testing a new version of a ground-launched cruise missile in 2011. The Obama administration protested the violation by letter in July of 2014. The assurance that the Russian’s will not continue to violate this treaty is currently in question and raises serious doubts about their intentions to adhere to any established covenants.
The final treaty to consider is the New START treaty. The United States and Russia entered into New START treaty on February 5, 2011 limiting each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers). This treaty also has a verification regime to include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. However, given the strain on relations and likely negative effect on the verification regime there may be no reliable means of enforcement going forward. Additionally, the Russian’s nuclear arsenal contains enough plutonium to produce about 12,500 warheads, more than ten times the treaty limits.
The Russian government has repeatedly stated that modernizing strategic nuclear forces is its priority, and within the next decade experts assess all Soviet-era ICBMs and SLBMs will be fully retired and replaced with modern weapons and systems. In addition to their strategic nuclear forces, Russia is also replacing their tactical missile forces in surface-to-surface missile systems as well as their fighter aircraft delivery systems.
Although obtaining information on Russian nuclear spending is scarce and contradictory, analysts are reporting the spending of tens of billions of dollars on strategic weapons over the next 5 years. In contrast, to the Russian modernization approach, the U.S. is spending billions of dollars in life extension programs for their strategic nuclear force. Although the U.S modernization program will add some additional capability, the aging weapons will be programmed for operational capability through 2040.
Under President Putin, Russia’s latest nuclear doctrine declares they will use nuclear weapons “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation” and would also consider using them even if Russia proper was not directly attacked. In addition, the doctrine declares a right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of any kind of weapon of mass destruction.
Current administration cabinet officials have endorsed the phased elimination of nuclear weapons and President Obama has directed the DOD to develop new non-nuclear strike options to reduce the role of nuclear munitions. Given the instability our current threat environment and the recent aggression of our key nuclear adversaries, now is a good time to revisit our nuclear deterrence strategy and long term nuclear program objectives. The thought of a nuclear strike occurring anywhere on the globe is horrific. The thought of having no ability to counter a nuclear strike on the homeland is unconscionable. Once deterrence is lost, we will never be able to recover it.
