Nuclear Terrorism:
A Realistic Threat
or DHS Hype?
Part 2 of 2
Part 1 of “Nuclear Terrorism: A Realistic Threat or DHS Hype” discussed the types of nuclear and radiological material that pose a threat as well as the opportunity for nefarious groups and actors to acquire the material. Part 2 considers the actors and nation-states implicated in nuclear terror activities and the risk of such an attack occurring in the United States.
Who are the threats?
There are two primary categories of actors involved in the creation of a radiological or nuclear device used to create terror, harm or destruction in the U.S. The first category considered here encompasses all of the countries and businesses who possess the materials for legitimate civilian purposes as well as the countries who are in control of nuclear weapons. Essentially, these countries serve as the major suppliers of the nuclear terror system. Civil and military entities in more than 40 countries are assessed to possess highly enriched uranium (HEU), one of the most sought after nuclear materials. In addition, there are approximately 140 civilian research reactors across the globe that produce enriched uranium. Some countries have converted these research reactors from a weapons grade HEU to a low enriched uranium (LEU) significantly reducing the risk of the material. This has occured in places like the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. However, over 120 research and isotope production reactors around the world still use HEU and many of these have very modest security measures. LEU is primarily used for medical and energy applications and although it is much less dangerous than HEU, it is still capable of causing dangerous air and water contamination. As a result, terrorist groups consider these reactors as a sought after target.
In addition to nuclear material, nearly two-dozen countries have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons over the last 50 years. Currently, there are nine countries assessed to have over 16,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled and some countries that have engaged in illicit trade to acquire advanced nuclear technology. Further, of the nine possessing nuclear weapons, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are expected to conduct illicit trade within the next decade to either maintain or improve their nuclear arsenals.
Pakistan has significantly improved their nuclear security efforts in recent years but despite these improvements, it remains the locus of the world’s most deadly terrorist capabilities and fastest-growing nuclear stockpile, posing significant ongoing dangers. One of the biggest concerns in Pakistan is the critical challenge of an insider threat. The fear of nuclear weapons and materials escaping the protective custody of Pakistan’s army is real. Key military installations have experienced repeated attacks and the ease of militants reaching heavily-secured facilities suggesting a possible collusion between the state officials and militants. For example, in 2012, Islamic militants attacked a major Pakistani Air Force Base where some 100 warheads are said to be stored. Events like these have caused international concern that militants could steal Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or fissile material. A complete American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan will allow Al Qaeda and its affiliates to create trouble in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The uncertainty in the region surrounding Afghanistan and the continued tension with a rival nuclear power make this region ripe for illicit activity.
Russia is another country that, with considerable U.S. financial and technical assistance, has dramatically improved nuclear security and accounting in the last two decades. But, with the world’s largest nuclear stockpiles in the world’s largest array of buildings and bunkers, there remains significant security weaknesses and especially vulnerability to insider theft. In addition, the crisis in Ukraine will add to the vulnerability of the nuclear materials.
India, like Pakistan, is rapidly expanding its nuclear stockpiles and also faces significant terrorist threats within the region. Very little is known about India’s nuclear security program and cooperates very little with the U.S. or other nuclear powers.
Even the U.S. has shown weakness in its security culture as evidenced by the intrusion of the 82 year-old nun and two other protesters at the Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, TN. The intruders crossed multiple fences and were able to reach a building housing enough HEU material to produce thousands of nuclear weapons before they were apprehended.
Many countries have significant nuclear security weaknesses to include: no on-site armed guards; no background checks prior to gaining access to nuclear facilities and materials; and limited protections against insider theft. To counter these weaknesses, President Obama launched a series of nuclear security summits to find ways to secure nuclear weapons, nuclear fuel, and radioactive wastes so that they do not fall in the hands of terrorists. Of the 53 nations taking part in the third summit, the nuclear powers of Russia, China, India and Pakistan did not pledge to turn international guidelines into national laws further demonstrating a weak international security framework.
The second category of actors involved in the creation of a radiological or nuclear device used to create terror, harm or destruction in the U.S., are radical groups including terror cells and trafficking organizations. More than 90 percent of the work in building a nuclear weapon is making the nuclear weapons grade materials. Once you have the nuclear material, making the actual bomb is not as difficult. Radical groups are assessed to have the money, training and technical knowledge to build a nuclear device.
At least four terrorist groups have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. Al-Qaeda is perhaps the most prominent terror group to actively pursue nuclear material. The Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has explicitly expressed the desire to acquire nuclear material and has attempted to buy nuclear material from the former Soviet Union and Europe. Furthermore, Al Qaeda has repeatedly attempted to buy stolen nuclear bomb material and to recruit nuclear expertise. Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and the substantial disruptions the core al Qaeda organization has suffered, nearly all of the people involved in al Qaeda’s nuclear effort remain at large.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP’s) is another terror group with capability, opportunity and potential intent to acquire nuclear materials. They have conducted numerous attacks on critical Pakistani civilian and military installations with some potentially storing nuclear weapons. Therefore, it cannot be ignored that the TTP might be emboldened through their success to target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons installations. The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo has also actively sought nuclear weapons, and there is some evidence that North Caucasus terrorist groups have as well. Finally, in early July 2014, the International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed that militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized a large quantity of uranium compounds during their conquest of territory in Iraq. Although the material is thought to be low grade, it could still be successfully used as a weapon of terror.
The trafficking of nuclear materials is also a considerable threat and a significant concern. Organized transnational criminal groups have been engaged in smuggling fissile materials across international borders since the 1990’s. This activity was facilitated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union making nuclear weapons and fissile material readily available due to the stockpiles being dispersed to new countries that faced serious politico-military upheavals.
For the past two decades fissile material has been a hot commodity in the international criminal underworld. According to the latest estimates, a kilogram of plutonium can sell for more than $500,000 on the nuclear black market. Our porous borders and the ability of cartels to move vast amounts of drugs across our international borders causes additional concern. The IAEA also notes that most cases of illicit nuclear trafficking have involved gram-level quantities, which can be challenging to detect with most inspection methods.
This trafficking challenge opens even non-nuclear states to the challenge of implementing nuclear security policies and capabilities. Non-nuclear weapons states, for example, in Africa that are grappling with domestic problems like political unrest and economic bankruptcy are susceptible to nefarious nuclear activities taking place without their knowledge.
What is the biggest risk?
There are three possible types of nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks. The most destructive attack is one using nuclear weapons that could be detonated from a stolen state-owned nuclear weapon, or one from a crude nuclear bomb from stolen separated plutonium or HEU. Although difficult to accomplish, the devastation could be absolutely horrifying, with political and economic aftershocks reverberating around the world. The second type is nuclear sabotage. Terrorists could infiltrate a nuclear reactor or a spent fuel pool or high-level waste store and potentially cause a Fukushima-like meltdown. The final type is a dirty bomb. The simplest of the three to pull off, this method involves obtaining radiological or nuclear materials and using a conventional bomb to disperse them over a broad area. All three types of attacks surprisingly require minimal nuclear expertise to accomplish.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the greatest danger to nuclear security comes from terrorists acquiring sufficient quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to construct a crude nuclear explosive device. Even at the lowest level of sophistication, terror groups using similar designs and technologies as those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have a yield of one or a few kilotons. A weapon that does not achieve a full chain reaction, often referred as a fizzle yield, would still attain the destructive power of the weapon dropped on Hiroshima.
While a nuclear yield weapon may be most desirous from a terrorist’s perspective, a dirty bomb could be the more likely threat due to fact that the radioactive material is easier to obtain and the device easier to make. In addition, the advancement of modern high explosives makes an explosive radiological dispersal device or eRDD something of a hybrid since it combines radiological material and high explosives in a single device.
The intent of an eRDD detonation is to leverage the disruptive effect of social reaction to the dispersion of radioactive material an area. Indeed, a well-placed dirty bomb would result in massive economic disruption and be highly consequential. Contamination in the detonation’s aftermath could prevent the use of critical transportation nodes or critical infrastructure for an extended period of time. The attack would spread fear, force the evacuation of many blocks of a major city, and inflict billions of dollars in costs of cleanup and economic disruption.
The psychological effects of an eRDD may be the most significant and impactful. Psychosomatic symptoms due to the fear of radioactive material effects may become widespread and overload medical facilities across the region. While it is unlikely that an eRDD detonation would expose a significant number of persons to critical radiation doses, misinterpretation of the explosion as a nuclear detonation may induce fear similar to that produced from a true nuclear detonation. This phenomenon is best illustrated in the accidental release of cesium-137 in Brazil in 1987. Once the accident was made public over 140,000 residents sought medical attention and the government spent nearly $20 Million on cleanup efforts. In reality, only 249 individuals were actually exposed and only 49 were serious enough to require hospitalization.
With the many radiological and nuclear materials known missing, numerous storage facilities lacking the necessary security, the known and expressed desire of terrorist groups to carry out a nuclear terror attack, and the readily available technologies and information on how to detonate a nuclear or dirty bomb, the biggest question that remains is why haven’t terrorist groups launched a nuclear attack? It is a difficult question to answer. Perhaps the terrorist groups have not successfully acquired sufficient amounts of material to make a weapon. Or perhaps the terrorists were waiting for the strategic opportunity to carry out such a catastrophic attack. With the self-proclaimed establishment of the Islamic State, could now be the time they were waiting for?
