Nuclear Terrorism:

A Realistic Threat

or DHS Hype?

Part 1 of 2

In order to overcome an overwhelming military and public safety advantage, terrorists seek to find an asymmetric advantage in striking their enemies and our homeland. Nuclear and radiological weapons offer terrorists an opportunity to inflict great damage to infrastructure, harm large segments of the population and cause widespread disruption with minimal effort. While the three main elements of nuclear terrorism are motivation, capability, and opportunity, the only element that the global community has any control over is opportunity. Therefore, keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of nefarious individuals and groups will go a long way in preventing the possibility of a nuclear terror attack.

Nuclear materials are most often associated with fissile materials that are capable of sustaining a chain reaction through a fission process that releases large amounts of energy. These materials include the isotopes of uranium, thorium, and plutonium with uranium and plutonium being the most common.

Uranium is found naturally all across the globe and is about as common as tin or zinc. In its natural form uranium contains only about 0.7 percent of the key isotope used for nuclear weapons and power, uranium-235 (U-235). However, uranium can be transformed through an enrichment process to become usable for nuclear energy or nuclear weapons. Low enriched uranium (LEU) is used in nuclear power plants and ranges from 3–5% U-235. High enriched uranium (HEU) contains 20% or more of the U-235 isotope and a 90% enrichment is considered weapons grade. Once a 20% level of enrichment is reached it is relatively easy to increase the enrichment level to weapons grade.

Unlike uranium, plutonium is not an element found in nature except in minuscule amounts but a by-product of nuclear reactor operations. To get the quantity of plutonium needed to fuel a reactor or build a bomb, spent fuel is chemically treated to separate out the plutonium, a process called reprocessing.

In addition to nuclear materials there are also radioactive materials readily found in a variety of industrial and medical applications. There are four radioactive materials, called radionuclides, that could also be used by terrorists with significant effect; cesium-137, americium-241, cobalt-60, and iridium-192. Cesium-137 and americium-241 are normally supplied in powder form, which is the most effective form for purposes of widespread dispersal. Cobalt-60 is an ideal radionuclide because of its relatively short half-life and its resulting high radioactivity.

When explosives are combined with any of these radionuclides and detonated, the result is a combination of radioactive and non-radioactive shrapnel, and a radioactive plume. The plume is an aerosol of fine particles of radioactive material. The size of the plume will influence how far the particles are carried by the wind and how easily people inhale them. As the radioactive particles settle to the ground they may also be carried away on people’s clothes, and spread by vehicles that pass through a contaminated area.

The use of the radionuclides in a homemade bomb is commonly called a dirty bomb or an explosive radiological dispersal device (eRDD). This type of weapon is generally considered a coercive weapon rather than a military fission weapon. Although the dirty bomb is capable of causing significant damage, injury and deaths in close proximity to the device, few people are likely to die from the radiation. However, the use of radioactive or nuclear material would cause widespread fear, force the evacuation of many blocks surrounding the site, and inflict billions of dollars in costs of cleanup and economic disruption. Additionally, a dirty bomb attack is a relatively easy type of attack for terrorists to carry out.

If obtaining the materials to build a radiological or nuclear device is the critical element of terrorists conducting such an attack, how hard would it be to gain access to these materials? There are several possibilities of acquiring these materials; theft, black market sales, nation-state alliance, or even the assumption of ownership and control as the current acquisition of vast amounts of territory by the Islamic State has demonstrated.

The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently stated there are “over a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material reported to the IAEA every year.” In fact, the presence of nuclear and radiological materials, the supply side of nuclear terrorism, is in virtually every country. Of the many countries with substantial stockpiles of radiological and nuclear materials, the Terrorism Risk Index identifies eighteen countries at “Extreme Risk” of terrorism with another eleven said to be at “High Risk”. Other states identified as an elevated risk of terrorism also posted significant numbers radiological and nuclear materials.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union much of the effort to control the proliferation of nuclear materials has focused on Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This focus is rightly placed since Russia has almost as many HEU-fueled research, training, or isotope production reactors as the rest of the world combined. However, over that period of time hundreds of confirmed cases of successful theft of nuclear materials were reported. In 1997, Russia revealed that 84 out of 132 special KGB “suitcase nuclear weapons” were unaccounted for. In 2002 the CIA obtained reliable information of senior al Qaeda leadership in Saudi Arabia negotiating for the purchase of three Russian tactical nuclear devices but it remains unclear if those negotiations were successful.

The first confirmed nuclear trafficking case in the former Soviet Union took place in 1992 and involved the diversion of approximately 15 kilograms of HEU. Over the next two years more than 10 additional high-profile cases of trafficking incidents involving HEU or plutonium took place. The materials from these incidents were capable of killing thousands of people through the poisoning all the water supply plants in Munich or the detonation of a dirty bomb that would disperse radioactive particles in the densely populated city.

More recently, 160 incidents involving the illegal trade and movement of nuclear or other radioactive material across national borders were recorded in 2012. Of those, 17 involved possession and related criminal activities, 24 involved theft or loss and 119 involved other unauthorized activities. Two incidents involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) in unauthorized activities and three others involved dangerous category of radioactive sources, two of which were thefts.

In 2013, 5 incidents were reported involving high dose rate radioactive sources, 4 of which were theft. An additional 1461 other incidents were reported, 6 involving possession and related criminal activities; 47 involving theft or loss; and 95 involving other unauthorized activities. Although most of the reported incidents involved small quantities of radioactive material, a recent example involved several hundred kilograms of plutonium that appears to have fallen through the cracks.

In an effort to help track global nuclear and radiological material, the IAEA established an Incident and Trafficking Database nearly two decades ago. More than 120 countries volunteer in this information exchange project, covering theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfers. Since inception, there have been a total of nearly 2,500 cases reported.

The database serve as a useful tool but the reports that populate the database are strictly voluntary, lack standards, and have no oversight to ensure accuracy. For example, although over 30 countries posses HEU and only three of those report on their stocks. To complicate the matter, the two countries that posses a vast majority of HEU stocks are not among the countries who report. These limitations inspire little to no confidence in the accuracy of the data. In truth, very little is known about the amounts of fissile material that are circulating around the globe.

The reality is nuclear material is stolen or lost two to four dozen times a year every year, sometimes small amounts, sometimes large. It happens frequently in Russia and other former Soviet states and it happens in many other nuclear-capable countries such as Mexico, India South Africa and France. According to confirmed intelligence reports, organized and professional criminal groups are currently involved in nuclear and radiological trafficking. Based on the information we know as well as the known gaps in reporting, it is highly likely that the various amounts of the reported uranium and plutonium stocks lost or stolen across the globe may only be the tip of the iceberg. No one knows the exact amount of fissile materials that terrorists or criminal syndicates might have succeeded in smuggling to their desired destinations.

Part two will look at the groups and nation-states that comprise our biggest threat and the greatest risk of nuclear terrorism to the homeland.