Reducing Irrational Fear in Homeland Security
A common sense, low cost approach for government
“Once you learn how to roll your kayak, flipping over no longer freaks you out.”
What is the role of irrational fear in homeland security and what should be done about it?
Firstly, what is irrational fear? Rather than exploring the lexicon of psychology, can we agree that fear is possessed by the person experiencing it, while rationality is a subjective perception by another? Certainly, a fear of spiders is not irrational to the person experiencing it, but may seem so to the person who gets rid of the spider.
Fear, the most basic of core human emotions, has life preserving value. The spectrum from paralyzing fear to fearlessness has its homeostasis in a healthy fear that keeps us safe. A fear is borne of process that weighs perceived risk versus actual risk, in the context of a possible consequence.
After 9/11, many Americans were afraid of working above the ground floor of an office building. Was it irrational then? Is it irrational now? Does the distinction matter? The fact remains that people in tall buildings perished, and it could happen again. These fearful Americans observed that people died due to an actual risk of death and have an elevated perceived risk that has origins in fact. What may be irrational about the fear is the unlikelihood of its recurrence, and the infinitesimal odds of it occurring at one of their offices. But does that matter? The fear is present nonetheless.
What could happen if a campaign by a homeland security entity tried this: inform those in fear of the unlikelihood of airborne terrorism, due to security increases on planes and at airports — and the very small odds, if it did reoccur somehow, that it would happen at a given location?
Let us consider that rationality of fear may not be the relevant condition. Yet fear, irrespective of rationality, is arguably the paramount driver of homeland security’s existence, funding, priorities, and perception of success. Making Americans feel safer is equally as important as making them safer in fact. Homeland security works hard on the latter. The former is largely underserved and begs improvement.
The homeland security enterprise has in its hands on the levers that drive both perceived and actual risk, and thus, fear. It can reduce fear or increase it, intentionally or inadvertently. For example, the declaration of the “global war on terror” could be interpreted to have caused a culture of fear and paranoia, which drove support for a homeland security spending spree and a drumbeat for war. A former national security advisor claims that was the plan.
Similarly, the employment of a multicolored alert system for terrorism risk detrimentally increased perceived risk, to the point that it became intolerable. Americans would either panic during an elevated alert, or would ignore it altogether from the continuous heightened status. When alerts were issued that lacked information to evaluate the risk due to secrecy, and alerts further lacked the specific steps to take, it came crumbling down. Without being informed of the actual risk, perceived risk was skewed. The system was replaced by one whose charter is to provide notifications that specifically describe the threat and what actions to take. To date, it has issued no alerts, and Americans are less worried. Why? No alerts drive down perceived risk, and reduce fear. Arguably, it is the intent of the system never to issue an advisory.
An example of reducing perceived risk is FEMA’s Ready.gov initiative, where tools are provided to help Americans plan for catastrophe, prepare their family, help others, and become informed about preparedness. Immigration and Customs Enforcement offers education about human trafficking and provides tips to detect and report suspecting trafficking. Secret Service provides information about identity theft and allows the reporting of incidents.
Each of these examples gives Americans knowledge to reduce perceived risk, and empowers them with something to do about it. Even the posting of police activity on Twitter by local agencies has reduced fear. We all want to know what is going on that affects our safety locally and nationally, and we want to know what to do about the risks we face. If homeland security improves its communication of actual risk, with an approach to reduced secrecy (instead of secrecy by default), it could inform us of what mitigating steps have reduced actual risk or are underway to reducing actual risk. This will drive perceived risk downward.
Reducing actual risk in homeland security is an expensive, unending task. But increased communications, even of an elevated actual risk, is relatively inexpensive, and will reduce both healthy and irrational fear when perceived risk is reduced. Any measured reduction in fear translates to an increase in the effectiveness of homeland security.
