Preventing the Next 9/11: What Needs to Change
There were certainly failures on many fronts on 9/11, just as there were in Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years earlier. While it would be easy to point the finger at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for failing to prevent the attacks- or to connect the proverbial dots- on 9/11, a deeper examination indicates the root cause may not be as clearly evident or understood as it may appear.
In his book Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond, Erik Dahl argues that intelligence can succeed in preventing surprise attacks by what the author refers to as the “Theory of Preventive Action.” Dahl suggests that the production of specific tactical-level intelligence has a greater likelihood of influencing decision-makers by highlighting imminent threats and the need for immediate action. Conversely, he argues that strategic-level intelligence often lacks the precision necessary to present an immediate decision point for action. Decision-makers must learn to be open to accepting and acting on both tactical-level and strategic intelligence, even though many often view strategic intelligence as being better suited for policy-level decision-making.
Dahl not only challenges conventional wisdom concerning what he refers to as the first law of intelligence failure, he asserts it is wrong. The basis for his argument is that the intelligence community has traditionally only reviewed intelligence failures when determining why intelligence did not succeed in preventing an attack. Dahl opines that in order to fully understand why intelligence failed, one must also review and understand what led to intelligence successes. To do otherwise fails to paint a full picture of why intelligence fails.
An example of an intelligence success based on tactical intelligence is the case of Najibullah Zazi, who was planning to bomb subway trains in New York City. Zazi had been attempting to develop peroxide-based explosives for backpack bombs in a hotel in Denver, Colorado, but was unable to obtain the correct chemical mixture. In his efforts to achieve the correct mixture, Zazi reached out for assistance via email to an account operated by Al-Qaeda (AQ) in Pakistan. Unbeknownst to him, the account was also known to intelligence authorities, who coordinated with domestic law enforcement agencies in the United States. After successfully transporting explosives to New York City, the plot to bomb the New York City Subway was thwarted, the conspirators were captured, and several AQ associates in Pakistan were identified.
Dahl’s aforementioned “Theory of Preventive Action”, coupled with an elimination of organizational barriers (e.g., lack of information sharing, fewer career opportunities and respect for analysts), would contribute significantly in reducing future intelligence failures. The elimination of organizational barriers, coupled with willingness by decision-makers to accept and act on precise, tactical intelligence, may very well prove to be the two most difficult mindsets to change. However, this change is critical as the prevention of future surprise attacks, and the security of the American people, hinges on it.
Darren Price is a contributor to the Homeland Security (HS) Vortex which is a platform where insiders from the policy, law enforcement, fire service and emergency management fields converge to discuss issues related to Homeland Security.
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