Uneven Policy or Unequal Justice?
The targeted killing of Americans versus the Capture of Foreign Terrorists
Last week the Obama administration touted the successful operation capturing Ahmed Abu Khattala, the alleged ringleader of the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in 2012. According to unnamed American officials, Khattala was captured in Benghazi in a secret raid by U.S. Special Operations forces. Khattala has reportedly been turned over to FBI agents and transported to “a secure location outside of Libya”.
This initially appears to be a significant intelligence and counter-terrorism success for the administration, it has also regenerated discussions of the 2011 raid into Pakistan where operators from the heralded SEAL Team 6 killed Osama bin Laden. However, Osama bin Laden was not afforded the same benefit of American due process that Khattala appears to be destined to be granted. Most would argue that there is no comparison, in terms of the magnitude of devastation and influence, of the two formally designated terrorists, with Osama bin Laden having unquestionably more direct impact on the United States and globally in the Jihadist extremism movement. Though both have participated in operations that have killed Americans and were continuing threats to the United States, the endgame for each is very different.
Even more profound is the policy approach toward Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011. With the release this week of a Justice Department memo instrumental in the legal justifications allowing for the killing of al-Awlaki, or other Americans in like circumstances, the debate over his killing by his own government has resurfaced. Much of the memo demonstrating that al-Awlaki was more than an inspirational figurehead and had an actual operational role in terrorist acts against Americans is redacted from the memo and remains classified. The legal reasoning behind the targeted killing of an American citizen has been made more transparent by the release of the memo.
The justifications stated by the administration include the following criteria:
“Active involvement” in terrorism
Operational leadership
Imminent Threat
Capture is not feasible due to undue risk
The above criteria are clear in the case of Osama bin Laden, although some could argue his capture was feasible. It is also evident that the bin Laden mission was conducted at great risk, in a sovereign nation without its knowledge. The terrorist acts committed by Osama bin Laden and Abu Khattala are well known and documented yet the operations al-Awlaki was operationally involved in cannot be so easily cited, if at all. Khattala was evidently captured with the knowledge, if not consent of the Libyan government and the U.S. has had a cooperative relationship in regards to military operations with the Yemenis yet a similar mission to capture al-Awlaki was not conducted. Instead, his government opted to conduct a drone strike killing him.
The nearly two year manhunt to capture Khattala and have him face American due process for an assumed direct link to an attack on an American compound overseas and the murder of several Americans only further weakens the case for targeting and killing one of America’s own sons; no matter how offensive his views and public denunciations of his native country had been. Even the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shiekh Mohammed, was captured and afforded some form of legal due process.
Consistency is essential in counter-terrorism policy. It is what distinguishes a morally based government from the arbitrary designation of Kafirs or declarations of unsupported fatwas against anyone who does not support the cause of terrorist extremists.
So, is U.S. policy simply unevenly practiced or is justice unequally distributed?
