Emile Durkheim: the Moral Basis of Humanism
Humanists hopefully know that they are humanists, and what it entails for them. But do they also know “why” they are humanists? If someone questions the need for the very existence of humanism, Human Rights and a global outlook, would they be able to answer such a fundamental challenge?
In August 2018 in Auckland, Humanists International approved with overwhelming majority the Auckland Declaration which affirms that:
“The best ethical foundation from which to approach the problems of today’s world and the future of us all is to try to see humanity as one global community.”
But nationalists and religious conservatives alike are likely to question the very foundations behind this globalist call. “Why?” they will ask, “Why should I care about the fate of all humans populating this planet? We live differently; we believe different things; a lot of them are backward, and we have enough problems as it is now. We should take back control and think of ourselves, our nation, our religion first!” What should we answer? This is why I think it is very important to get the foundations right, to understand the very basis of why we believe what we believe. And that is where Emile Durkheim comes into play and his long, but brilliant, article that fell into my lap a few years ago. For it is this precise article that did much towards “converting” me to Humanism, the article is called “L’individualisme et les intellectuels” and was published in the Revue Bleue, back in 1898! For those who know French, I warmly recommend reading the original article. But for all others, I will translate the relevant excerpts in 4 parts. But first, a bit of context!
In the 1890s, there raged a war of minds that divided Third Republic France. A Jewish officer was falsely imprisoned for life for crimes a well-connected officer of the “more decent religion” had committed (anti-Semitism has old roots). In order to help officer Dreyfus, Emile Zola published his famous “J’accuse…” article citing names of those he thought were complicit, with the aim of being sued so that the Highest Court of France would be forced to take notice of the whole affair. It worked! And it became known as the Dreyfus Affair, possibly the most important lawsuit in the country’s history. Because Zola and intellectuals standing with him dared to challenge the “Authority of the State and its Army,” religious traditionalists retorted that it was treasonous. Furthermore, they claimed that it was done in the name of individualism, an amoral pseudo-ideology for opportunists to push for commercialism (today we would have called it neoliberalism), which at the time meant doing away with morality where it was in the way of business and monetary gains.
What followed was this brilliant article by Emile Durkheim defending individualism and the intellectuals accused of it. This text has done much of the job in “converting” me to Humanism, and I hope you enjoy it as much as I did. I filtered the parts of the text that were more specific to the times so that a clear view of what he calls “individualism.” “Individualism” as Durkheim understands it is a forerunner of the life stance created in 1952 under the name “Humanism.” Perhaps the confusions invoked in the text are one of the reasons its name evolved. Here is part 1 (of 4):
Part 1: The Cult of Man
First, there is one ambiguity that must be eliminated first and foremost.
To make the trial of individualism easier, it is confused with the narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian selfishness of Spencer and economists. It’s makes arguing about it much easier. It is all too simple to denounce as an ideal without grandeur this petty commercialism that reduces society to being nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange, and it is too clear that all communal life is impossible if there are no interests superior to individual interests. That such doctrines should be called anarchic, nothing is more deserved and we give our support to them. But what is unacceptable is that we reason as if this individualism were the only one that existed or even possible. On the contrary, it is increasingly becoming a rarity and an exception. Spencer’s practical philosophy is so morally miserable that it no longer has many supporters. As for economists, if they once let themselves be seduced by the simplism of this theory, they have long felt the need to temper the rigour of their original orthodoxy and to open themselves to more generous feelings.
[…]
But there is another individualism that is less easy to overcome. It has been professed for a century by the very great generality of thinkers: it is that of Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualists, that which the Declaration of Human Rights has tried, more or less fortunately, to translate into formulas, that which is commonly taught in our schools and which has become the basis of our moral catechism. It is true that we believe we can reach it under the guise of utilitarism, but it differs profoundly from it and the criticisms that apply to one cannot be appropriate for the other. Far from making self-interest the objective of conduct, he sees in everything that is self-motivated the very source of evil. According to Kant, I am only sure to do the right thing if the reasons that determine my actions are not the particular circumstances in which I am placed, but my status as a man in abstracto. Conversely, my action is bad, when it can only be logically justified by my financial situation or my social condition, by my class or caste interests, by my passions, etc. This is why immoral conduct is recognized by this sign that it is closely linked to the individuality of the agent and cannot be generalized without manifest absurdity. Likewise, if, according to Rousseau, the general will, which is the basis of the social contract, is infallible. If it is the authentic expression of perfect justice, it is because it is a result of all particular wills; consequently, it constitutes a kind of impersonal average from which all individual considerations are eliminated, because, being divergent and even antagonistic, they neutralize and erase each other. Thus, for both of them, the only moral ways of acting are those that can be appropriate for all men without distinction, that is, those who are involved in the notion of man in general.
Here we are far from this glorification of private well-being and interest, from this selfish cult of the self for which utilitarian individualism has been criticized. Quite the contrary, according to these moralists, duty consists in turning our eyes away from what concerns us personally, from everything that relates to our empirical individuality, in order to seek only what our human condition claims, such as it is common to us with all our fellow men. This ideal even goes so far beyond the level of utilitarian ends that it appears to the consciences that aspire to it as all imbued with religiosity. This human person, whose definition is like the touchstone according to which Good must be distinguished from Evil, is considered sacred, in the ritual sense of the word, so to speak. It has something of the transcendent majesty that the Churches of all times attribute to their Gods; it is conceived as invested with this mysterious property that empties around holy things, that abstracts them from vulgar contacts and detracts them from the common flow. And that is precisely where the respect for it comes from. Whoever makes an attempt on a man’s life, a man’s freedom, a man’s honour, inspires a sense of horror in us, in every way similar to that experienced by the believer who sees his idol profaned. Such a morality is therefore not simply a hygienic discipline or a wise strategy of existence; it is a religion in which Man is both the faithful and the God.
But this religion is individualistic, since it has the human being as its object, and a human being is an individual, by definition. There is even no system whose individualism is more intransigent. Nowhere are the rights of the individual affirmed with more energy, since the individual is put on the list of sacred things; nowhere is he jealously protected against infringements from the outside, wherever they may come from. The doctrine of the utilitarian can easily accept any kind of compromise, without lying to its fundamental axiom; it can admit that individual freedoms are suspended whenever the interest of the greatest number requires this sacrifice. But there is no such compromise possible with a principle that is thus put outside and above all temporal interests. There is no reason for a state to excuse an attack on a human being when human rights are above the state. If individualism is, therefore, by itself, a catalyst for moral dissolution, we would have seen it manifest its anti-social essence by now. This time, we can see how serious the issue is. Because this 18th century liberalism, which is basically the whole subject of the dispute, is not simply a theory for ministerial cabinets, a philosophical construction; it has become a reality, it has penetrated our institutions and customs, it is part and parcel of our whole lives, and if we really had to get rid of it, it is our entire moral organization that would have to be rebuilt at the same time.
Here we see Durkheim do two things. First, he ascertains the difference between two kinds of individualism: utilitarian, and humanist. Then he expands on what it implies for this philosophy to regard the human being as both an independent individual and part of “humanity,” which he will continue in part 2. Note that Durkheim is especially harsh (perhaps unfairly) in his rejection of utilitarianism. But note that utilitarianism is a very British (and American) philosophical current, and it could be that Durkheim is being a child of his time with the rivalry between France and the United Kingdom during that period. And given the cultural domination of the Anglosphere in the international humanist community, it can act as a breath of fresh air to have a different perspective than the utilitarian one. Now, on to part 2.
Part 2: The Challenge of Religion
[…]
And, indeed, once we have stopped confusing individualism with its opposite, that is, with utilitarianism, all these supposed contradictions disappear as if by magic. This religion of humanity has everything it takes to speak to its followers in a tone no less compelling than the religions it replaces. Far from simply flattering our instincts, it assigns us an ideal that infinitely exceeds nature; for no one naturally has that wise and pure reason that, free from any personal motive, would legislate in the abstract on its own conduct. Undoubtedly, if the dignity of the individual comes from his individual characteristics, from the particularities that distinguish him from others, one might fear that he would be locked in a kind of moral selfishness that would make any solidarity impossible. But, in reality, he receives it from a higher source which is common to him with all men. If he is entitled to this religious respect, it is because he has something of humanity in him. It is humanity that is respectable and sacred; however, it is not all in him. It is widespread among all his fellow human beings; consequently, he cannot take it as the end of his conduct without being forced to go out of himself and spread outwards. The cult of which he is both the object and the agent, does not focus on the particular being that he is and which bears his name, but on the human person, wherever that human person is encountered, in whatever form he or she may be incarnated. Impersonal and anonymous, such an end therefore hovers well above all particular consciences and can thus serve as a meeting place for them. The fact that this doctrine is not foreign to us (if only by the fact that it is a human one) does not prevent it from overwhelming us. However, all that societies need to be coherent is for their members to have their eyes fixed on the same goal, to meet in the same spirit, but it is by no means necessary that the object of this common conviction is bound by any link between the lives of those individuals. In the end, individualism as understood in this way is the glorification, not of the self, but of the individual in general. It is based not on selfishness, but on sympathy for all that is human, on a broader pity for all human pain and misery, on a more ardent need to fight them and soften them, on a greater thirst for justice. Isn’t this enough to bring together all the good will. Undoubtedly, it can happen that individualism is practiced in a completely different spirit. Some use it for their personal ends, use it as a means to cover their selfishness and more easily evade their duties to society. But this abusive exploitation of individualism proves nothing against it, just as the utilitarian lies of religious hypocrisy prove nothing against religion.
But I look forward to this great counter-argument of yours. This cult of man has as its first tenet the autonomy of reason and as its first rite free inquiry. Now, it is said, if all opinions are free, by what miracle would they be harmonised? If they are formed without knowing each other and without having to take into account each other, how can they not be mutually incoherent? Intellectual and moral anarchy would therefore be the inevitable consequence of liberalism. This is the argument, always refuted and always reborn, that the eternal opponents of reason periodically resume, with a perseverance that nothing discourages, whenever a temporary weariness of the human spirit puts it more at their mercy. Yes, it is true that individualism does not go without a certain intellectualism; because the freedom of thought is the first of freedoms. But where has it been seen to result in this absurd self-infatuation that would lock everyone into their own feelings and create a void between intelligences? What it requires is the right of each individual to know things of which he or she can legitimately know; but it does not enshrine any right to incompetence. On a matter where I cannot make an informed decision, it does not cost my intellectual independence anything to follow a more competent opinion. The collaboration of scientists is even possible only thanks to this mutual deference; each science constantly borrows propositions from its neighbours that it accepts without verification. But my reason must have reasons for it to bow to the reason of others. Respect for authority is not incompatible with rationalism provided that the authority is rationally founded.
This is why, when some men are summoned to rally to a feeling that is not theirs, it is not enough, in order to convince them, to remind them of this commonplace of banal rhetoric that society is not possible without a mutual sacrifice and without a certain spirit of submission; it is still necessary in this case to justify the docility we ask of them, by showing them that they are humanly wrong. That if, on the contrary, it is one of those questions which, by definition, fall within the scope of the common judgment, such a surrender of critical thought is contrary to any reason and, consequently, to duty. Yet, to know whether a court can be allowed to convict an accused without having heard his defence, there is no need for extraordinary intelligence. It is a problem of practical morality for which every common sense man is competent and in which no one should lose interest.
[…]
After Durkheim finishes explaining the intricacies of being an individual and being human, and the autonomy, responsibility, humility, and solidarity that it brings, he moves on to the attacks of the religious traditionalists. You may here recognize arguments still used against humanism to this day. It may then please you to see that refutations of these arguments exist since at least one hundred years old! But in the third part comes also a humbling paragraph for the secular humanists among us, a reminder of the religious and Christian-structural factors without which Humanism may never have been born. Aside from that, Durkheim will now go on the offensive and argue the point that there is nothing more suited for the modern world than societies united by humanist beliefs.
Part 3: The Religion/Philosophy of Today and Tomorrow
Not only is individualism not anarchy, but it is now the only belief system that can ensure the moral unity of the country.
We often hear today that only one religion can produce this harmony. This proposal, which modern prophets believe must be developed in a mystical tone, is, in essence, a simple truism on which everyone can agree. For we know today that a religion does not necessarily imply symbols and rites as such, temples and priests; this whole external apparatus is only the superficial part. In essence, it is nothing more than a set of collective beliefs and practices of particular authority. As soon as an end is pursued by an entire people, it acquires, as a result of this unanimous accession, a kind of moral supremacy that elevates it far above private ends and thus gives it a religious character. On the other hand, it is obvious that a society cannot be coherent if there is no intellectual and moral community among its members. But when we have once again recalled this sociological evidence, we are not much more advanced; for if it is true that a religion is, in a sense, indispensable, it is no less certain that religions will be transformed, that yesterday’s religion cannot be tomorrow’s. The important thing would therefore be to tell us what today’s religion should be like.
Yet everything contributes precisely to the belief that the only possible is this religion of humanity whose individualistic morality is the rational expression. What, indeed, could collective sensitivity now be taken from? As societies become more voluminous and spread over larger territories, traditions and practices, in order to be able to adapt to the diversity of situations and the mobility of circumstances, are forced to remain in a state of plasticity and inconsistency that no longer offers enough resistance to individual variations. These variations, being less well contained, occur more freely and multiply: that is, everyone follows their own sense of meaning more closely. At the same time, as a result of a more developed division of labour, each mind is turned towards a different point on the horizon, reflects a different aspect of the world and, consequently, the content of the consciousnesses differs from one subject to the next. We are thus gradually moving towards a state, which is almost reached now, and where members of the same social group will no longer have anything in common with each other except their human quality, only the constituent attributes of the human person in general. This idea of the human person, defined differently according to the diversity of national characters, is therefore the only one that is maintained, immutable and impersonal, above the changing flow of particular opinions; and the feelings it arouses are the only ones that are found in almost every heart. The communion of spirits can no longer be made on defined rites and prejudices since rites and prejudices are carried away by the course of events; consequently, there is nothing left for men to love and honour in common, except man himself. This is how man became a god to man and why he can no longer, without lying to himself, make other gods for himself. And as each of us embodies something of humanity, each individual consciousness has something divine in it, and is thus marked by a character that makes it sacred and inviolable to others. All individualism is there; and that is what makes it the necessary doctrine. For, in order to stop its growth, it would be necessary to prevent men from differentiating themselves more and more from each other, to level their personalities, to bring them back to the old conformism of yesteryear, to contain, therefore, the tendency of societies to become ever more widespread and more globalised, and to put an obstacle to the incessant progress of the division of labour; yet such an undertaking, desirable or not, greatly exceeds all human forces.
What is being proposed to us, moreover, instead of this slandered individualism? We are told the merits of Christian morality and are discreetly invited to join it. But is it not known that the originality of Christianity has precisely consisted in a remarkable development of the individualistic spirit? While the religion of the city [Rome] was entirely made up of material practices from which the spirit was absent, Christianity showed in the inner faith, in the personal conviction of the individual, the essential condition of piety. The first, he taught that the moral value of acts must be measured according to intention, an intimate thing par excellence, which by its nature avoids all external judgments and which can only be competently assessed by the agent. The very centre of moral life has thus been transported from the outside inside and the individual has been set up as the sovereign judge of his own conduct, with no other accountability than to himself and his God. Finally, by consummating the definitive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, by abandoning the world to the dispute of men, Christ has at the same time surrendered it to science and free inquiry: this explains the rapid progress that the scientific spirit made the day when Christian societies were constituted. So let us not denounce individualism as the enemy that must be fought at all costs! We only fight it to get back to it, because it is so impossible to escape it. Christianity is not opposed by anything other than itself; but the whole question is to know what the right measure is and whether there is any advantage in disguising it under symbols. Yet if it is as dangerous as they say, we do not see how it could become harmless or beneficial by itself by having hidden its true nature with the help of metaphors. And on the other hand, if this limited individualism of Christianity was necessary eighteen centuries ago, chances are that a more developed individualism will be vital today; because things have changed since then. It is therefore a singular error to present individualistic morality as the antagonist of Christian morality; on the contrary, it is derived from it. By focusing on the first, we are not denying our past; we are only continuing it.
[…]
There is that last humbling paragraph I had written about previously. Now, we already implied that Durkheim was one of the intellectuals supporting Zola. We never specified what kind of intellectual he was, but it now transpires in his words. Durkheim was a sociologist. In fact, he is widely considered one of the four founders of sociology along with his compatriot Auguste Comte and the Prussians Karl Marx and Max Weber. In his lifetime, he analysed social facts in the religious dimension and the modernization that happened around him, such as the division of labour. He, therefore, posits that as societies become more complex and interconnected,labourr more differentiated and people more interdependent (how many people fix their own plumbing nowadays?), societies will have a better time appealing to the lasting common denominator of all those humans leading ever more different lives: their humanity. In the last part, Durkheim will try to formulate a political way forward in a time of malaise for individualism and in the face of attacks by traditionalists. Tell me if you notice any similarity with what happens today!
Part 4: Humanism and its Political Future
In truth, we fear that there has been some negligence in the way this campaign has been conducted. A verbal similarity may have led to the belief that individualism necessarily derives from individual, and therefore selfish, feelings. In reality, the individual’s religion is a social institution, like all known religions. It is society that assigns this ideal to us, as the only common end that can currently rally the wills. Taking it away from us, when we have nothing else to put in its place, is therefore rushing us into this moral anarchy that we precisely want to fight.
However, we are far from considering as perfect and definitive the formula that the 18th century gave to individualism and that we were wrong to keep almost unchanged. Sufficient a century ago, it now needs to be expanded and completed. It presents individualism only in its most negative aspect. Our fathers had exclusively set themselves the task of freeing the individual from the political obstacles that hindered its development. The freedom to think, the freedom to write, the freedom to vote were therefore put by them among the first goods to be conquered, and this emancipation was certainly the necessary condition for all subsequent progress. But, carried away by the ardor of the struggle, completely committed to the goal they were pursuing, they ended up not seeing anything beyond it and erecting as a sort of final end this next phase of their efforts. For political freedom is a means, not an end; it is only valuable for the way it is put into use; if it is not used for something beyond it, it is not only useless; it becomes dangerous. Weapon of combat, if those who handle it do not know how to use it in fruitful struggles, they soon turn it against themselves.
And it is precisely for this reason that it has now fallen into a certain discredit. The men of my generation remember what our enthusiasm was when, about twenty years ago, we finally saw the last barriers that contained our impatience fall. But alas! the disenchantment came quickly; for it was soon necessary to admit that we did not know what to do with this freedom so laboriously conquered. Those to whom we owed it used it only to tear each other apart. And it was from that moment that we felt the wind of sadness and discouragement rising over the country, which became stronger by the day and which had to end up breaking down the least resilient of the braves.
Thus, we cannot stick to this negative ideal. We must go beyond the results achieved, if only to preserve them. If we do not finally learn to implement the means of action we have in our hands, it is inevitable that they will depreciate. Let us therefore use our freedoms to seek what must be done and to do it, to soften the functioning of the social machine, which is still so harsh on individuals, to put at their doorstep all possible means to develop their faculties without obstacles, to finally work to make the famous precept a reality: To everyone according to their works! Let us even acknowledge that, in general, freedom is a delicate instrument whose handling must be learned and in which we must practice our children; all moral education should be directed to this end. We can see that work is not likely to be lacking in our activity. But while it is certain that we will now have to propose new ends beyond those achieved, it would be foolish to abandon the latter in order to pursue the former better: for the necessary progress is only possible thanks to the progress made. It is about complementing, extending, organizing individualism, not restricting and combating it. It is a question of using thought, not of imposing silence on it. It alone can help us to get out of the present difficulties; we do not see what can take the place of it. However, it is not by meditating on the Politics of Sacred Scripture that we will ever find the means to organize economic life and introduce more justice into contractual relations!
Under these conditions, does the assignment not appear to be fully delineated? All those who believe in the usefulness, or even simply in the necessity of the moral transformations accomplished over the past century, have the same interest: they must forget the disagreements that separate them and combine their efforts to maintain the positions they have acquired. Once the crisis is over, it will certainly be necessary to remember the lessons of experience, so as not to fall back into the sterilizing inaction for which we are currently suffering; but this is the work of tomorrow. For today, the urgent task that must come before all others is to save our moral heritage; once it is safe we will see to it flourishing. May the common danger at least serve us to shake our torpor and get us back in the mood for action! And indeed, we are already seeing initiatives that are awakening in the country, good wills that are being sought. Someone could come to group them and lead them into battle and perhaps victory would not be long in coming. Because what must reassure us to some extent is that our opponents are only strong because of our weakness. They have neither the deep conviction nor the generous ardour that irresistibly leads people to great reponsiveness and great revolutions. Not that we are thinking of challenging their sincerity!
[…]
But also what a humiliation if, not having to deal with a bigger enemy, the side in championing reason would end up to be the losing side, if only for a while!
Have you noticed anything? I know I did. Except for a few sentences, Durkheim’s analysis could have been written for today’s rise of nationalism and populism. Today also a writer might have described political freedom as a “weapon of combat, if those who handle it do not know how to use it in fruitful struggles, they soon turn it against themselves” to describe those new political qualms. Also in describing his way for does Durkheim sound like he is preaching in the 21st century. It can be reassuring to know that some malaise comes by now and again, or unnerving when knowing what happened in the following century. But I do believe he utters two truths that transcend the time of his article: political achievements are only as strong as the moral communities that actively defend them, and that they shouldn’t be an end or a stop to innovation, but a means and part of a bigger project. Perhaps his message through the centuries is that we should think of how to make the world more democratic, both in democracies and other countries.
If you stuck with me until now, congratulations and thank you! I hope this text has helped you formulate a strong defence of your humanist ideals. Either because you agree or because you now have a conception of humanism you now have to one-up. In both ways, please do remember the following: it is as important for the advancement of humanism in the world that its champions be intellectually well-armed as it is to be well-organized.
