Sanctions, Autocrats, and Soft Power
The Carrot and the Stick
“Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Words from President Theodore Roosevelt, a motto which would carry US foreign policy. It was how the US handled it’s affairs — from interactions with Spain over the Philippines, conflict with Mexico, or European intervention in the Americas.
It was, to some extent, very simple policy. As America began to evolve into the sole power in the Western Hemisphere, it’s ability to use the so-called ‘big stick’ began to inform decisions. It was easy to demand that Europe remain away when no country would risk projecting their navy into American waters.
And then the world went to war twice, and America found itself a competitor. The Soviet Union was the first time that power began to be projected in the Americas, a crossing of doctrine that had been set nearly a century before.
But at the same time, America began to find regions where it could no longer project military strength. And as the shattered armies of Europe quickly coalesced around the American flag, the US turned its eyes to Asia.
There were few countries in the region at the time that were powerful. Japan, now under American control, was in the process of being rebuilt after bombings and war. China, occupied by the Japanese for the better part of a decade, was reorganizing. And Korea, a country brutalized by imperial powers for centuries, was just about emerging out of Japan’s shadow.
And then, there was civil war, and American troops found themselves in Korea.
Korea was partitioned into two, the North, an industrialized power, relying on two massive nations to fund its development, and the South, an agrarian society that relied heavily on investment from the West.
And this trend continued for decades. The South was slow to develop, as the US focused its efforts on Japan. Meanwhile, a steady supply of Soviet materials and rubles kept North Korea as the superior power out of the two.
But, today, South Korea has one of the highest standards of living in Asia. It’s GDP is massive, and it has a firm place as a manufacturing powerhouse in the world. It dwarfs the North’s economy, and North Korea has become not only reliant on Chinese funds, but unable to function without them.
This seems shocking 70 years ago, even as American politicians began to write the first sanctions on a foreign country — allegations of human rights abuses against the North.
For years, sanctions were the black sheep of foreign policy. Both Soviet and American leaders used them sparingly, and direct actions of some form became considerably more popular. It was easier to send a few thousand boots on the ground than write a set of economic policies.
And unfortunately, many found sanctions to be ineffective. While the US sanctioned North Korea in 1950, the country continued to grow until the collapse of the Soviet Union left it without trading partners. US sanctions on Iran, Syria, and Cuba have had some effects, but eventually became the last resorts after any direct action either failed or became too costly to maintain. And even as American politicians have attempted to place costs on Venezuela’s corruption, Maduro remains in power.
So, why are sanctions still used? To some extent, the American taste for war has by and large, shrunk. There are no more Cold Warriors, nor Cold Wars for them to fight, and the likes of Reagan, Bush Sr, and their peers are no longer leading statecraft. Sanctions are the most used tool across many countries, as unilateral or multilateral US sanctions are the de facto representation of dissatisfaction. It’s cheaper, easier, and has a smaller human cost than intervention.
Are sanctions, then, useful? Are they a way to influence foreign countries, or simply loud words to bring focus to an issue?
The consensus is divided. Some argue that sanctions can really only affect democratic countries. A democracy might change leadership due to the higher costs of sanctions, while an autocracy will remain under a dictator’s rule.
Others, however, point to the few successes of sanctions. US sanctions against the Dutch over Indonesia helped push the nation towards independence, as the US placed a number of burdens on the Netherlands over mass arrests of Indonesian leaders. To combat nuclear proliferation, the US levied sanctions on Taiwan and South Korea to discourage the production of a nuclear weapons. America’s actions against Guatemala helped dethrone a dictator.
For each success, there are a dozen failures. Actions taken against individuals can be successful, but they can also be another in a string of policies that don’t affect outcomes. US sanctions on Russia in the wake of Russia’s invasions of Georgia, Chechnya, and Crimea were ineffectual, even as Russia’s economy tumbled. Autocracies are difficult to affect economically — so what’s left?
That was, interestingly, where Bangladesh became the centerpoint of foreign policy. Member’s of the country’s secret police and paramilitary forces were sanctioned heavily by the United States in December of 2021, and the results? A resounding success. While Bangladesh remains a relative autocracy, extrajudicial killings have dropped significantly, and in the coming months, the country could see even more changes.
To some extent, sanctions are tools — ones with a complex past, but perhaps suited to handling some of the complex issues that the world finds itself in.
