HOW ALL THE WORK IN CRIMEA DOES NOT GO TO WASTE
The Kursk Incursion…Crimea?
Medium stories abound, written by writers who provide facts and speculation about this very consequential war for the free world.
ISW's report of August 17, 2024, on “The Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment” made some interesting points, which are listed below.
“Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.” (strategic objectives without an integrated end goal are in reality “tactical objectives.” there is one and only one strategic objective for Ukraine, “Win their Independence” once and for all)*.
* — Parenthetical comments by the author.
“Russia’s and Ukraine’s ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent exploitation is often not feasible.” (This is called a “Stalemate.” The question is, given the reality in a 600-mile front, how do you break the 600-mile stalemate?)
“Effective Ukrainian and Russian campaign design, therefore, requires forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each set conditions for the subsequent operation.” (this is true if you want to “sequentially” attack the 600-mile front, a la surfing a big wave from one side to the other) Is that the only option?
“Ukraine and Russia both have the ability to establish deep defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates. Russia’s and Ukraine’s ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks…” (That is the difficulty in surfing a breaking wave. You need to surf on a fast slope to keep the closing wave from catching you. You are racing the force in front of the closing wave)
“The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation*, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.” (True statement. * Who has already shown the ability to plan and execute “complex” operations?)
In addition, “Decreased operational tempo has offered the other belligerent the opportunity to contest and seize the initiative.” All that is affected by the defense trenches laid out with the mine fields in between them. All trenching is more or less Parallel to the 600-mile front, in friendly geography.
Many inferences can be drawn from the above extremely important points made by ISW in their report of August 17. The last bolded and the “In addition” paragraph left me thinking.
As explained above, an attack from any “local” front leaves flanks exposed, so how about a rollup operation?
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, an area famous for the WWII Battle of Kursk, where the Germans almost decimated a Russian Army and followed it East, all the way to Stalingrad, where, for all practical purposes today, WWII ended, when a handful of Russian heroes, with a lot of “local” tactical decision making (Vasily Chuikov was there with the troops making by the minute decisions), held through a bitter winter and stopped a German Army of over 100,000 starving Germans (their logistics failed — Herman Goring was a farce).
That operation started the “squeeze” of what was left of the German Army. Russia drove West as fast as Stalin demanded, and the Americans drove East. Both were well-armed and had full logistics behind them. The rest is history.
The local above is in quotes because that is what the Russian Army is missing today: local tactical decision-making. General Georgy Zhukov had to manage Stalin’s expectations in Moscow and was able to do so while driving a cadre of generals below him to push the fronts and manage logistics. This happened after Stalingrad was settled.
Putin barely trusts his generals. This paranoia cascades all the way down to the front lines, where today, the Russian Army has no local tactical direction. All they do is “attack in mass” after someone radios the order to a local KGB Officer, who orders the attack (speculation).
To win battles, the Russians need Local leadership supported solidly by logistics. Both are the very basic requirements for success, and it is obvious they do not have either.
Thus, according to the ISW declaration, Russia needs better training and local leadership capability, and Ukraine needs more people. “Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.” Ukraine does have local leadership. They have that and discipline from training. They are lacking depth in logistics. They do not know when they will be resupplied with the needed ammo. The “local” planning of logistics is not necessarily in their hands unless they have been “saving for a rainy day.”
On the other hand, we have seen the deterioration of Russian support in Crimea. Two things: IFF (if and only if) 1. Ukraine is certain that Crimea will give little to no resistance (like Kursk today), and 2. The Kerch Bridge is unusable for any traffic, then Ukraine could start the sweep from Crimea and take the neophyte 600 mile Russian Army in the middle of two fronts (North from Kursk, South from Crimea). The Russian Army will have no logistic support or the Morale to support or hold back an aggressive, all-the-marbles-on-the-floor attack. The Russian Navy is non-existent for supplies, and no reinforcements can be expected.
The two Armies, North and South, could then work a sweep operation to force the Russian Army in the middle to surrender. This would be a smaller operation than the one executed in WWII when both huge armies were well-supplied.
In Soccer, this is called a “Fish Sandwich.” Two players approach the one with the ball from opposite directions to trap the ball. The one in the middle is “the fish.”
It is still a big operation with big logistic requirements. But given the way Ukraine has been preparing the ground in Crimea, it begs the question. Can that possibility be a reality in their plans?
If anyone can do it, the Ukrainian Army can. They have what it takes to execute this operation with discipline and precision, provided they have the logistics and enough soldiers (which they do, as they are spread out over a 600-mile front). The armies parallel to the squeeze operation can join the sweep as the North or South front gets to them.
Can they? or, Can’t they?
Rooting for Ukraine.
