ISLAMIC STATE, THE WAR WITHIN
This critical essay will discuss and argue the rise and the fall of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the factors that motivated the formation of the group and the aftermaths in social, cultural and political arena. First part will give a brief insight about the historical reasons behind the formation of the group which include social and political instability in the middle eastern peninsula. The second part will argue and discuss the possible reasons for re-emergence of ISIS and the third part will argue that possible threat from the extremist organisations is null as the terrorist organisation have faced a significant defeat. The essay will end with a conclusion of the whole.
This part will elucidate on the historical evets and the factors which triggered the formation of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/ISIS). The points will include the historical events pre and post United States (US) led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Syrian civil war and the poor socio -economic and political oppression of Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria. Origins of ISIS can be traced back to 1989 (Bayman 2016, p. 125), Abu Musab Al Zarqawi a Jordanian citizen who zealously prepared for the Soviet-Afghan but could never participate directly in the fight returned back to his home country Jordan after he involved himself in Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan (Michael 2007, p. 340), upon returning he was arrested by the Jordanian authorities. In a Jordanian prison he admired a notorious Salafi preacher Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi and became a student of his sermons (Michael 2007, p. 340). After his release in 1999, he travelled back to Afghanistan to forge ties with the Al-Quaeda, though the Islamic extremist organisation opposed his idea of selectively targeting Shia Muslims, Osama in 2000 gave Zarqawi seed money to raise an army of Jihadis in the greater levant region which consists of Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey. The US led campaign to Iraq propelled the formation of the group and thus in 2003, a small batch of trained Jihadis initially named Tawid wal Jihad came into existence (Bayman 2016, p.131). It was nothing but an incarnation of Islamic extremist organisations operating in the region pre-invasion of Iraq. In 2004, the group pledged alliance to Osama Bin Laden and changed the name to Al-Quaeda in Iraq and finally with the death of Zarqawi in 2006, the group renamed itself to Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (Bayman 2016, p.131).
State oppression of Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria gave a reason for them to join the Sunni extremist group ISIS in order to take revenge of the wrongdoings of the past. Iraq first oppressed its Sunni when the Baathist regime started a brutal crackdown on Shias and Kurdish ethnic group, this triggered Iran to make Iraq a Shia block (Sowell 2014, p.40). With the oppression, different Sunnis tribes took to insurgency. Shias grew strong politically by gaining more seats in the elections of 2010 and 2014 general elections. Insecurity grew amongst the Sunni community after the 2010 elections and the Sunnis started to demand for an autonomous region. Region formation crisis of 2011 coupled with failure in implementing reforms of 2014 scaled up the Sunni insurgency (Sowell 2014, p.49). Abdel Malik al Saadi, a Jordan bases senior Sunni cleric called for a unification of all Sunni insurgent groups and get ready to mobilise and demanded all Iraqi forces to be taken out of Sunni dominated areas (Namma, 2013). Coming to Syria, Alawats a sect of Shia Islam which makes up just 12 per cent of the country’s population have been ruling the country since 1971 (Qaddour 2013, p.67). The Assad dynasty has been notoriously cracking down on Sunnis by dismissing them from key positions of the government including the army(Qaddour 2013, p.69) and taking other social and political measures to marginalise them from the Syrian society. The history of brutal rule and oppression by the Assad dynasty compelled citizens especially Sunnis to protest and join the Syrian Arab spring of March 2011. This led to a chain of protests in Damascus, Aleppo and had its epicentre in the southern province of Daara which latter snowballed into the Syrian civil war.(De Juan & Andrew 2015, p95) Concluding this part, US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, led to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, oppression of Sunnis first sparked the initial idea or a demand for a separate Islamic State and the when the ISIS marched into Mosul in June, 2014 after 30,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered to just 800 ISIS fighters (Islamic State: What has happened since the fall of Mosul? 2015) they were warmly greeted by the Sunni tribes of the region who had a long history of being oppressed and maimed (Sowell 2014, p.61) this was replicated by the Syrian Sunnis who saw ISIS as a tool of defiance and revenge against the Assad regime.
As the threat of ISIS decreases by the day (Harrison 2017), one looming question remains, whether the terror organisation will be able to make a come-back in Iraq and Syria? The second part of the essay is further divided into two parts, first analysing the factors suggesting a formal presence of ISIS and the threats and the second part will draw on the points suggesting that the terror group is in its final stages.
Though Iraq formally declared the end of ISIS in December 2017 (Harrison 2017) and according to US military officials, the government has driven out extremists from 98 per cent of the area which was once controlled by the group (Calamur 2018) but it still controls 1000 sqaure kilometres (Schmitt 2018) The risk of ISIS re-emerging under no circumstances can be ignored. The terrorist group now controls insignificantly small patches, mostly deserts and inhabited and has changed its tactics from conventional warfare to asymmetrical warfare or insurgency (Calamur 2018). As Iraq is coming out of a war, it is grappling with major issues like depleted finances, services and infrastructure. An official report suggests that Iraq needs $88 billion in total, out of which $23 billion for short term and $65 billion for medium and long term but the international community has managed to pledge only $30 billion (Chmaytelli & Hagagy 2018). The country also cannot expect to draw investments as investors fear the re-emergence of ISIS and lack of infrastructure. Corruption is also a worrying problem in Iraq as Transparency International (2017) ranks Iraq as the 10th most corrupt country. The situation of Syria and its economy faces a similar situation, as the civil war started in 2011 the Syrian economy has declined more than 70 per cent till 2017 (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). A report by Chatham House’s analyst David Butter (2015) suggests that inflation since the start of war has averaged at 51 per cent, Syrian pound has depreciated by 80 per cent. As ISIS controlled major oil and gas fields, barrels per day production fell from 3,87,000 barrels per day to 10,000 per day. The report also stated that the terror group had the capacity of producing 60,000 barrels per day in 2015 from their contested oil fields which largely financed their military operations.
One more aspect of ISIS’s military operation was that the group largely focused on the greater levant area as they followed the fundamental principles of Islam which featured the Caliphate of Madina which existed in 7th century AD (Hussein 2016, p.438). The group slowly changed from ISIS to only Islamic State (IS) as they started to lose ground in the greater Levant area. With IS on backfoot in the greater Levant, the group opened new fronts in west Africa, northern Afghanistan, Sinai region of Egypt, Libya, Marawi region of Philippines and Yemen (Byman 2018). Focusing on eastern African region, the group is present in northern Nigeria and Mali-Niger-Chad-Cameroon belt (ISIS gains ground in sub-Saharan Africa 2015, p.1), in 2015 the Islamic extremist group Boko Haram formally pledged allegiance to IS and renamed itself to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Although the two groups have joined hands, they are two different identities with different commands and approaches (ISIS gains ground in sub-Saharan Africa 2015, p.1).Concluding this part, lack of infrastructure, funds and international support, no formal hierarchy in government backed by rampant corruption makes Iraq and Syria loose states which opens up an opportunity for the ISIS to reassemble, rearms and retake territory. Although ISIS has lost significant territory and has reduced to a mere insurgent group, it has opened new fronts in adjoining states and adopted new cost-effective tactics like lone wolf attacks for the west (Geltzer & Easterly 2017). Thus, the threat of ISIS/IS still looms large, greatly in the Levant region.
This part will draw point upon points and argue that, ISIS’s end has indicated an end of the war and there are remote chances of the group re-emerging for a fight. With major cities like Daara, Palmyra, Raqqa (erstwhile capital of ISIS) and Mosul retaken by the governments, the ISIS has lost 98 per cent of its territories which it used to contest from 2014 till 2016. The territory loss and loss of fighters have deeply impacted the fighting capabilities of ISIS, indicating a remote chance of the group resurfacing. This defeat was possible with the intervention of global powers led by US. With the request of support made by Bashar Al Assad in early 2015, Russian military hardware started to flow into Syria by August that year and strikes started by late September. Many suggest that Russia intervened into Syria solely for its self-interest as it maintains a naval base in Tartus and an airbase in Khmeimim as it has reduced troops significantly but has maintained a heavy presence in the mentioned bases. (Souleimanov, Aslan 2016. p.108) Russia has also helped Syria financially by minting banknotes and in 2013 initiated a $500 million package which was forwarded jointly by Russia, China and Iran for oil and credit (Dahi & Wind 2014 p.132), this helped Syrian economy stabilise (Central Intelligence Agency 2018). As mentioned, Iran also plays a major role in Syrian politics and at one time had deployed 2000 (Souleimanov, Aslan 2016. p.109) Hezbollah fighters in Al Qoseir, Qalamoun and Damascus to fight alongside Syrian Arab Army, Iran also trains and advices Syrian army personnel. (Randa 2014, p.61) Talking about Iraq, gone are those days when ISIS swept across cities overrunning security establishments. The coalition of 79 members led by the US are helping Iraq and Syria in eradicating the ISIS. Since 2015, the coalition airstrikes have killed more than 20,000 ISIS fighters (Byman 2016 p.151). According to the global coalition report (2018), they have trained 1,42,000 and 12,577 security personnel and militias in Iraq and Syria respectively and 1900 stabilisation and other redevelopment projects have commenced all across the 25 liberated zones of Iraq. One point seldom covered is the loss of appetite for fight among the population. Instead of joining the cadres of ISIS, they are now looking for jobs and other opportunities. (Ansary & Chaudhary 2011) Concluding this part, with the loss of territory by ISIS, intervention of Iran and Russia in Syria, intervention of the Global coalition, stabilisation in Iraqi and Syrian economies and normalcy returning back to the region we can conclude that the war with ISIS is in its final stages and the chances of the group re-emerging is remote and very low.
Concluding this essay, the paper first elucidated on the history of the extremist organisation, it then drew upon points, facts and arguments indicating that the ISIS might surface back and the risk from the group remains high despite losing ground. The points included the depleting situation in Iraq and Syria and ISIS’s opening of new fronts. The second part discussed and analysed the points which indicated an end to this war. These points included the significant loss to ISIS, intervention of global powers, economic stability in the region and the re-development work being initiated in the liberated areas.
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