Talks with the Taliban pave the way for US withdrawal but what next for Afghanistan?
First published 24th March 2020
by Alex Gale
Middle East | Operating in Foreign Environment | Understanding Your World
On Saturday 29 February, representatives from the US and the Taliban signed a historical agreement in Doha. The deal, officially dubbed the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, will bring the 18 years long conflict between the US and the Taliban to an end. Just a week and a half later, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the peace agreement.
What is in the Agreement?
The agreement is comprised of four main parts. Firstly, the Taliban will desist from conducting attacks against the US and its allies and measures will be taken to prevent the use of Afghan territory to threaten American security interests. Secondly, all foreign forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, providing the first condition is met. If both sides honour the first two parts of the agreement, intra-Afghan talks are scheduled to begin in March. Assuming talks are successful, a ‘permanent and comprehensive ceasefire’ should be negotiated alongside a ‘future political roadmap for Afghanistan’ fleshed out between the key Afghan parties.
The most significant consequence of the agreement is the withdrawal of American, allied and Coalition troops. This is to be achieved in stages. The US is set to reduce the number of its troops deployed to Afghanistan from approximately 12,00 to 8,600 withing the first 135 days after signing the agreement. Complete withdrawal will be completed within a 14-month period, providing the agreement is not dashed by a sudden outburst of violence or one or both sides renege on the deal.
In addition to the four main parts of the agreement, the official document also details the release of Taliban prisoners over a three-month period. In return, the Taliban are also expected to release prisoners, most of whom work as a part of the Afghan security apparatus or government.
Who does the Agreement Benefit?
The Taliban are the real winners of this agreement. With the US and Coalition forces out of the way, the Taliban will enjoy a significantly safer strategic environment, offering greater opportunities to exert control. The central government in Kabul is divided and weak and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) may find themselves more vulnerable without Coalition backing.
The Taliban will almost certainly try and impose their will at intra-Afghan talks. They are at their strongest now since any time after 2001 and control or contest nearly half of Afghan territory. Taliban leadership will likely use this to their advantage and press for greater concessions and a larger say during intra-Afghan talks. Alternatively, the Taliban may shun dialogue following a complete US withdrawal and use their newfound operational freedom to gain a military advantage.
Depending on events over the next few months, President Donald Trump could benefit from fulfilling the promise to leave Afghanistan. If the deal does successfully pave the way for a US withdrawal, Trump will have achieved what presidents Bush and Obama could not — an exit from Afghanistan. Given Trump’s recent spate of foreign affairs involvement, notably the trade deal with China, the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and the Middle East Peace Plan, Trump will be keen to present himself as a winner abroad in the upcoming US presidential election.
Will There Be a Lasting Peace?
Clearly, it is too early to determine whether the agreement will bring the peace and stability which Afghanistan desperately needs, but there are several factors to be aware of going forward. A divided and weak central government in Kabul is a cause for major concern, as is the reliability of the Taliban in holding up their end of the bargain. Incidents between insurgents and Afghan government or US/foreign security personnel could also derail the whole process.
The Afghan government was not directly involved with the agreement signed between the US and the Taliban, but it does play one of the most important roles in what follows. For the intra-Afghan talks to be successful, the government must present a united front in its negotiations with the Taliban. The Taliban’s territorial gains have already disadvantaged the government and internal discord would push the authorities further on the back foot.
The rivalry between political leaders Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdulla threaten to sow further divisions within the government. Both men claimed victory on Monday 9 March and were sworn in as president in separate ceremonies. According to the electoral commission, Ghani is the legitimate president and he appears to have the support of the international community. Prominent officials from the US, NATO, the European Union, Germany, Canada, Australia, Norway and Denmark were present at Ghani’s inauguration ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Kabul. Nevertheless, Abdullah’s opposition could cause further problems at a time when the government should be fully focusing on talks with the Taliban.
There is also the question of the Taliban’s true intentions. Writing in the New York Times, just nine days before the agreement was signed, deputy leader of the Taliban Sirajuddin Haqqani said of the agreement, ‘we are fully committed to carrying out its every single provision, in letter and spirit.’ However, until significant progress is made with intra-Afghan talks, many will be taking Haqqani’s words with a pinch of salt.
As US forces ready themselves to leave, officials in Kabul may increasingly ponder the fate of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) when Soviet forces withdrew in 1989. They will remember how Najibullah’s government could not hold back the Mujahidin forces and ultimately fell in April 1992. Four years later, the Taliban ousted the competing Mujahidin factions from Kabul and the country was essentially split between the Taliban and the warlords who were pushed back to the north. Now, many in Kabul will be wondering if history is about to repeat itself.
If US forces leave, but the civil war resumes shortly after, or is never really resolved during peace talks, two scenarios are likely. The present stalemate may persist, with the government struggling to assert authority in southern and eastern Pashtun-majority regions, or in the worst-case scenario, the government may collapse entirely. If the government collapses, the Taliban will likely control Pashtun-majority regions, leaving the remainder of the country to various warlords from Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other backgrounds.
A US report highlighted the possibility that even if the Taliban leadership honour the terms of agreement and take part in talks with Kabul, disgruntled hardliners may ignore calls to cease fighting and continue their campaign. The report also examined the possibility that hardliners might be drawn to extremist groups, such as the ISIS affiliate, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). The Taliban has fought against ISIS affiliates and splinter groups from amongst its own ranks since 2015. Lat year, ISIS affiliates condemned the US-Taliban talks and called on Taliban fighters to leave the group and join Islamic State.
Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the central government faces a tough task. The agreement even prohibits foreign private military contractors from operating in Afghanistan, so the ANDSF will be well and truly alone. Should the security situation deteriorate following the US withdrawal, it is questionable whether the ANDSF will be strong enough to confront the Taliban without assistance. Even if further conflict is averted, the government face an uphill battle to prevent the Taliban securing too many concessions during the negotiation process.
