What is the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty?

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11 min readNov 30, 2017

This week on the News and Information Study Group, our participatory YouTube Live Show, we are reading Reimagining Great Power Relations Part I Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr. One of the major topics this week is whether or not America is keeping its word:

The idea that previously agreed arrangements can be abandoned or renegotiated at will has succeeded the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” (“agreements must be kept”). The result is greatly reduced confidence not only in the reliability of American commitments but also in the durability of the international understandings that have constituted the status quo. In the security arena, this trend is especially pronounced with respect to arms control arrangements. As an example, Russia has cited American scofflaw behavior to justify its own delinquencies in Ukraine and with respect to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Ronald Reagan introduces the INF Treaty before the final negotiations with Gorbachev in 1987:

Well one thing left to do. One of the great challenges of these next months will be seeing if we can work out with the Soviet Union a better answer to nuclear weapons. As you know I’ll be meeting here in Washington with General Secretary Gorbachev, unless some hitch develops that we can’t foresee. But if all goes well we’ll sign an agreement that will for the first time in history eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.
It’s a good bargain. For every nuclear warhead of our own that we remove they’ll have to give up four. It would however be hasty to assume that we’re at the point where we’re ready to put pen to paper and sign the treaty.
But one thing and at least one important area. Verification. The treaty is not yet complete. Any treaty that I agreed to must provide for effective verification. Including on site inspection of facilities. Before and during reduction and short notice inspection afterward. The verification regime that we’ve put forward in Geneva is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. I actually learned a couple of words in Russian in order to talk about this with the General secretary. “Doveryai, no proveryai.” That is a proverb in Russia that says trust but verify.

Doveryai, no proveryai: Trust but verify

An introduction to the INF Treaty.

www.c-span.org

Verification is key here and what makes this work, but what is this we are verifying and why?

A little bit about Intermediate-Range Nuclear matters

Many of the treaty’s topics introduce themselves through the document itself. For instance some basic definitions:

Ballistic missiles

1. The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

Article II of The INF Treaty

This is one of the treaty definitions from Article II. A ballistic trajectory refers to the curve its path takes when subjected to gravity. The missile may be initially aided, but eventually drops. The OED defines a ballistic missile as such:

n. a missile which is powered (as a rocket) and guided only in the initial phase of its flight, thereafter falling freely towards its target, typically following a high, arching trajectory.

Cruise missiles

2. The term “cruise missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)” means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

Article II of The INF Treaty

On the left is one of the cruise missiles destroyed by the INF Treaty. The cruise missile is currently contentious because of a Russian claim that the treaty is currently being violated by drones whose definition is included under the definition of a cruise missile.

Here is how the OED defines a cruise missile:

n. orig. U.S. a weapon in the form of a guided pilotless jet aircraft carrying a warhead and able to fly at low altitudes.

The missiles and delivery systems initially destroyed

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

A static burn of Pershing rocket motor in 1988.

American Missile Types Destroyed

Soviet Missile Types Destroyed

Images of the weapon systems destroyed under the treaty:

Where are we today?

According to the State Department website, we are in compliance with INF Treaty obligations, but how is our relationship with Russia currently?

From the New York Times:
Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake
By TERENCE NEILAN
DEC. 13, 2001
In a move that reflected what he said was “a vastly different world,” President Bush formally announced today that the United States was withdrawing from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty that it signed with the Soviet Union in 1972.
Russia termed the move a mistake, but said it did not feel threatened by the decision. China, which was not a signatory to the pact, repeated its opposition to the missile defense system proposed by the Bush administration.
In making his announcement, Mr. Bush declared at the White House Rose Garden, “I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.”
“Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander in chief,” he added, “and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.”

Post ABM

Wikipedia has an article entitled: United States missile defense complex in Poland. There is much debate as to the purpose of this weapon. One justification is for intercepting long range missile strikes potentially by Iran and North Korea. Why is was this being built and who would it be likely to effect?

It is already clear that a new phase in the arms race is unfolding in the world. Unfortunately, it does not depend on us, it is not us who are starting it.

President Putin, February 8, 2008 as quoted in European Missile Defense and Russia by U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

This BBC article is the earliest I have yet found about the Polish missile base explicitly. Here also is an article from the Guardian about Russia’s response and arguments for why they don’t like this missile defense system in Poland.

In an interview with the Guardian, the Kremlin’s chief spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said Moscow felt betrayed by the Pentagon’s move. “We were extremely concerned and disappointed. We were never informed in advance about these plans. It brings tremendous change to the strategic balance in Europe, and to the world’s strategic stability.”
He added: “We feel ourselves deceived. Potentially we will have to create alternatives to this but with low cost and higher efficiency.” Any response would be within “existing technologies”, he said. As well as military counter-measures, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, also wanted “dialogue” and “negotiations”, he added.

Are many Americans unaware of how nervous this makes Russia? It seems as if the Obama administration was not:

In one of the biggest national security reversals of his young presidency, Mr. Obama canceled former President George W. Bush’s plans to station a radar facility in the Czech Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. Instead, he plans to deploy smaller SM-3 interceptors by 2011, first aboard ships and later in Europe, possibly even in Poland or the Czech Republic.
Mr. Obama said that the new system “will provide stronger, smarter and swifter defenses of American forces and America’s allies” to meet a changing threat from Iran. Administration officials cited what they called accumulating evidence that Iran had made more progress than anticipated in building short- and medium-range missiles that could threaten Israel and Europe than it had in developing the intercontinental missiles that the Bush system was more suited to counter.

In this New York Times article White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield, it is never clear that this was to deescalate the conflict with Russia:

The White House adamantly denied that its decision had anything to do with Russian objections to Mr. Bush’s program and said that the United States would continue developing the larger interceptors in case it eventually needed to deploy them.

Even so, it ends:

In Moscow, Mr. Medvedev offered a measured reaction. “We appreciate the responsible approach of the U.S. president toward implementing our agreements,” he said on national television. “I am prepared to continue this dialogue.”

The systematic attempts by individual countries and military-political alliances to shake up the existing balance in the sphere of arms control are extremely dangerous. The desire to achieve military superiority and to use the factor of force to achieve self-serving geopolitical ends seriously undermines strategic stability. The efforts by the United States and its allies in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and other regions to create a global layered missile defense system and to bring its elements close to the Russian and the Chinese borders remain one of the key problems in this regard.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference also said:

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) remains in a difficult situation. We have repeatedly affirmed our commitment to implement it. We spoke about our willingness to discuss the concerns of both parties, ours and the Americans’. Unfortunately, Washington persistently continues to make allegations against us, while refusing to specify them. This approach is not helpful in resolving the issues surrounding the Treaty. On the contrary, there is a suspicion that the real purpose of such false statements is to portray Russia as a willful violator of international obligations, while keeping quiet about their own double-dealing practices.
Our specific claims with regard to the United States in connection with the INF Treaty are well known and are certainly clear to professionals. Yesterday, President Putin made a clear statement about Russia’s political approach to this situation at the Valdai Discussion Club forum.
Other factors have a negative impact on strategic stability as well. In view of the absence of a ban on the deployment of weapons in outer space, except, of course, WMD, there is a threat that outer space can become a place for military rivalry. The possibility of such a development should be reliably precluded. The Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the non-deployment of weapons in outer space, as well as our initiative on no first deployment of weapons in outer space, which, in addition to Russia, is supported by another 16 states, are aimed at achieving this goal.

Drone Strikes

At the Russian Embassy, Lavrov raises questions about the legality of drones:

Question: Russia has been accused of violating the INF Treaty, which was adopted to reduce military risks in Europe. Has it really violated the treaty?
Sergey Lavrov: Russian authorities have more than once confirmed our commitment to the INF Treaty. We have not violated it. The United States claims that we have, but it has not provided any verifiable facts of such violations.
We have urged Washington again and again to abandon its megaphone diplomacy and instead to speak to the point in order to settle each other’s concerns regarding the INF Treaty and resolve potentially arguable issues. Moreover, we have very serious questions for the United States regarding the liberties it has taken with regard to the treaty. I am referring to the US programmes for creating targets for missile defence tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched intermediate-range missiles and missile launchers for ground-based BMD systems that can also be used to launch cruise missiles.
However, our American partners refuse to discuss these embarrassing issues. They prefer to talk about mythical Russian violations without producing any proof of these allegations. This strategy was used to float allegations about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Remember the definition for cruise missile from Article II of the INF Treaty?

The term “cruise missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.

How is that any different than a drone?

Additional Research:

We did not have time to put every link we found within, but here most of the articles that did not make it in.

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