China and big data: is technology liberating or repressive?
Jinghan Zeng
‘Big data’ is perhaps one of today’s most fashionable terms. The data revolution has allowed the application of big data to be extended to every aspect of our digital society. In adapting to the digital era, the Chinese government has been enthusiastic about big data. In November 2015, the State Council of China officially announced the development of its big data capabilities as a national strategy. China has the largest population of mobile phone, internet and social media users of any country in the world. By late 2015, it had 688 million internet users and 620 million mobile phone users. As such, there is considerable potential, and demand, for the application of big data in China.
The Chinese government is interested not only in big data’s potential in respect of business activity and technological innovation, but also in its potential to improve governance and upgrade state surveillance. China’s weak awareness of civil rights combined with the strength of the state, both in terms of financial capacity and in willingness to resist social autonomy, open up the possibility — perhaps more than a possibility — that cutting-edge ‘big data’ technology could be used to construct the most sophisticated electronic police state on the planet. This potential development re-opens the debate on the impact of modern information and communication technology (ICT), a subject which I recently wrote about in the November issue of International Affairs.
‘Liberation’ or ‘repression’ technology?
The rise of ICTs has sparked lively discussion about the changing nature of information dissemination in authoritarian regimes. Some consider ICTs as ‘liberation technology’. In particular, social media sites have attracted considerable attention owing to their potential as ‘liberation technology’, which challenges authoritarian rule through collective mobilization. For example, some argue that social media played a significant role during the Arab Spring by facilitating communication among individuals and the organization of political protests. Thus, the Arab Spring has been described by many as a series of ‘Twitter revolutions’.
Others, however, are sceptical about ICTs (especially social media platforms) as a potential liberating factor. They consider it as a ‘repression technology’ used by authoritarian regimes to strengthen their hold on power. The Great Firewall of China has shown that technology can be used to block information flow as well as enabling it. Instead of serving a liberalizing function, this technology prevents Chinese citizens from being exposed to foreign liberal ideas. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has been keen to spread pro-government views on Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter), especially after Xi Jinping took power in 2012. Thus, instead of undermining authoritarian rule, digital technology actually empowers authoritarian states by making them more capable of repressing civil rights.
From big data to Big Brother 2.0?
Edward Snowden’s revelations of 2013 astonished the world, showing that extensive surveillance could still be secretly implemented in western liberal democracies despite the existence of sophisticated and well-defined legal frameworks to protect citizen privacy against the abuse of state power. In comparison, the Chinese government faces almost no legal or practical obstructions when implementing ‘big data’ surveillance projects. It has hugely privileged access to citizens’ private information collected, while the evolving Chinese legal framework pertaining to citizen privacy seems to be leaning towards the side of the government.
At the request of the government, Weibo introduced a real-name registration scheme in 2012 despite the operator’s concern about its negative impact. All new Weibo users are required to fill in ID registration, as well as provide their real names, in order to sign up. This registration scheme is linked with the database of the Ministry of Public Security, which will verify the submitted registration information. The registration is not complete if the name and ID do not match.
In addition, the regime has attempted to build its capacity to forecast large-scale popular protest. As early as 2011, Beijing was considering an ‘Information Platform of Realtime Citizen Movement’ system, which would track the precise movement of 17 million mobile phone users in the city. Once implemented, this would provide real-time information about the movement of the population, and advance warning of any emerging large demonstrations.
Authoritarian backfire?
With its potential to improve governance and upgrading state surveillance, will big data strengthen authoritarian rule in the long run? I argue that there is a possibility of ‘authoritarian backfire’. That is to say, the use of digital data on a massive scale might backfire against the authoritarian regime. When data is highly concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals or agencies, it may be sufficiently destructive to damage the entire authoritarian regime if used in the interests of competing actors in power struggles.
In the era of big data, data means power. Thus power will be granted to those who control the data. This might change the power structure within the highly centralized authoritarian regime. The massive amounts of digital data controlled by the security bureau could turn into an information bomb at any moment if they were to fall into the wrong hands. This is a new version of an old dilemma for authoritarian leaders: how to ensure the security forces are in the right (loyal) hands. In the era of big data, this dilemma may translate into who has control in the sphere of cyber-security.
Sensitive information, especially regarding corruption, is frequently used by competing interests in power struggles in China. The Chinese government has already started to collect personal banking and credit information to identify the network of corrupt officials and collect relevant evidence. Even if the data is not deliberately used for power struggle, data leakage may significantly undermine regime legitimacy and the raise the possibility of the removal of leaders — just as the Panama Papers led to the downfall of Iceland’s Prime Minister.
So, will big data really strengthen or undermine the authoritarian rule in the end? While it may improve the authoritarian governance and state surveillance, the possibility of ‘authoritarian backfire’ should not be under-estimated. This is to say, the regime’s efforts to strengthen authoritarian rule by embracing big data may end up undermining it.
Jinghan Zeng is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations and Deputy Director of the Centre for Politics in Africa, Asia and the Middle East (AAME) in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London.
This blog is based on an article titled ‘ China’s date with big data: will it strengthen or threaten authoritarian rule?’ which was recently published in the November 2016 issue of International Affairs.
Click here to access the original article.
