China’s actions in the South China Sea are self-defeating
Kacie Miura explores Xi Jinping’s nationalistic foreign policy, its impact on maritime actors and international perceptions of Beijing.
Drawing on her article in the September 2023 issue of International Affairs, Kacie Miura speaks to Isabel Muttreja about Chinese maritime actors in the South China Sea. She delves into President Xi Jinping’s nationalistic foreign policy and consolidation of personal power to explain the aggressive action at sea and advises on how regional and international actors should respond.
What has been happening in the South China Sea in recent years?
The South China Sea is home to territorial disputes — involving China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei — that have been simmering against the backdrop of China’s rise as a military and economic powerhouse. These disputes have grown increasingly salient following the 2009 deadline for countries to submit their claims to continental shelf rights to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Following this, all parties increased their efforts to publicly defend their positions.
China’s actions include use of its coast guard and maritime militia to intimidate other claimants and the reclamation of disputed features like the Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs. Concerningly, China also rejected a ruling by an international tribunal that found no legal basis for its claims. These actions have alarmed its neighbours and contributed to growing regional tensions.
These acts of assertiveness have pushed other claimants, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, to seek strengthened defense partnerships with the United States. Over the last decade or so, as the US and other outside actors have become increasingly involved, the dispute appears to have gone from a contest over territory to a contest over the regional and international order.
In this context, there is a tendency in policy circles to view China’s behaviour in the South China Sea as an indicator of its broader strategic intentions, even though maritime actors often have their own political motivations for behaving assertively.
Why is China so assertive in the South China Sea?
China’s assertiveness precedes Xi Jinping, but it has intensified dramatically over the course of his tenure. There are several reasons for this. China’s rise during this period, particularly vis-à-vis other South China Sea claimants and the United States, has emboldened China’s leaders. Moreover, due to increased domestic attention to the disputes, China’s leaders are under greater pressure to stand firm and advance China’s claims.
As I argue in my recent International Affairs article, in order to more fully understand the reasons behind China’s assertiveness, one must consider the professional and political incentives of the various maritime actors who are tasked with defending and strengthening China’s offshore claims.
Xi’s use of nationalistic appeals and his effort to rid the bureaucracy of corrupt officials have generated incentives for maritime actors, including those in the People’s Liberation Army, coast guard and maritime militia, to demonstrate their loyalty through aggressive behaviour. In the current political climate, not only are acts of assertiveness more permissible, but they are also a key way by which maritime actors can enthusiastically showcase their support for Xi and his foreign policy.
What values underpin China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping?
Xi has promoted the ‘China Dream’, which is an aspirational concept that emphasizes national rejuvenation. The ‘China Dream’s’ strong nationalistic undertones, combined with Xi’s frequent references to the concept in speeches on foreign policy, reflect the importance that he has placed on taking a more activist international approach. In promoting this goal to foreign policy actors within the Communist Party of China (CPC) bureaucracy, he has repeatedly called on them to strengthen the ‘spirit of struggle’, which involves standing up to countries that infringe upon China’s sovereignty claims. By placing the goal of national rejuvenation at the heart of his highly personalized foreign policy approach, foreign policy actors now have reason to believe that assertive behaviour demonstrates loyalty and support for Xi’s worldview.
Due to his anti-corruption campaign, the spectre of getting caught in Xi’s dragnet makes its all the more imperative for foreign policy actors to take visible actions through which they can showcase their enthusiasm for the objectives and priorities outlined by Xi. As is often the case, when cadres are uncertain about how to interpret foreign policy directives, hawkish, aggressive acts that exemplify the ‘spirit of struggle’ have the appeal of appearing politically ‘safe’.
What are the implications of Chinese assertiveness beyond the South China Sea?
As maritime actors have used assertive behaviour as a way of demonstrating their eagerness to advance Xi’s foreign policy agenda, the broader foreign policy consequences for China increasingly appear to be self-defeating. Even if the intimidation of foreign vessels through aggressive on-water manoeuvres helps China to deter challenges to specific contested features in the South China Sea, China’s assertiveness has facilitated the formation of a coalition to oppose it. This is reflected by the US’s growing presence in the area and strengthening defence relationships with other claimants — developments that China has long wanted to prevent.
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea also feeds into perceptions of China as a revisionist power that is threatening the ‘rules-based’ regional and international order. These perceptions are not only damaging to China’s international reputation, but will also propel countries to respond in ways that will further complicate China’s rise. Moreover, the aggressive actions taken by China’s maritime actors, which are perhaps sometimes more extreme than intended by Xi, undermine efforts by other foreign policy actors within the Chinese bureaucracy to engage with states in the region.
The tensions that arise due to confrontations in the South China Sea thus undermine China’s attempts to enhance its soft power and improve relations with its neighbours. They also detract from China’s efforts to promote a more inclusive vision for the region as an alternative to the vision of a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific promoted by the US and its allies.
How should policy-makers respond to China’s foreign policy assertiveness?
Policy-makers should keep in mind that not all of China’s international behaviour is the result of strategic coordination. Even in light of the increasing centralization of foreign policy under Xi, foreign policy actors continue to advance narrow agendas and must act in ways that will best advance their careers. The current political environment in which these foreign policy actors operate under Xi provides them with incentives to engage in assertive behaviour. As such, policy-makers should carefully consider the political and professional reasons behind why these actors engage in such behaviour.
While countering displays of Chinese assertiveness is important, policy-makers should not lose sight of the importance of preserving off-ramps. Xi’s nationalistic appeals have only heightened the need for Chinese officials to demonstrate their willingness to stand firm against perceived foreign provocations. During a confrontation, unnecessarily inflammatory actions and rhetoric will risk further boxing into an escalatory response China’s leaders and foreign policy actors.
It is also critical that senior officials in the US and other claimant states establish or maintain open channels of communication with their Chinese counterparts, who play a key role in relaying messages both to the top and to those maritime actors on the frontlines. In addition, when meeting with Xi and other top Chinese officials, leaders should seek to emphasize how stability and abidance by international rules and norms in the South China Sea advances China’s long-term economic and diplomatic interests.
Read more about this topic in the full article ‘Strongman politics and China’s foreign policy actors: maritime assertiveness under Xi Jinping’. It was published in the September 2023 issue of International Affairs. It is free to access and download until the end of November 2023.
Kacie Miura is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of San Diego.
All views are individual not institutional.
