Does Africa have a China strategy?
Chris Alden and Lu Jiang
One of the implicit assumptions of much work on Africa is the idea that China has an Africa policy, but that Africa does not have any overt ‘China policy’. From closed-door meetings of senior policy-makers to open-air public debates, the assembled notables will move seamlessly from impassioned discussions as to the merits and shortcomings of, for instance, Chinese investment in a particular sector to a wholesale bemoaning of the absence of any comparable African strategy towards China. Its supposed absence is seen to be at the root of all manner of problems facing Africans as they seek to manage their development partnership with China. A relationship which, as we detail in our recent International Affairs article, is undergoing profound changes.
It is true that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been clear about its policy towards Africa by releasing white papers on ‘China’s Africa Policy’, first in 2006 and then an updated version in 2015, which outlined the principles that guide policy and the sectors of focus for Beijing. Looking for an equivalent public policy statement on China produced by Africans is indeed more complex — something which is of course to be expected given that it incorporates the views of all of the continent’s states. However, Africa’s China policy at both state and continental level does exist, or is ultimately revealed through careful analysis, even if it is demonstrated in a more practical and dynamic manner.
Key objectives of Africa’s China policy
To begin with, the strategic objectives of Africa’s China policy are evident and composed of the below principles. First, though not always publicly pronounced, mobilizing Chinese financial and technical resources, among others, to boost the economic transformation and development is obviously a key motivation for many African states. Second, for some regional powers as well as a continental actor such as the African Union (AU), aligning positions with and winning support from China on certain security and foreign affairs in the international arena are also among top considerations. This is, for instance, to increase the representation of African countries in the UN Security Council, and other agencies, and gain the support for ‘African solutions to African problems’. Third, some African governments are seeking alternative development partners and experiences from Asia, in attempts to go beyond Foreign Direct Investment. Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Rwanda, for instance, have explicitly produced ‘Look East’ policies, which take China, among other important Asian powers, into account.
The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
In terms of the action plans of Africa’s China policy, though we may not see that from the respective African states or the AU, their focuses and pursuits for the specific policy measures in engaging with China are well incorporated into the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) action plans released every three years. This is done through the pre-consultation mechanism involved in FOCAC: whereby ideas and proposals are widely collected — through Chinese embassies and offices in Africa and vice versa — and discussed — at the high-official meeting in the run-up to FOCAC — among all the participating African governments and the AU in order to formulate the action plans. In addition, African representatives are now being called to a coordinators’ meeting in between two FOCACs to provide feedback as to implementation of the action plans and suggestions for the follow-up measures. Indeed, the more responsive and proactive African countries, such as Ethiopia and South Africa, have managed to incorporate and shape the policy measures to be more favourable to their concerns. The FOCAC, therefore, has developed into a practical and increasingly mature platform for joint policy-making to make sure that African and Chinese parties both contribute, have a voice and hold each other accountable.
The Agenda 2063
Furthermore, Africa’s China policy has also taken a more dynamic form in that it continually incorporates the elements of Africa’s evolving demands and China’s shifting policies. The African Agenda 2063 initiative is a case in point. Devised over an extended period of time by officials at the AU, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank, it represents the most detailed blueprint of African development aspirations and priorities for the coming decades. African inputs into the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, which in large measure overlap with Agenda 2063 and to which Beijing subscribes, are a clear policy expression of Africa’s development aims which all external partners are expected to support. National development plans are expected to replicate, as appropriate, these continental guidelines. Notably, the FOCAC declarations make explicit reference to Agenda 2063’s priorities (for example, infrastructure, industrialization and agricultural modernization, among others) and, along with the SDGs, these certainly reflect Africa’s strategic aims.
Involvement in the BRI
Beyond this, African actors, either individual states or the AU, have also been closely following the development and shifts of Chinese policies and trying to make the most of them. The ‘belt and road initiative’ (BRI) launched by the Chinese government in 2013, with a special emphasis on overseas energy, power and infrastructure development, has since attracted widespread attention from the international community. The African continent was quick to respond to this new move and, so far, 39 African governments as well as the AU have signed memoranda of understanding with China concerning cooperation under the BRI framework. A few countries along the east coast of the continent (Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Mozambique) have also participated the ‘Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’ held by Beijing and secured multi-million dollar packages supporting infrastructure development through this engagement. The AU, furthermore, has sought to boost the continental framework of Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) by fostering its partnership with China under the BRI. Both the AU and individual African countries close cooperation with China’s BRI demonstrates, in particular, that the economic transformation and development objectives, as detailed above, are part of Africa’s China policy.
Conclusion
In a nutshell, though rarely manifested through explicit official statements, African states and the AU do have certain policies towards one of their foremost partners, China. They have clear goals for engaging with China to boost African states’ economic transformation and development, to gain support from China on certain security and foreign affairs, and to attract alternative development partners and experiences. The continent has also been increasingly able to utilize existing platforms — particularly the FOCAC — to shape the cooperation agenda with China by effectively incorporating their goals and evolving needs, as well as seizing opportunities of Chinese policy shifts such as the BRI.
Chris Alden is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), a research associate at the University of Pretoria and a senior research associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
Lu Jiang is a post-doc research fellow of the Fudan Development Institute and research fellow of Shanghai University of International Business and Economics.
Their recent article, ‘Brave new world: debt, industrialization and security in China–Africa relations’, was published in the May 2019 issue of International Affairs.
Read the article online here.
