(Mis)understanding Russia
Tracey German
The headlines and media attention surrounding a recent speech on security threats by General Sir Nicholas Carter, the UK’s Chief of the General Staff (CGS), were reminiscent of a previous era. Describing Russia as ‘the most complex and capable state-based threat to our country since the end of the Cold War’, he warned that hostilities could begin a lot sooner than expected and called for more resources to counter the threat.
The most telling parts of his speech were those that attracted the least attention. Although he emphasized the importance of analysing threats on the basis of capability and intent, he focused merely on Russian capabilities, providing very little analysis of intent. A lack of understanding of Russian strategy and intent, which has been in evidence since 2014, increases the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation. Insight into the wide range of tools at Russia’s disposal isn’t especially helpful without a clear understanding of how and why they intend to utilize them.
Western (not just British) understanding of Russia and Russian strategic thought has declined dramatically since the end of the Cold War, reflecting the lack of emphasis and focus on Russia at the state level. Russia was perceived to be a ‘problem solved’ and certainly not as a threat to the UK. Neither country had been a priority for the other since 1991: their bilateral relations largely took a back seat to relations between Russia and the EU, NATO and the broader West. Consequently, for many years UK interest in, and concerns about, Russia were largely connected to its membership of the EU and NATO, as well as its close relationship with the US.
The UK’s first published National Security Strategy (NSS) from 2008 mentions Russia in passing on several occasions in relation to energy security, US–Russia talks on nuclear disarmament and the need to engage with it on missile defence and Iran. The second UK NSS, published a year later in 2009, refers directly to the Russia–Georgia conflict of August 2008 and its ‘potential negative wider implications’. Nevertheless, the principal focus remained Russia’s contribution to, and impact on, European energy security, and it was not portrayed as a threat. The 2010 UK NSS made no mention of Russia at all, a startling omission, particularly when contrasted with the latest version — published in November 2015 in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 — which makes over 20 references to Russia.
The lack of political focus on Russia was reflected at the military level where the emphasis since 2001 has been on counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya: low-intensity, discretionary interventions rather than large-scale conventional operations against a peer competitor. By contrast, conventional military force has remained a central focus of the Russian military. Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the Kremlin has demonstrated an increased willingness, and ability, to use the military lever to achieve broader strategic and foreign policy goals. Despite this, many in the West continue to be surprised by the primacy of hard power and the use of force in Russian policy-making.
In an attempt to make sense of Russian actions, analysts in the West have seized hold of concepts such as hybrid warfare and the so-called Gerasimov ‘doctrine’ (based on the writings of Russian CGS General Valery Gerasimov), which are characterized as constituting a new Russian way of war. However, these developments are often not examined in their political, historical or organizational context, and unsurprisingly this approach has had very little success in terms of either understanding or countering Russian actions.
Carter paraphrased Gerasimov in his RUSI speech, suggesting that there are no longer distinct states of peace and war, but a series of stages that could creep up and surprise an opponent. There is irony in the fact that Gerasimov’s original writing from 2013 has been used to outline the potential threat to the UK from Russia, when in fact his preoccupation was the significance of instability in the Middle East, which he perceived to be driven by US-sponsored regime change.
Russia’s proactive and often ambiguous use of force (across the post-Soviet space and the Middle East) has been related to a variety of issues — not least to an attempt to counter the attraction of the EU, NATO and the West with hard power tools of coercion and threats. Russia has become increasingly concerned about the perceived expansion of western influence across the post-Soviet space and, in an attempt to counterbalance this, the Kremlin has sought to reassert its primacy by employing an array of unconventional tools that allow it to coerce its neighbours without provoking a military response. The Russian political narrative remains dominated by anti-western sentiment, as well as talk of ‘competition’ and the need to be ‘competitive’ with the West. This narrative of competition was echoed in General Carter’s speech with references to an era of ‘great power competition’ and ‘constant competition’.
Russia is undoubtedly the most ‘capable state-based threat’ that the UK is currently facing — but only because for many states the focus has not been on traditional state-based threats for years. Conventional defence and deterrence have not been a priority. Whilst states such as the UK have continued to cut defence spending in the belief that the era of conventional state-based threats had disappeared at the end of the Cold War, Russia has continued to emphasize the importance of the military lever of state power to achieve their strategic objectives.
The spectre of Russian military capability currently provides a very useful pretext for the British Armed Forces to plead for more resources from the Treasury. Those resources might be better spent on improving our understanding of Russian intent, its motivations and interests, to ensure effective deterrence in the future. Not to do so will increase the risk of escalation and miscalculation, with potentially grave results.
Tracey German is Deputy Dean of Academic Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London.
Her 2016 article in International Affairs is titled ‘NATO and the enlargement debate: enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting confrontation?’
Read the article here.
