Shinzo Abe’s dilemma: caught between Abenomics and nationalism
Joel R. Campbell
Shinzo Abe is one of Japan’s longest serving prime ministers. After leading what was viewed by many as a failed government in 2006–2007, his political career seemed over. He had pushed a largely nationalist agenda, including his ‘Beautiful Country’ programme which called for a conservative overhaul of the education system, the Self-Defense Force (SDF, Japan’s military), and the 1947 Constitution drafted by the post-Second World War American Occupation authorities. Unfortunately for Abe, the administration was derailed by a combination of cabinet scandals, serious gaffes by himself and his ministers, and mishandling of the fallout from the government’s loss of millions of pensioners’ records. Political comebacks are rare in Japan but Abe rose from the dead to take the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and then win a landslide victory in the general election at the end of 2012.
This time, he ditched nationalism and focused on the economy by introducing the ‘Three Arrows’ programme, commonly called ‘Abenomics’, aimed at raising the country out of the low-growth swamp in which it had been stuck since the early 1990s. The three arrows were an aggressive monetary policy including quantitative easing and pushing down the yen to boost exports, a brief targeted fiscal stimulus and structural reform of the Japanese economy. The first two arrows were achieved almost effortlessly, and observers at home and abroad were excited by the gathering revival. The third arrow, structural economic reform, proved much more difficult to bring about, as industry after industry balked at changing traditional business practices and cozy protective relations with government ministries. Abe then shifted focus to ‘womenomics’, a campaign to dismantle elements of patriarchy in business and introduce policies to allow women to better pursue full-time careers and to raise children without dropping out of the workforce. Briefly, he tried to promote a number of women as potential conservative leaders within the LDP. These efforts have achieved only limited success, and Japanese companies still move at a glacial pace in promoting women in their ranks or making their working culture more accommodating for mothers. As with any major Japanese social change, it will take time.
Meanwhile, nationalism has never been far from Abe’s thoughts during his second tenure as prime minister. Most recent media discussion on his government has been couched in the language of prelude: Abenomics is a mere opening act for the main event, which is amending or rewriting the constitution; and every election was seen as a benchmark before Abe could pivot to his real interests. Abe still would like to inject nationalist teaching into education curriculums and beef up the Self-Defense Force. So far, he has tread lightly along the nationalist path. He visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates Japan’s war dead since 1868 and includes fourteen Class-A war criminals from the Second World War period, but has not made this a yearly habit like his predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. These visits drive the Chinese and Koreans crazy because they imply whitewashing of Japan’s bad behavior in the wartime era, so Abe probably judged that it was not prudent to do more damage to bilateral relations than necessary to make a conservative political point. He appointed several avowed hardliners to his cabinet, but often did not reappoint them or shift them to higher positions.
Recently, Abe and his wife have faced scandal over their support for a nationalist school, Moritomo Gakuen, in Osaka. The prime minister allegedly helped arrange for the foundation behind the school to buy government land cheaply which, if true, would constitute a breach of ethics at the very least. It also raised troubling questions about why the prime minister would maintain a relationship with such a hard right organization, and what this says about his plans for Japanese education. The scandal briefly dented Abe’s public approval but he looks set to be reelected as the LDP president in September, which would set him and the LDP up for another general election win over a fragmented opposition, perhaps in 2019.
Abe’s nationalist-economic dilemma is a reflection of the broader foreign policy and economic dilemma facing Japanese society as it enters an uncertain era. Fifty years ago, Japan’s security seemed relatively stable, as the country largely depended on the US for its defense. Major student protests against the Vietnam War and Japan’s support for the U.S. alliance were widely seen as an aberration. The country was among the fastest growing economies in the world, topping ten percent growth most years. As late as the beginning of the 1990s, Japan grew at around four percent per year. Since the end of the Cold War, the security environment of east Asia has changed substantially, as a rising China, assertive Russia and scary North Korea make the majority of Japanese increasingly nervous. Meanwhile growth has stagnated alongside a fall in productivity increases and a failure to capitalize on the Internet and social media revolutions. Japan is also undergoing a demographic implosion. As fertility rates fell to 1.41 per woman in 2017, the general population and working population began to shrink, and the proportion of the population over the age of 65 ballooned. Accordingly, social pension and public health insurance costs have also increased.
One could argue that enhancing national security and returning to strong economic growth do not have to be mutually exclusive alternatives, but in Japan they have been seen as occupying separate baskets. Pursuing a nationalist agenda does not equate to smart security policy, given Chinese, Russian and Korean sensitivity to historical issues involving Japan. The problem is that Japanese politicians and businesses often seem unwilling to face the difficult choices that they will have to make over the coming decades. The country needs to cope with the demographic challenges while encouraging business to do things differently. They could take cues from the small and medium-sized businesses that have spearheaded some exciting initiatives in recent times, including the introduction of flexible schedules, widespread use of English, family-friendly workstyles, more employment of foreign and elderly workers, and emphasizing teamwork over traditional hierarchical work practices. Such reforms would just be the beginning of a much-needed transformation.
If he is still in office in September 2020, Abe will become the longest-serving prime minister in Japanese history, surpassing Eisaku Sato, who held office from 1964 to 1972. Will Abe, like his mentor Koizumi, push for another round of economic reforms, this time leading to deeper structural changes? Or will he return to his favoured nationalist agenda, looking backward to a Japan that has long been relegated to dusty history textbooks? I would bet that Abe is likely to continue temporizing in both issue areas, as it has served to keep him and the LDP in power. However, if long-term growth flattens he may be forced to take stronger action. The next two years will tell. Stay tuned.
Joel R. Campbell is Associate Professor of International Relations at Troy University, Pacific Region.
His recent Review Article in International Affairs is titled, ‘Japan steps up its game: Tokyo’s new security approach and its relations with Asia.’
Read the article (free until the end of September) here.
