Understanding the nuclear ban treaty
Laura Considine and Leah de Haan
This blogpost summarizes the key takeaways from a recent Chatham House webinar on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) given by Laura Considine, Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.
1. The ban treaty makes nuclear possession a humanitarian issue
The TPNW, or ban treaty, is based on the work of the Humanitarian Initiative, a movement comprised of governments, United Nations agencies and non-government organizations which stresses the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. By seeing nuclear weapons solely in the context of the human suffering that their use causes, these weapons then become part of the existing international humanitarian and human rights law structures.
This approach to prohibiting nuclear weapons follows in the path of other special weapons which are considered, by their very nature, to be inhumane and thus incompatible with principles of international humanitarian law. In doing so, the weapons themselves become the problem and it is their existence, not necessarily their use, which a treaty can prohibit. Based on this, the TPNW bans any signatory from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing or stockpiling, including in assisting other states with these activities.
2. It concerns stigmatization and delegitimization
In practice this means that the ban treaty is designed to delegitimize the object of the nuclear weapon which will then lead to the delegitimization of its possession. In other words, if we consider these weapons to be inherently inhumane, then possessing them is unacceptable.
Though it is clear that the states who already possess nuclear weapon capabilities will not sign up to the TPNW initially, the idea behind the treaty is that it will develop a norm where the possession of nuclear weapons will globally be seen as unacceptable. Such a norm will be strengthened over time as more states sign the treaty. This will put political pressure on the nuclear-armed states, as well as their allies, as their possession of nuclear weapons becomes stigmatized even without them being a signatory to the treaty. The very purpose of the treaty then is to change the existing narrative on nuclear weapons into one that considers their possession unacceptable and illegitimate under any circumstances.
3. Its relationship to the NPT is tricky
In many ways the ban treaty seems very much to be in the vein of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which limits the proliferation of nuclear weapons and requires all states to work towards nuclear disarmament — something which TPNW-proponents emphasize. However, there are clear tensions. This is as the NPT does provide some international legitimacy to certain states who possess nuclear weapon, at the very least according to the nuclear-armed states themselves. Instead, the ban treaty considers all nuclear weapons possession unacceptable.
This means that going down the road that the ban treaty has set out does to a certain extent challenge the influence of the NPT and, by extension, the stability of the nuclear status quo. In fact, critics have argued that the ban treaty weakens the norm of non-proliferation as well as legitimizes states’ withdrawal from the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation it stresses. This is contested by TPNW-proponents who argue that the TPNW strengthens the norm of non-proliferation by prohibiting nuclear weapons.
4. The nuclear-armed states really dislike it
Another key difference between the NPT and the TPNW is the relationship with nuclear-armed states. The NPT accepts the possession of nuclear weapons by China, France, Russia, the UK and the US — India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, the four other nuclear-armed states, are not members of the NPT. The ban treaty does not accept the possession of nuclear weapons by any of these states. This meant not only that the nuclear-armed states and their allies did not engage in the negotiations, but that they strongly denounced the process as irresponsible. In fact, after the adoption of the treaty, the US, UK and France released a joint statement stressing that they would never sign the ban treaty. They emphasize that the ban treaty risks undermining the stability of the existing international security structure and dismisses the importance of nuclear weapons to states’ national security.
5. The ban treaty’s future is unclear
The ban treaty opened for signature on 20 September 2017 after adoption at the United Nation by 122 states. It will enter into force once 50 states have ratified it. Given the opposition to the TPNW by the nuclear-states and their allies this may seem like a high bar, however 33 countries have already ratified the treaty to date.
However, reaching 50 signatories is only the first step on the way to achieving the stigmatization and delegitimization of nuclear weapons possession. Especially as the Great Powers, nuclear-armed states and their allies are actively opposing this. Here the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) which banned AP landmines is a particularly interesting precedent to look at. This is as it demonstrates that attempts to develop prohibitionary norms which stigmatize the possession of weapons can successfully change behaviour, even when not supported by Great Powers.
Despite the opposition the ban treaty is facing, there are thus examples of similar efforts being successful. The TPNW’s potential for success will rest both on whether proponents and signatories to the treaty can increase the stigma attached to nuclear weapon possession as well as on their inclination towards challenging the established structures which currently legitimize some nuclear weapon possession, including the NPT.
Laura Considine is Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds
Leah de Haan is Junior Editor in the International Affairs team at Chatham House.
The webinar drew on an article published in the September 2019 issue of International Affairs, titled ‘Contests of legitimacy and value: the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the logic of prohibition’.
Read the article online here.
