Why buffer zones are vital for understanding great power conflict
Boaz Atzili and Min Jung Kim outline the importance of buffer zones for the India–China rivalry and the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Buffer zones may seem like a historical relic, harking back to imperial geopolitics. However, in our recent article in International Affairs, we suggest that the concept of buffer zones provides a valuable analytical tool for understanding contemporary interstate dynamics. In this blogpost we argue that a more nuanced approach to buffer zones is vital for understanding escalating tensions among great powers, including between India and China and between Russia, Ukraine and NATO.
This more nuanced approach to buffer zones has three key features. First, one should understand buffer zones in the context of interstate rivalry. In other words, buffer zones are territories located between two rival states. Second, buffer zones are more than a simple binary of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Rather, they take on various forms and shades. The typology of buffers in our article can help understand the varying degrees and kinds of buffering that territory can provide, including everything from demilitarized zones to full buffer states and zones of mutual neglect. Lastly, an active buffer zone mitigates conflict between rival states by discouraging cross-border militarized attacks, reducing border clashes and providing a low-risk arena for contestation.
This way of thinking about buffer zones helps us to better understand prominent interstate conflicts, particularly in the India–China borderlands and the war in Ukraine.
Buffers in the India–China rivalry
Buffers were instrumental in maintaining stability along highly volatile frontiers between India and China.
Inherited from its British predecessor, India long considered Tibet a traditional buffer against China. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reflected: ‘From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent frontiers … We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India.’ But the Chinese communist annexation of Tibet in 1950 and its expanded control over the territory by the late 1950s brought Chinese military forces much closer to the disputed border with India, corroding the buffer between them. The absence of Tibet as a buffer reinforced mutual suspicions and led to escalating tensions between the countries, culminating in the brief but painful 1962 Sino-Indian War.
Following the war, partially due to resource constraints and partially to deny China infrastructure access in case of invasion, India consciously refashioned its north-eastern Himalayan borderlands into a new type of buffer, which we refer to as a ‘zone of neglect’. This approach involved creating internal buffers along India’s north-eastern frontiers and intentionally limiting the development of state institutions and infrastructure in the region. This strategy allowed India to reduce military interactions with the Chinese on the border, ultimately reducing interstate tension.
But in the twenty-first century, massive Chinese infrastructure projects and military deployment in Tibet and India’s parallel push in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh once again diminished the buffering qualities of the Himalayas. Interstate friction increased as troops on both sides interacted more frequently in disputed areas. The 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley was a tragic outcome of these evolving dynamics, resulting in the loss of dozens of lives.
Ukraine as a buffer?
In recent academic and policy debates, there has been active discussion about whether Ukraine should or even could serve as an effective buffer state between Russia and NATO. The answer to these questions is complex.
If we expand the definition to include a buffer between alliances or blocks, the geopolitical position of Ukraine makes the country a good candidate for a buffer state between NATO and Russia. Indeed, before 2014 Ukraine did function as a ‘zone of contestation’, in which Russia and NATO competed for influence through their local proxies on relatively equal terms, without one overwhelmingly dominating the territory.
The Maidan Revolution of 2014 tilted Ukraine to the West. Yet it was Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea and its support for armed separatists in the Donbas that established Russian hegemony in eastern Ukraine and pushed the rest of the country into the pro-western camp.
As Tanisha Fazal argued, buffer states have historically been much more likely to suffer ‘state death’ than others. This would have been the fate of Ukraine if Russia had succeeded in its initial assault in 2022. A Russian-controlled Ukraine would have lost its buffer status, bringing Russia into even more direct contact with NATO. Triggered by the increase in perceived Russian threat, recent NATO membership applications from Finland and Sweden further eliminate buffering between NATO and Russia.
Buffer choices for the future?
When considering the role of buffers in the future of NATO–Russia rivalry, one needs to remember that the buffer itself — in this case, Ukraine — has a high degree of agency. Ukraine as a state will not go back to a buffer zone status because the war has shown Ukraine that it cannot trust Russian security guarantees. Ukraine, hence, will seek membership in NATO or, at the very least, an institutional commitment from NATO to its security.
But not every buffer needs to be an independent state. One possible arrangement for future peace in Ukraine is establishing a ‘zone of management,’ similar to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. In such an arrangement, the Donbas will be returned to Ukrainian sovereignty, but become demilitarized, with a similar arrangement on the Russian side of the border. Such an arrangement could slowly re-establish stability in the region, but would require cooperation between Russia and NATO to limit their current engagements in Ukraine, as well as Ukrainian agreement. It is unlikely that Russia will agree to such an arrangement without a major military defeat.
In Ukraine, as on the India–China border, the erosion of buffers brought heightened tensions and increased the likelihood of interstate conflict. But re-establishing or creating buffers — and the stability they might offer — will prove difficult.
Boaz Atzili is an Associate Professor at the School of International Service, American University.
Min Jung Kim is a doctoral candidate at the School of International Service, American University, Washington DC, and a Visiting Researcher at UNU-WIDER in Helsinki.
Their article, ‘Buffer zones and international rivalry: internal and external geographic separation mechanisms’ was published in the March 2023 issue of International Affairs.
All views expressed are individual not institutional.
