The Trump — Putin Bromance and its Effect on the Annexation of Crimea
In 2014, Russia began making military incursions in Ukraine that ultimately ended with then-President Viktor Yanukovych being ousted from power and Crimea being annexed to Russia in a heavily disputed referendum. This series of events drew ire from much of the rest of Europe, and the West in general. In response, the European Union (as a collective), along with the United States, Australia, Canada, and a few others, implemented economic sanctions against Russia. The goal of such sanctions was to put pressure on Russia and provide incentive for the rogue state to comply with the measures of the Minsk II agreement designed to bring the Ukrainian conflict to an end.
These sanctions, introduced in July 2014, and thusly renewed three times for 6 months each, have been largely effective in hurting the Russian economy. Much of the reason for this success is the United States’ forceful stance against its Cold War foe and the unanimity of the 28 nation bloc created by the EU. However, a stark change in power looms in the United States, and with it so too does a change in American relations with Russia. Donald Trump’s perceived coziness with Vladimir Putin is well documented, particularly on the issue of Ukraine. On the campaign trail, Trump said that he “would look at” recognizing Crimea as part of Russia, a step that would legitimize a military takeover most of the world says is illegal under international law.
An American withdrawal of sanctions against Russia would likely have ripple effects across the Atlantic. Under the EU sanctions regime, sanctions are handed out through the rule of unanimity, with each member state having a formal veto. “During this two-and-a-half year period, a group of sanctions-skeptical EU nations including Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Hungary has bowed to pressure from German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Obama for western unity vis-a-vis Putin and refrained from exercising their veto power.” If the US is taken out of the equation, then several member states will be more and more unwilling to continue sanctions for a variety of reasons.
Perhaps most notably, US and EU sanctions have caused economic woes, not just in Russia, but throughout the European Union as well. These collectively are estimated to have cost the European economy as a whole over €100 billion in the 2015 fiscal year. While EU sanctions have cost pro-sanction nations the most (roughly 465,000 German jobs are deemed to be in jeopardy), those weary of the sanctions have also been hit hard with 335,000 and 215,000 jobs at risk in Poland and Italy respectively.
What’s more, these western sanctions have prompted counter-sanctions from Russia. These reciprocated measures against the EU have exacerbated this negative impact on the EU’s poorer members. Italy, for example, gets about 30% of its natural gas from Russia, and has had to pay more elsewhere the past several years. If the United States ends its sanctions against Russia then the EU’s sanctions become less effective and the logic for states like Italy to continue with them becomes less and less clear.
Whether this all happens is still up in the air. As of now the question of renewing economic sanctions again Russia is on the draft agenda for the next meeting of EU leaders on December 15 and 16. The last several renewals have gone through easily thanks to the political consensus of the member states. But with the United States’ role in a sort of limbo, the economic pressures caused by the sanctions may soon overcome the political principles they were originally based upon. After all, only one veto is needed to end the sanctions regime. If this comes to fruition, other measures, perhaps even militaristic ones, will have to be discussed by EU leaders if they are really serious about contesting Russia’s claim to the Crimean peninsula and the war in Ukraine in general.
