Israel-Palestine: Pt.3 — The Norm Enforcement Model

By Bhavya Mittal, Parikshit, Harshit Gupta

This is the third post in the series of Israel-Palestine conflict through the eyes of Game Theory. In this post, we try to model the prevalent disagreements between Israelis and Palestinians using something called the Norm Enforcement Model and try to see how the existing norms and practices further sustain the ongoing friction between the two nations. Let’s get started then.

Cartoon depicting the Israel-Palestine conflict

Introduction

Norms are unwritten rules and practices in society. As such, norms are also a potent force governing individual and societal behaviors. For example, in India, most people consider eating beef as a sin. This is so as a cow is considered ‘’holy’’ in Hinduism, which also explains the ban of beef by the government in some states.

Now suppose if there are many norms related to a nation in another. These norms may be in favor of the other state or against it. What if each and every one of them is against the opposite state? This instills an ill-disposed attitude towards them and thus breeds conflict. Let us take an example to clear this out. In Israel, it is forbidden to talk to someone from the Palestinian military. Since this norm is negatively related to Palestine, it causes further unrest between the two nations.

These negative norms are a major factor in giving rise to and sustaining the current unrest between the nations. The enforcement of these norms by the respective governments and people of the two nations can, thus, help us ‘model’ the conflict between them. Let us see how we can do that.

Basics of Norm Enforcement Model

1. Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Norm Enforcement Model has its roots in the classic model of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Whenever a norm is broken by a person, the person of that nation can be considered analogous to a prisoner. There will obviously be many prisoners but, like the classic ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, if we consider two prisoners at a time, they both have two choices: whether to co-operate or to defect.

1)By co-operation, that prisoner can stay silent and not say anything to the authorities.

2)In defection, that prisoner can snitch on the other prisoner and betray him.

Payoff Table for the players in Prisoner’s Dilemma

If we compare the payoffs for each strategy from the pay-off table to actual prison sentences, we can see that mutual defection is the ideal strategy for an individual.

When both the prisoners(players) chose to defect they get a sentence of P. When a prisoner remains silent and is ratted out by the other, the one who defects walks free while the accused gets the highest payoff as T. (Eg. T = 3, R = 1, S = 0, P = 2) T > P > R > S The sum of payoffs is least when both prisoners remain silent (co-operate) 2R < S + T. This results in mutual co-operation being the best collective strategy.

2. Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma

In the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma(IPD), prisoners interact across multiple periods, reacting to one another’s actions. In the case of IPD, we are considering the prisoner’s dilemma applicable for 2 agents over and over in n iterations. In such a setting, a prisoner’s decision to cooperate or defect today not only determines payoffs for the first iteration but also influences the outcome of future iterations.

A sanctioning stage in the game can lead us towards the strategy of mutual cooperation in which players may punish one another, iteratively. How?

If a player chooses to punish, the punisher incurs a cost, cp, where cp > 0, while the punished player is harmed h, where h > cp > 0. Such sanctioning is referred to as costly punishment and combining both the IPD model and a sanctioning stage, we arrive at the Norm Enforcement Model.

3. Norm Enforcement Model

The Norm Enforcement Model(NEM) can be considered as an extension of the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma model containing sanctioning or punishing stages — when we consider a long frame of time, where norms are broken repeatedly then and again.

The model assumes perfect information, that is: if a player defects, all other players observe the defection, and if a player punishes, all other players observe the punishment. The punishment involved is of 2 types :

1)Third-party punishment — direct punishment of defectors.

2)Higher-order punishment — indirect punishment of individuals who fail to punish defectors.

The strategy of a given player thus has two parameters. First, players must select whether to cooperate or defect. Second, players must decide whether to punish one other. Since prisoners have a fear of retaliation for today’s defection, they can be heavily punished by the sanctioning stage from the other prisoner and so as a result, they count on the other prisoner to co-operate as well. Both prisoners stay silent in the hope that the other person doesn’t punish them in the sanctioning stage. This way, mutual cooperation is induced.

Some underlying assumptions in the Norm Enforcement model are —

• The model assumes a sufficiently long “shadow of the future” or time frame, ensuring that agents sufficiently value future payoffs.
• All players observe the actions of their peers. This assumption merely serves to simplify the model.
• The cost of exacting punishment is relatively less than the damage induced (h > cp > 0). Costly punishment is a realistic behavior, observed across a variety of cultures and societies.

With the model in place, let us explore the different norms that influence the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Norms in Israel and Palestine

A man protesting in the Israel state

Social, bilateral, and international norms all influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The following sections elaborate upon each of the mentioned norms — explaining what they are, how they multiply and support the existing conflict, and employ the NEM to see how well they do so.

Social and Political Norms

Social norms define the acceptable conduct of people, enforced and sustained by the mechanisms of punishment identified in the Norm Enforcement model.

As societies embroiled in intractable, interethnic conflict, Israeli and Palestinian national narratives and societal beliefs are saturated with notions of ethnocentric superiority, enemy criticism, and the veneration of national unity. Consequently, Israeli and Palestinian social norms solidify such beliefs and ideals. Let us see how these ideas are ingrained in society through something called Internalization.

Internalization

Internalization is an individual’s acceptance of a set of norms and values through socialization. The internalization of social norms in Israeli and Palestinian society is widespread, as citizens strongly identify with their respective identities and national narratives. Strong internalization ensures that violating an established social norm becomes psychologically painful, even when material payoffs for defection are positive.

Why is internalization relevant?

In the structure of the Norm Enforcement model, internalization reduces the temptation to defect. If that is the case, then the norm goes on and thus conflict expands. Internalization ensures that violating an established social norm becomes psychologically painful, even when material payoffs for defection are positive. As such, widespread internalization eliminates the incentive to defect and further stabilizes existing social norms.

Israeli Norms

Discriminatory social norms in Israeli society include boycotts of Palestinian goods and services, as well as prohibitions against selling property to or hiring Palestinians. Such social norms have remained in existence for such a long time, given the severe punishments and social sanctions that await the Israelis who dare violate them. Businesses that hire Palestinian workers may be subject to boycott. Families that sell their property to Palestinians may be condemned and socially ousted. Furthermore, citizens who fail to punish defectors who get involved with the Palestinian community may be subjected to similar punishment, even being treated as defectors themselves.

Israeli political norms further worsen cooperation and compromise with the Palestinians.

Employing social media attacks and vigilante justice, Israelis punish politicians perceived as compromising with the Palestinians. Meaning that cooperation with Palestinians is termed punishable. Thus, such political attacks and violent reprisals inhibit political compromise and negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Both Israeli social and political norms are sustained by mechanisms of costly punishment, as well as widespread internalization. The primary mechanisms which sustain Israeli norms remain third party and higher-order punishment.

Overall, the robustness and authority of Israeli social and political norms indicate that the mechanisms sustaining such norms are strong, effectively preventing defections of cooperation and compromise with the Palestinians.

Palestinian Norms

The dominant Palestinian narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict characterizes Palestinians as innocent, moral people maliciously and violently uprooted from their homeland. As such, cooperating or even sympathizing with Israelis is equally worse as national betrayal, formalized in the Norm Enforcement model as defection.

Social norms in Palestinian society that inhibit defections of cooperation or collaboration primarily intend to hamper Israeli economic growth and territorial expansion.

Such social norms in Palestinian society include the boycott of Israeli products, the ban on land sales to Israelis, and the prohibition against cooperating with the Israeli military. Defectors face ridicule and social exclusion, stamped as Israeli collaborators. Furthermore, Palestinians are prohibited from selling land to Jewish or Israeli individuals, a social norm recently added into law by the Palestinian Authority. Defectors convicted of violating the prohibition face the death penalty.

Thus, both the boycott of Israeli products and the prohibition on land sales to Jews are maintained through higher-order punishment (punishing those who fail to punish defaulters), manifested as social exclusion, vigilante justice to name a few. Also, the norms prohibiting Palestinians from collaborating or cooperating with Israel are maintained through the most violent means of third-party punishment.

Furthermore, bystanders that fail to condemn and punish defectors are frequently denounced as defectors themselves, subject to the same severe mechanisms of punishment.

From the above discussion, it is evident how the prevalent social norms in the Israeli and Palestinian society sustain and encourage the ongoing conflict between the two nations. Changing our perspective a bit and coming onto bilateral and international norms, we will see how these norms act as major catalysts to further deepen the ongoing problems between Israel and Palestine.

Protesters from both nations going head-to-head

Bilateral Norms

Bilateral means something which affects both parties involved in a conflict. Bilateral norms are shaped by repeated interactions between Israelis and Palestinians, defining guidelines of acceptable conduct for interracial interactions happening amongst the two nations.

The Israeli state when dealing with terrorism claims to take a strict stand against it. However, while Israeli terrorists are typically tried for murder in Israeli courts and, if convicted, sentenced to life in prison. On the other hand, Palestinian terrorists are either slain in self-defense or tried for murder in Israeli courts, facing life in prison if convicted.

Also when dealing Palestinian defectors, they are punished by the Israeli government with the use of a collective form of punishments, which typically includes:-

1. Demolishing the defector’s family’s home, and forcibly removing its inhabitants.
2. Revoking social security and healthcare benefits from the defector’s next of kin.

Such powerful mechanisms of third-party punishment administered by the Israeli state sustain the bilateral norm and dissuade would-be perpetrators of terrorism.

Despite such severe penalties put upon terrorists by the Israeli state, acts of atrocious violence still occur with some frequency in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, predominantly perpetrated by Palestinians. Notably, robust third party and higher-order punishment of terrorists remains absent in Palestinian society. In fact, terrorism is regularly celebrated by citizens and political leaders in the Palestinian community. Without robust enforcement of the norm prohibiting terrorism, heinous acts of extreme violence and terrorism will continue to haunt both communities and thus reinforcing interethnic hatred.

International Norms

International norms are the informal rules and regulations determined by the international community that constrains sovereign domestic and foreign policy.

The purpose of organizations such as the UN is to codify and enforce such international norms, looking over the domestic and foreign policy of sovereign states. However, the UN realizes little success in constraining the domestic and foreign policy of nations due to the organization’s inability to reliably produce consensus and its lack of effective mechanisms for punishment, if any nation commits a violation. Thus, the failure of the UN to enforce international norms is well explained by the missing effective mechanisms for punishments that are critical to the Norm Enforcement model.

Today, the UN regularly addresses the conflict by condemning Israel’s domestic policy and security strategy. Yet, despite many resolutions and denunciations, the UN has had little to no impact on Israeli policy. UN resolutions censuring Israel and demanding adherence to international norms typically fail to attain a complete agreement for punishing the Israeli state. Even when the UN is able to reach a conclusion against the state, it lacks effective mechanisms to materially punish Israeli violations of the international norm prescribing settlement expansion.

Thus, few viable mechanisms of third-party punishment exist for stemming the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements. Consequently, the Israeli government has no external incentive to enforce any such norm internally.

All the above norms and their enforcements act as a major catalyst to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. How? Since these norms are followed by extreme punishments amongst the Israeli and the Palestinian society, they are continued across generations further deepening the already present divide between the two nations. The Norm Enforcement model just tries to give a brief logical explanation as to why this is the case.

Through this article, we hope you now have a new view to look at the Israel-Palestine conflict with the eyes of game theory. We touched upon the Norm Enforcement model and saw that how this model can correctly describe the conflict which has been sustained through the norms prevalent in both societies. Will the conflict reach a solution is a question which the future can answer better. Till then, stay tuned for more by IGTS, NSUT!

Bibliography

Dobrushkin, Eryk. 2019. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bachelor’s thesis, Harvard College