Chinese Students’ “Turn against the West”

Jason CHAO
Jun 10 · 23 min read

From admiration of western democratic ideals to ignorance of western values

Introduction

In February 2019, Chinese students studying in Canada staged protests against the election of a pro-Tibetan independence president of a students’ union and a talk on the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China. The students did not seek to engage the debates, but rather, sought to silence any voice critical of China.

Chinese nationalism is the main driver of the protests. However, from the perspective of the West, the students’ actions are violating others’ freedom of speech. Traditionally, Chinese students studying abroad were admirers and learners of western ideas. Their acts in defiance of western values signal “a turn against the West”.

A number of factors also contribute to the Chinese students’ “turn against the West”, which are: a shift in students’ attitude to consumers, the intensification of propaganda campaign and surveillance by the Chinese government, and the formation of social bubbles.

Chinese Nationalism

China has prided itself on its cultural tradition.[1] For thousands of years, the Chinese regarded foreigners as “uncivilised”, or literally “barbarians”.[2] Traditionally, China did not have a strong sense of “nationalism”.[3] “Chinese-ness” is more about whether the rulers and the social hierarchy are arranged in line with the Confucian ideal.[4] The ethnicity of rulers did not matter as much as adherence to Confucian norms.[5] Chinese culturalism is more of a “non-territorial concept”.[6]

Not until the 19th century, did the might of Chinese culturalism encounter a disruption.[7] The defeat of China to the British at the First Opium War opened a floodgate of exploitation by western powers.[8] In a series of “unequal treaties”[9], China was “forced” to open trade ports[10], grant extraterritoriality to nationals of some western countries[11] and lease out territories to foreign powers[12].

Following the Second Opium War (1859–1860), the government of the Qing dynasty of China realised its technological backwardness which would put its survival at risk.[13] The superiority of technologies developed in the West was believed to be the major cause of the defeat of China.[14] The Qing dynasty started a project known as “Self-Strengthening Movement” aiming to learn the latest technologies from the West[15] to defend itself while preserving the old culture and systems[16].

The Self-Strengthening Movement modernised some Chinese industries and the military.[17] However, following a devastating defeat of the Chinese navy to the Japanese one, the movement was regarded as a complete failure.[18]

The defeat stimulated calls for further reforms, in particular, introducing western ideas to the political system.[19] Unfortunately, the realisation of backwardness in the systems was too late. Subsequent military and political encounters with the West could only be more humiliating.[20]

The fall of China from the position as a cultural and political leader in the region to a loser was described as “national humiliation”.[21] The consciousness of humiliation caused a shift in Chinese identity from culturalism to nationalism.[22]

In contemporary China, the history of national humiliation and the cultivation of nationalism are indispensable parts of the curriculum in all Chinese schools.[23] In popular culture, the struggle against Japanese aggression in World War II is a recurring theme in Chinese TV dramas.[24] In 2012, in response to a Japanese gesture to display effective control over Senkaku islands (or Diaoyu islands according to the Chinese), violent street protests against Japan erupted in multiple Chinese cities.[25] Shops believed to be Japanese investment suffered from damages.[26]

Chinese Students Abroad

In the 1870s, as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Qing dynasty sent 120 children to the United States (US) for education.[27] These children were hoped to bring knowledge in military technology back to China for the defence against western powers.[28] However, the children’s rapid cultural assimilation to Americans was seen by the Qing officials as a sign of rebellion against the Chinese roots.[29] The officials could not stand the contamination of western cultures.[30] The study programme was prematurely terminated.[31] Most children had to leave the US for China.[32] Upon their return to China, they were not given important roles and positions.[33] Not until the military defeat of China to Japan at sea a quarter century later, did the Qing dynasty appreciate the values of those who studied in the US.[34]

After the fall of the Qing dynasty, the sentiment that “everything from the West is good and everything from China is bad” is popular and strong, especially amongst the Chinese students who wish to study in the West.[35] In 1911, Tsinghua College was founded in Peking to prepare Chinese students for studies in the US.[36] At Tsinghua, there was a “western Fever” — meaning that the students “admired all things western”.[37] Students who made it to US had debates about bringing reforms in China in light of Western models.[38] Many Chinese students abroad believed that the old Chinese culture should be dismantled to give room to “[building] an imitation of the West”.[39]

In the early 20th century, Chinese students abroad were heavily influenced by the political and cultural ideas of the West.[40] Yet, the students did not call for a complete abandonment of Confucianism.[41] Some students envisioned an idealised form of Confucian China to contrast with the materialism and individualism of the West.[42] It was clear that the Chinese students had a good understanding of the mainstream values of the West.

Many Chinese educated in the West made a prominent contribution to the modernisation of China in the first half of the 20th century.[43] However, after the Chinese Community Party (CCP) took power in 1949, those studied in the West were seen as “traitors”, except for those who went to the Soviet Union.[44] Only after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, could the intellectuals trained in the West be “resurrected”.[45]

In 1978, China opened its door again to the outside world and started a transformation to the market economy.[46] Studying abroad became desirable again.[47] In the 1980s, students in China showed admiration for opportunities to the study in the US.[48] Also, Chinese students abroad were enthusiastic in promoting democratic reforms in China.[49] From overseas, they signed open letters to the CCP to call for reforms.[50] American political scientist Maria Chang even described Chinese students as “the most uncynical believers in American democracy”.[51]

However, in the aftermath of student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese government tried to control the “craze” to study abroad.[52] The Chinese government imposed a five-year work requirement or a fee for those who wish to study overseas.[53] This measure was in force for 12 years before its abolishment in 2003.[54]

The CCP stepped up its efforts in ideological control and surveillance of Chinese students inside and outside China.[55] The diplomatic missions of China facilitated the opening of branches of CCP on western campuses to reinforce the official ideology of the CCP amongst Chinese students.[56] Some students were recruited as informants to spy on their peers for speech critical of the Chinese authorities.[57] Chinese students knew that they could be reported to the embassy for what they had said in the classroom and at public events.[58]

Australian professor Kevin Carrico reported his students’ account that the Chinese authorities reached out to the students’ parents in China for the “sensitive comments” that they had made in class in Australia.[59] The use of parents to exert influence on Chinese students is understandably effective in Confucian culture.

In a recent study on the attitudes of Chinese students studying in the United States, the main motive for them to study abroad was to “gain a new perspective on my own country”.[60] However, they tended to disagree that “political easiness in programs abroad” was one of their motives.[61] Also, even more Chinese students disagreed that they wanted to be “away from my country.”[62] Like the Chinese students in the past, China has a central place in their studies and aspirations. However, the value of political openness of western intuitions is now much less appreciated compared to the time before 1989.

Petition against pro-Tibetan Independence Student Union Leader

In February 2019, “Kennedy L” started an online petition against the election of Chemi Lhamo as the president of the student union of University of Toronto’s Scarborough Campus (UTSC).[63] The original text of the petition has been taken down and was replaced by a toned-down statement.[64] Fortunately, the Wayback Machine of the Internet Archive has kept a copy of Kennedy L’s original statement (figure 1).[65]

Figure 1. Screenshot of Kennedy L’s original statement found in the Internet Archive

In the statement, Kennedy L offered two “reasons” questioning Lhamo’s election.

For the first “reason”, Kennedy L accused Lhamo of using “miserable experience” to win the sympathy of voters at her election campaign. Kennedy L said in an assertive manner that it was not Lhamo’s proposal that got her elected. He speculated that many students “actually [did not] want to vote for [Lhamo].”

For the second “reason”, Kennedy L pointed to Lhamo’s involvement in political groups, in particular, “Free Tibet”. Kennedy L said that Lhamo “was irrational about this” and had “talked about [Asian] regional conflicts badly”. Kennedy L argued that Lhamo’s posts on social media would “damage the relationship and feeling of international students”. Kennedy L continued to say that international students would not feel comfortable with a student union leader “criticising foreign countries”. Finally, according to Kennedy L, “international students” need “[respect] from the university” and they felt “insecure” with Lhamo serving as the president of the students’ union.

The first “reason” concerns Lhamo’s campaign strategy and the voters’ voting behaviour. This accusation might look trivial in the eyes of people who have experience with elections in a democracy. Sometimes, of course, election results in the West may be questioned when voters are believed to be misled by the disinformation, as in the case of Donald Trump’s election in 2016.[66] However, the incorporation of some sentimental elements in a candidate’s personal life into an election campaign is totally permissible.[67] Furthermore, except a mention of his knowledge of some “complains”, Kennedy L did not substantiate the first “reason” with much evidence. I interpret that the critique of Lhamo’s campaign strategy is a façade to the second “reason”.

The second “reason” concerning Lhamo’s involvement in the Free Tibet movement is the meat and is supplied with more evidence. A screenshot of Lhamo’s Instagram account was attached to the statement. In the screenshot, the phrase “Free Tibet” in the description of Lhamo’s account was circled in red. The strongest argument in the second “reason” is that Lhamo’s past criticism on “foreign countries” would make “international students” feel not respected.

The name “Kennedy L” per se does not reveal a lot about the nationality of the petitioner. Although there is no single reference to “China” or “Chinese” in the statement, the reaction of Chinese students to the petition and the subsequent events suggest that Chinese nationalism is the motive behind the petition[68]. It looked that Kennedy L tried to frame the issue beyond Chinese concerns. However, a lack of elaboration on the loaded words like “irrational” and “badly” does not help make the statement look objective. Kennedy L’s attack on Lhamo’s legitimacy in election victory by virtue of her election strategy and international students’ “feelings” looks very unpersuasive.

On Instagram, Lhamo posted photos to show her identification with the Tibetan culture and her presence at Free Tibet events.[69] In the captions of some of her photos, she made criticism of the Chinese government in photo captions for the mistreatment of Tibetan people on human rights grounds.[70] In my judgement, Lhamo’s social media contents could hardly be associated with the ideas of xenophobia, irrationality or hatred understood in the West.

Ladder Street — the social media account of the Chinese students’ association of the UTSC’s business school — posted a statement calling on the Chinese students to sign the Kennedy L’s petition (figure 2).[71] This statement, written in Chinese, revealed more inner reasons behind the call for Lhamo’s disqualification.

Figure 2. Screenshot of the Ladder Street statement

The main ideas of the Ladder Street statement are translated into English as follows.

“There are about twelve thousand Chinese students at the University of Toronto contributing a total of 700 million dollars in tuition fee [to the university]. But [the university] still allowed the existence of pro-Tibetan independence associations.”

“This time… the [student union] will be managed by [people who support] Tibetan independence.”

“… Few candidates were Chinese. But many votes were drawn from Chinese [students] …”

The “Overseas Students in North America Post” put “700 million [dollars] of tuition fee to support a pro-Tibetan independence student union president” (translated from Chinese) in the title of its article about the petition.[72] The Global Times — a subsidiary of the mouthpiece of the CCP[73] — put “using Chinese students’ money to support Tibetan independence; doesn’t your conscience feel hurt” (translated from Chinese) in the subtitle of its report on the petition.[74] The references to tuition fee suggest that Chinese students are very mindful of their monetary contribution to educational institutions.

The Ladder Street statement shows Chinese students’ intention to rid the university campuses of the presence of pro-Tibet independence associations. The intention may be explained by the trend of students becoming consumers[75] against the backdrop of the marketisation of higher education institutions[76]. When students see themselves as “consumers”, they would feel “right” to ask the service provider, an educational institution, in this case, to remove what they dislike.

Kennedy L’s petition went viral with over 10 thousand people signing the petition.[77] Chinese students flocked to Kennedy L’s petition page to post their comments.[78] The original comments left on the petition page are no longer accessible. The “Overseas Students in North America Post” highlighted some comments as follows.[79]

Kevin Mo said “[she] rebels against her country and the people and she should get out here”.[80] Mo asserted that Lhamo was a Chinese national and used the language of subversion to describe Lhamo’s political activities. Indeed, Lhamo was born in India and is now a Canadian citizen.[81] Mo’s assertion of Lhamo as “Chinese” for the purpose of criticism is consistent with a strategy of the Chinese government to impose Chinese nationality on foreign nationals based on ethnicity as to justify criminal jurisdiction[82].

Dominic Wang said “[such] a pathetic hypocrite shouldn’t be the president of the student union …”.[83] Dominic Wang’s comment was loaded with strong words. However, these words look very thin, in the absence of evidence or elaboration.

Vince Wang acknowledged the principle of freedom of speech.[84] However, Vince Wang insisted that “as a leader of the student government, you shouldn’t have any political attempts in your [mandate] because you represent the campus….”[85] Vince Wang’s comment invoked the idea of free speech but made an exception to it using an utilitarian reason that Lhamo’s stance on Tibet would create problems representing the students.

The most popular type of comments identified by the “Overseas Students in North America Post” is about “the unity of the motherland”.[86] These comments usually contain the expression of “Tibet is part of China”.[87]

The rhetoric using loaded words works only with people in support of Chinese nationalism. I believe that the comments, although written in English, hardly resonate with the western community. On the contrary, Lhamo’s posts on social media in relation to the Free Tibet movement stood well on the grounds of free speech and self-determination.[88] Concerns were raised in the West over the reach of the Chinese government’s “long-arm” to the West.[89]

Protest against Talk about Treatment of Uyghurs in China

Figure 3. Joint statement of Chinese students’ associations at McMaster University

Meanwhile, at the McMaster University in Ontario, Canada, a protest of the same nature happened. On 11 February, Chinese students staged a protest against a talk on the mass internment of Uyghur Muslims in China.[90] Chinese students filmed the talk, shouted at the speaker and then walked out.[91] Two days later, five Chinese students’ associations at McMaster University issued a “joint statement” in Chinese (figure 3).[92] The main points of the joint statement are translated into English as follows.

“On 11 February two student associations at McMaster hosted a ridiculous anti-China talk which used an Uyghur orphan as a sham to promote [a] separatist movement […], incite racial hatred and raise fund through attacking the Chinese government.”

“The associations of Chinese students [condemns] the event that fabricates [information] and confuses right and wrong.”

“We negotiated with the University […] to demand that [..] the events are compliant with rules and the dignity of Chinese students unviolated.…”

“On 12 February morning, we reported [the event] to the Chinese consulate in Toronto.”

“Facts are stronger than rhetoric. Anyone unbiased and nonhostile would be happy to see the unity, friendship and harmony of the Chinese peoples, rather than making hostile and false accusations.”

Chinese students said the talk was anti-China and was about lies. The students targeted not just the speaker but also the organisers of the talk. The students did not see themselves as individuals independent of the Chinese government. The statement implied that attacking the Chinese government meant attacking the dignity of Chinese students collectively.

Like the case of the petition against Lhamo, Chinese students tended to loaded language with little backup. Indeed, the merits of the statement may hardly be evaluated without the authors’ elaboration, especially, on the “lies”. However, the Chinese students did not engage with the content of the talk but the very existence of the talk.

Furthermore, concerns over the religious freedom of the Uyghur ethnic group in China are raised at the United Nations (UN) level.[93] The issue of detention and mistreatment of Uyghur people by the Chinese government is widely reported by the media in the West.[94] Students from China might have little knowledge of it because of news censorship in China.[95]

The Chinese students entangled their personal dignity with the government’s line. In the eyes of those living in the West, these Chinese students may be regarded as highly ignorant of current affairs.

The Chinese Embassy’s Endorsement

On 16 February 2019, the Chinese Embassy in Canada released a statement in response to the petition against Lhamo and the protest at McMaster University (figure 4). Main points are translated into English as follows.

“The recent incidents at [these universities] had nothing to do with the [Chinese] Embassy. However, we firmly support the Chinese students’ patriot and just actions…”

“Canada [allows] the free speech of the Uyghur secessionist power and Tibetan independence. Those who hold the opposite view should also enjoy the freedom of speech…”

Figure 4. Screenshot of the statement by the Chinese Embassy in Canada

The Chinese Embassy denied their involvement but openly endorsed the students’ actions. The embassy described the students’ actions “just” and “patriot”. Reference to patriotism definitely concerns Chinese nationalism. The invocation of the idea of free speech in the Chinese Embassy’s statement looked hypocritical from the western perspective. The very fact that Chinese students sought the cancellation of the event and rejection of Lhamo’s election for her political opinion was seen in the West as an intent to breach other parties’ free speech.[96] More importantly, the students did not engage in the dialogue.

The embassy’s statement may keep Chinese students’ morale high. However, the Chinese students’ display of nationalism while undermining the values cherished in the West would make westerners feel their openness being threatened.

Discussion and Conclusion

At least before the Tiananmen protests in 1989, Chinese students studying abroad were keen learners, or even admirers, of “everything in the West”. They wished to bring ideas from the West to modernise China, economically and politically. After 1989, the Chinese government tried to shield the students from the influence of western ideas. In recent years, the Chinese government carried out surveillance on the Chinese students abroad to strengthen ideological control. It seems that the contemporary Chinese leaders are adopting a utilitarian position similar to that of the officials of the Qing dynasty — acquiring scientific and technological knowledge from the West to protect the existing political structure.

This generation of Chinese students abroad seems much less influenced by or familiar with the values of the West compared to the pre-1989 generations. In the petition against Lhamo’s election, the Chinese students’ poor understanding of what “respect” and “dignity” mean in the West makes their invocation of these ideas as to appeal to non-Chinese audiences a failure. They could not present a stronger argument other than one based on Chinese nationalism. From a western perspective, unless for those who understand well the history of “nationalism humiliation” in relation to Chinese nationalism, the Chinese students’ arguments would look flimsy and unpersuasive. Furthermore, western universities would have no problem giving priority to the free speech of the Free Tibet movement and the Uyghurs in China because their concerns are well-grounded on the fundamental rights that supersede the interest of nationalism. Nevertheless, strategically speaking, the Chinese students did not take advantage of their access to the uncensored Internet to learn the western narratives around Chinese issues.

The emphasis on the tuition fee in the statements shows a strong tendency that the students see themselves as consumers. It is interesting to note that references to tuition fee are only found in materials written in Chinese but not in English. A shift in the students’ attitude to consumers may explain students’ expectation for the student union and the university to respect the view of Chinese nationalism.

In the advent of mobile technologies, Chinese students abroad get their news on their mobile phones as they were in China.[97] Although they live in a country with free internet, the social media circles in which they live in are still behind the Great Firewall of China.[98] The self-contained ecology of the Chinese Internet enables students to live in Chinese social bubbles.[99] It is interesting that a century ago, the Qing officials foresaw this possibility.[100] So, they dispersed the Chinese students across multiple towns in the north-eastern US to reduce their interactions with Chinese-speaking peers to foster the learning of English.[101]

In the West, these incidents were conceived as attempts of the Chinese government to interfere with the domestic affairs of western countries.[102] Although there is evidence that the Chinese Embassy “supported” the students’ actions, the students’ statements and comments suggest that the petition and the protest were started on their own initiative. The students saw criticism of the Chinese government as “anti-China” and thus against themselves as individual Chinese students. A strong sense of affiliation with the Chinese state is probably the success of the Chinese ideological work in education and popular culture.

From the perspective of historical development, the mindset of the Chinese students studying in the West was shifted from admiration of western democratic ideals to ignorance of western values. Students are now more drawn to the defence of the Chinese government than the aspiration to learn western ideas to reform China. Nevertheless, the students’ advancement of national interests abroad hits the freedom of speech — one of the core values of democracy — hard. I call this change a “turn against the West”. Indeed, taking into account their relatively low understanding of western values nowadays, the students themselves may not be conscious of “the turn”.

Finally, no single factor can explain “the turn” fully. While Chinese nationalism is the driving force, the Chinese students’ turn against the West is also facilitated by Chinese government’s propaganda work in education and popular culture, intensified surveillance on students and the formation of social bubbles as afforded by the technology.

[1] Townsend, ‘Chinese Nationalism’, 99.

[2] Townsend, 111.

[3] Townsend, 98–99.

[4] Townsend, 99.

[5] Townsend, 99.

[6] Townsend, 100.

[7] Townsend, 99; Cabestan, ‘The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism’, para. 8.

[8] Cabestan, ‘The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism’, para. 8.

[9] Callahan, ‘National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism’, 204.

[10] Bickers, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of western Domination, 11.

[11] Bickers, 17.

[12] Bickers, 14.

[13] Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81, 1:1–2.

[14] Rhoads, 1:2.

[15] Qu, ‘Self-Strengthening Movement of Late Qing China: An Intermediate Reform Doomed to Failure’, 150.

[16] Qu, 150.

[17] Qu, 152.

[18] Qu, 152.

[19] Karl and Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China, 214:136.

[20] Bickers, Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination, 154.

[21] Callahan, ‘National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism’, 202.

[22] Townsend, ‘Chinese Nationalism’, 98–99.

[23] Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, 99.

[24] Yu, ‘China’s Bizarre Anti-Japanese TV and Movie Kitsch Backfires’.

[25] Taylor, ‘Anti-Japan Protests in China’.

[26] Taylor.

[27] Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81, 1:4.

[28] Rhoads, 1:2.

[29] Rhoads, 1:216; Bieler, Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students, 7.

[30] Bieler, Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students, 7.

[31] Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81, 1:216.

[32] Rhoads, 1:217.

[33] Rhoads, 1:217.

[34] Rhoads, 1:5.

[35] Bieler, Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students, 69.

[36] Bieler, 51–54.

[37] Bieler, 83.

[38] Bieler, 142.

[39] Bieler, 142.

[40] Bieler, 142.

[41] Bieler, 142.

[42] Bieler, 142.

[43] Bieler, 315–45.

[44] Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81, 1:6.

[45] Bieler, Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students, 349.

[46] Brandt and Rawski, China’s Great Economic Transformation.

[47] TIME Magazine, ‘Thinking About Home.’

[48] Bieler, Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students, 352.

[49] TIME Magazine, ‘Thinking About Home.’

[50] TIME Magazine.

[51] TIME Magazine.

[52] Yang and Wagner, ‘Tiananmen: China’s Struggle for Democracy-Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact’, 225.

[53] Yang and Wagner, 226.

[54] 教育部, ‘教育部关于简化大专以上学历人员自费出国留学审批手续的通知’.

[55] Radio Free Asia, ‘Chinese Universities Ordered to Spy on Staff, Students in Ideological Crackdown’; Saul, ‘On Campuses Far from China, Still under Beijing’s Watchful Eye’.

[56] Allen-Ebrahimian, ‘The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting up Cells at Universities across America’.

[57] Saul, ‘On Campuses Far from China, Still under Beijing’s Watchful Eye’; Corr, ‘Chinese Informants In The Classroom: Pedagogical Strategies’.

[58] Saul, ‘On Campuses Far from China, Still under Beijing’s Watchful Eye’; Corr, ‘Chinese Informants In The Classroom: Pedagogical Strategies’.

[59] Redden, ‘China’s “Long Arm”’.

[60] Chao et al., ‘Chinese Students’ Motivations for Studying in the United States’, 264.

[61] Chao et al., 264.

[62] Chao et al., 264.

[63] Free Tibet, ‘OVER 10,000 SIGN PETITION REJECTING A TIBETAN AS UNIVERSITY STUDENT PRESIDENT IN TORONTO’.

[64] L, ‘Update on Petition’.

[65] L, ‘We Don’t Want Such Person to Be the Student Union President’.

[66] Bennett and Livingston, ‘The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic Institutions’.

[67] Survey & Ballot systems, ‘Successful Candidate Statements in Seven Easy Steps’.

[68] CBC, ‘“China Is Your Daddy”: Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election Prompts Questions about Foreign Influence’.

[69] Lhamo, ‘Chemilhamoooo’.

[70] Lhamo.

[71] Global Times, ‘多伦多大学中国学生联名请愿,要求废除“藏独”学生竞选学生会长资格’.

[72] 北美留学生日报, ‘7亿学费被拿来养藏独学生会长?’.

[73] The Economist, ‘China’s Global Times Plays a Peculiar Role’.

[74] Global Times, ‘多伦多大学中国学生联名请愿,要求废除“藏独”学生竞选学生会长资格’.

[75] Wright, ‘Student Evaluations and Consumer Orientation of Universities’.

[76] Furedi, ‘Introduction to the Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as Consumer’.

[77] CBC, ‘“China Is Your Daddy”: Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election Prompts Questions about Foreign Influence’.

[78] 北美留学生日报, ‘7亿学费被拿来养藏独学生会长?’.

[79] 北美留学生日报.

[80] 北美留学生日报.

[81] CBC, ‘“China Is Your Daddy”: Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election Prompts Questions about Foreign Influence’.

[82] Apple Daily News, ‘英外相夏文達證李波屬英國籍 王毅:李首先是中國公民’.

[83] 北美留学生日报, ‘7亿学费被拿来养藏独学生会长?’.

[84] 北美留学生日报.

[85] 北美留学生日报.

[86] 北美留学生日报.

[87] 北美留学生日报.

[88] Lhamo, ‘Chemilhamoooo’.

[89] GHOREISHI and DAI, ‘Beijing’s Shadow Haunts Overseas Chinese Students in Canada’.

[90] Shih and Rauhala, ‘Angry over Campus Speech by Uighur Activist, Chinese Students in Canada Contact Their Consulate, Film Presentation’.

[91] Shih and Rauhala.

[92] INSIGHT视界, ‘多伦多大学藏独分子靠卖惨竞选学生会主席?’

[93] Hollingsworth, ‘UN Boss Raises Xinjiang Uyghurs during His Trip to China’.

[94] Foreign Policy, ‘A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag’.

[95] The Independent, ‘China Suddenly Takes BBC News off Air after Muslim Detention Camps Mentioned’.

[96] Shih and Rauhala, ‘Angry over Campus Speech by Uighur Activist, Chinese Students in Canada Contact Their Consulate, Film Presentation’.

[97] Sear, Jensen, and Chen, ‘How Digital Media Blur the Border between Australia and China’.

[98] Sear, Jensen, and Chen.

[99] Sear, Jensen, and Chen.

[100] Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81, 1:216.

[101] Rhoads, 1:216.

[102] CBC, ‘China Denies Role in Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election at U of T’.

Bibliography

Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. ‘The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting up Cells at Universities across America’. Foreign Policy, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/18/the-chinese-communist-party-is-setting-up-cells-at-universities-across-america-china-students-beijing-surveillance/.

Apple Daily News. ‘英外相夏文達證李波屬英國籍 王毅:李首先是中國公民’. Apple Daily News, 6 January 2016. https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20160106/19440723.

Bennett, W Lance, and Steven Livingston. ‘The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic Institutions’. European Journal of Communication 33, no. 2 (2018): 122–139.

Bickers, Robert. Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination. Harvard University Press, 2017.

Bieler, Stacey. Patriots or Traitors: A History of American Educated Chinese Students. Routledge, 2014.

Brandt, Loren, and Thomas G Rawski. China’s Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. ‘The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism’. China Perspectives 2005, no. 59 (2005).

Callahan, William A. ‘National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism’. Alternatives 29, no. 2 (2004): 199–218.

CBC. ‘China Denies Role in Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election at U of T’. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 15 February 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/china-denies-role-in-backlash-against-tibetan-student-s-election-at-u-of-t-1.5021226.

— — — . ‘“China Is Your Daddy”: Backlash against Tibetan Student’s Election Prompts Questions about Foreign Influence’. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 14 February 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/china-tibet-student-election-1.5019648.

Chao, Chiang-nan, Niall Hegarty, John Angelidis, and Victor F Lu. ‘Chinese Students’ Motivations for Studying in the United States’. Journal of International Students 7, no. 2 (2017): 257–269.

Corr, Andres. ‘Chinese Informants In The Classroom: Pedagogical Strategies’. Forbes, 28 June 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/06/28/chinese-informants-in-the-classroom-pedagogical-strategies/#6e7ea10e12da.

Foreign Policy. ‘A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag’. Foreign Policy, 28 February 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/28/a-summer-vacation-in-chinas-muslim-gulag/.

Free Tibet. ‘OVER 10,000 SIGN PETITION REJECTING A TIBETAN AS UNIVERSITY STUDENT PRESIDENT IN TORONTO’. Free Tibet, 18 February 2019. https://www.freetibet.org/news-media/na/over-10000-sign-petition-rejecting-tibetan-university-student-president-canada.

Furedi, Frank. ‘Introduction to the Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as Consumer’. In The Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as Consumer, 15–22. Routledge, 2010.

GHOREISHI, OMID, and SIHUI DAI. ‘Beijing’s Shadow Haunts Overseas Chinese Students in Canada’. The Epoch Times, 14 February 2019. https://www.theepochtimes.com/beijings-shadow-haunts-overseas-chinese-students-in-canada_2800393.html.

Global Times. ‘多伦多大学中国学生联名请愿,要求废除“藏独”学生竞选学生会长资格’. Global Times, 13 February 2019. http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2019-02/14297818.html?agt=15422.

Hollingsworth, Julia. ‘UN Boss Raises Xinjiang Uyghurs during His Trip to China’. CNN, April 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/asia/xinjiang-china-un-intl/index.html.

INSIGHT视界. ‘多伦多大学藏独分子靠卖惨竞选学生会主席?’ 新浪网, 14 February 2019. https://k.sina.com.cn/article_6208490735_1720e0cef02700lrk3.html.

Karl, Rebecca E, and Peter Zarrow. Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China. Vol. 214. Harvard Univ Asia Center, 2002.

L, Kennedy. ‘Update on Petition’, February 2019. https://www.change.org/p/update-on-petition.

— — — . ‘We Don’t Want Such Person to Be the Student Union President’, February 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20190213012348/https://www.change.org/p/university-of-toronto-scarborough-we-don-t-want-such-person-to-be-the-student-union-president.

Lhamo, Chemi. ‘Chemilhamoooo’. Instagram, 2019. https://www.instagram.com/chemilhamoooo/.

Qu, Jason. ‘Self-Strengthening Movement of Late Qing China: An Intermediate Reform Doomed to Failure’. Asian Culture and History 8, no. 2 (2016): 148–54. https://doi.org/10.5539/ach.v8n2p148.

Radio Free Asia. ‘Chinese Universities Ordered to Spy on Staff, Students in Ideological Crackdown’. Radio Free Asia, 8 April 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/universities-04082019144318.html.

Redden, Elizabeth. ‘China’s “Long Arm”’. Inside Higher ED, 3 January 2018. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/01/03/scholars-and-politicians-raise-concerns-about-chinese-governments-influence-over.

Rhoads, Edward JM. Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872–81. Vol. 1. Hong Kong University Press, 2011.

Saul, Stephanie. ‘On Campuses Far from China, Still under Beijing’s Watchful Eye’. The New York Times, 4 May 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/chinese-students-western-campuses-china-influence.html.

Sear, Tom, Michael Jensen, and Titus C Chen. ‘How Digital Media Blur the Border between Australia and China’. The Conversation, 16 November 2018. http://theconversation.com/how-digital-media-blur-the-border-between-australia-and-china-101735.

Shih, Gerry, and Emily Rauhala. ‘Angry over Campus Speech by Uighur Activist, Chinese Students in Canada Contact Their Consulate, Film Presentation’. The Washington Post, 14 February 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/angry-over-campus-speech-by-uighur-activist-students-in-canada-contact-chinese-consulate-film-presentation/2019/02/14/a442fbe4-306d-11e9-ac6c-14eea99d5e24_story.html.

Survey & Ballot systems. ‘Successful Candidate Statements in Seven Easy Steps’. Survey & Ballot Systems (blog), 2019. https://www.surveyandballotsystems.com/blog/best-practices/successful-candidate-statements-in-seven-easy-steps/.

Taylor, Alan. ‘Anti-Japan Protests in China’. The Atlantic, 17 September 2012. https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/09/anti-japan-protests-in-china/100370/.

The Economist. ‘China’s Global Times Plays a Peculiar Role’. The Economist, 20 September 2018. https://www.economist.com/china/2018/09/20/chinas-global-times-plays-a-peculiar-role.

The Independent. ‘China Suddenly Takes BBC News off Air after Muslim Detention Camps Mentioned’. The Independent, 22 February 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-censor-uighur-muslim-detention-camps-bbc-news-report-xinjiang-a8792486.html.

TIME Magazine. ‘Thinking About Home.’ TIME Magazine 129, no. 5 (1987): 45.

Townsend, James. ‘Chinese Nationalism’. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 27 (1992): 97–130.

Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. Columbia University Press, 2014.

Wright, Robert E. ‘Student Evaluations and Consumer Orientation of Universities’. Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing 8, no. 1 (2000): 33–40.

Yang, Winston YL, and Marsha L Wagner. ‘Tiananmen: China’s Struggle for Democracy-Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact’. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 1990, no. 2 (1990): 1.

Yu, Miles. ‘China’s Bizarre Anti-Japanese TV and Movie Kitsch Backfires’. The Washington Times, 21 May 2015. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/21/inside-china-anti-japanese-tv-propaganda-dramas-ba/.

北美留学生日报. ‘7亿学费被拿来养藏独学生会长?’. 北美留学生日报, 14 February 2019. https://posts.careerengine.us/p/5c65829af39a2e4384ccf7cf.

教育部. ‘教育部关于简化大专以上学历人员自费出国留学审批手续的通知’, 12 February 2003. http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A20/gjs_left/moe_851/tnull_1187.html.

Jason Chao’s Depository

The work and thoughts of Jason Chao

Jason CHAO

Written by

postgraduate student, software developer and advocate of human rights / LGBT+ equality

Jason Chao’s Depository

The work and thoughts of Jason Chao

Welcome to a place where words matter. On Medium, smart voices and original ideas take center stage - with no ads in sight. Watch
Follow all the topics you care about, and we’ll deliver the best stories for you to your homepage and inbox. Explore
Get unlimited access to the best stories on Medium — and support writers while you’re at it. Just $5/month. Upgrade