The Mind of Maddon

Let’s start with what I liked about Joe Maddon’s decision to use John Lackey in the ninth inning Sunday night in Los Angeles. Three things:

1. It was one of those rare decisions that nobody on earth thought would work. So that’s something.
2. It led to a pretty cool Justin Turner home run.
3. It tells us a lot about what makes Joe Maddon tick.

OK, it’s actually only number three.

Every now and again, a manager will make a somewhat bizarre decision — or at least a decision that some portion of baseball fans finds bizarre — and the explanation only makes matters worse. You get the sense in those moments that the manager won’t just admit they had made a mistake. They had a brain fog or they totally forgot something important or they entirely miscalculated or, in the heat and confusion of the moment, they just blew it. Happens.

But Joe Maddon absolutely did not make one of those kinds of mistakes when he put Lackey into the game. He knew exactly what he was doing and, given the chance, he would do it again and again and again.

And I think it tells us so much about Joe Maddon.

First, let’s go over the situation. The score was tied 1–1 with two outs in the ninth. The Dodgers had the winning run at second base, and they had the top of the lineup coming up. Someone had to face Chris Taylor and, potentially, Justin Turner.

At the time, the Cubs had lefty Brian Duensing in the game, so the first option was to just let Duensing pitch to Taylor. This was obviously less than ideal because of the lefty-right matchup and because Duensing had already thrown 21 pitches (of which only 10 were strikes). Also, Duensing is a 34-year-old pitcher who was in the minor leagues most of last year and part of this year.

Still, it was an option. Maddon has shown in the postseason that he doesn’t trust many relievers at crunch time. For some reason he trusted Duensing for 1 2/3 high leverage innings, a decision about as curious as the one to bring in Lackey — the Duensing call just worked a little better.

Anyway, Maddon decided not to go with Duensing. So that left four options.

1. He could go with Mike Montgomery, a good lefty who pitched a lot for the Cubs as a starter and reliever.
2. He could go with Hector Rondon, a righty who was the Cubs closer for most of last year but had a rough time this year.
3. He could go with John Lackey.
4. He could go with Wade Davis, the team’s best reliever and only All-Star

None of these were perfect, to say the least. Bringing the lefty, Montgomery, to face the right-handed Chris Taylor was a non-starter. But bringing in Rondon to face Taylor didn’t seem all that great either; Maddon doesn’t exactly overflow with trust for Rondon (didn’t in last year’s postseason either) and the guy had given up a homer one day earlier.

Lackey: Well, Lackey seemed a terrible option for the exact reason that he proved to be a terrible option. He’s 39 and after a wonderful career is basically out of gas. He led the league with 36 homers allowed this year. AND he had pitched the day before; Lackey had never pitched on back-to-back days. So pitching Lackey was not ideal; it was the opposite of ideal.

But this is where we begin to get into the mindset of Maddon: Lackey offered that veteran presence thing that Maddon so treasures. As you will see, my theory builds around this basic theme: The one thing Joe Maddon believes above all others is that his team will be tougher in the biggest moments.

So what about that fourth option, the Davis option, the most obvious option?

Well, here it is, I’m going to give you my opinion.

I don’t think winning Sunday’s game — winning either game in Los Angeles, for that matter — were Joe Maddon’s top priorities.

That does sound harsh, and I don’t want you to take it wrong., OF COURSE Joe Maddon wanted to win both games. He absolutely tried to win both games. He’s undoubtedly disappointed that the Cubs did not win either game.

BUT …

I think getting this Cubs team rested and in order for the Wrigley Field portion of this series was the most important thing in Joe Maddon’s mind.

Here’s why I think that: The Cubs came into this series all scrambled after the Nationals series. Everybody knows that. The Cubs were forced to start Jose Quintana in Game 1, just a day after he had pitched relief against Washington. Davis was not available to pitch. And the Dodgers were starting the best pitcher on the planet, Clayton Kershaw.

Sure, the Cubs would have loved to steal that game — and they did take a 2–0 lead early — but Maddon and the Cubs knew the deal. This was probably going to be a loss. And it was a loss.

Game 2, the Cubs were in better shape — and they started Jon Lester. But again, Davis was really only available in a pinch and not for very long. Maddon decided to go with a defensive lineup — playing Albert Almora, Jon Jay and Jason Hayward in the outfield, none of them much of a threat at the plate — it was the sort of lineup you just hope keeps you close.

Then Maddon managed as unaggressively as possible. He let Lester bat twice. And he did not use Kyle Schwarber or Ian Happ at any point. When Maddon let Almora face Kenley Jansen with a runner on base in the ninth rather than go to one of of his lefty power hitters who at least gives the Cubs a punchers chance, you knew: Maddon wanted to win the game, but he was NOT going to sell out to win the game.

Which brings us to Wade Davis. Maddon clearly did not want to pitch him at all. He was WILLING to pitch Davis if the Cubs were two or three outs from wining the game, but that was it. The Cubs had to be in position to win. With two outs in the bottom of the ninth, yes, Davis was the best option to extend the game. But this was not a winning position. Maddon was not willing to pitch Davis just to extend the game. He was not willing, as he said, to “pitch Davis in a losing game.”

He WAS willing to put the game in the hands of John Lackey in the hope against hope that the guy would get them out using some magic trick he picked up along the way.

In other words: It was more important for him to have the Cubs at full strength for the three games in Chicago.

I think this is consistent with who Joe Maddon is. I think if you were his best friend, and you were sitting around and just talking, Maddon would tell your that his best plan to win this thing is to get this series back to LA for Games 6 and 7. See, those would be incredibly tense, pressure-packed games. The Dodgers would have the weight of history on their shoulders — it has been almost 30 years. They would have the memory of the Cubs beating them last year.

And the Cubs? They beat Cleveland three straight with the World Series on the line. They beat the Nationals in Washington with that series on the line. I think Joe Maddon’s greatest faith is that, as mentioned above, his team will be the tougher one when the biggest moments come.

He’d BET on his team coming through in Games 6 and 7.

And so: He was not going to do ANYTHING in this game that would jeopardize the Cubs’ chances in Wrigley, their chances to force this series to come back to LA. The Cubs have been a great team at home for three years (second-best home record behind only the Dodgers), they love everything about the Wrigley Field experience.

Yes, of course, Maddon would have loved the Cubs winning at least one of the first two games, but I don’t think he feels in a hole with the Cubs down. I think he played out this scenario in his mind more than any other one.

Will it work? Well, look, the Dodgers are up 2–0 in the series, they have Yu Darvish going on full rest, they had the best record in baseball all year. So the odds are against Maddon and the Cubs. I think most of us would have done all we could to win one of those games in LA … we certainly would not have bet on John Lackey in that situation.

But this really tells you the mindset of Joe Maddon. “We will be fine,” he said after the game, and I don’t think he was just saying that. I think he really believes it.