Ebb and Flow
by Chloë Voisin-Bormuth | La Fabrique de la Cité
“There is a tide in the affairs of men.
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.[1]”William Shakespeare — Julius Caesar (Act IV, Scene 3)
The previous articles in our series showed that in every approach to resilience, residents emerge as a key factor: first, because population density tends to swell a region’s vulnerability and increase risk (each risk has the potential to impact more people and assets); next, because residents play an important role in the decisions and directions taken in the context of emergency management and the return to normalcy, depending on their threshold for acceptable disfunction; finally, because residents represent a critical resource in rolling out a regional resilience approach by taking an active part in restoring equilibrium (strategy of “empowerment” and developing a collective risk culture). In the multivariable equation that is the relationship between residents, region and resilience, it remains to be studied if and how population size may represent a swift and brutal or slow and deleterious shock to cities. How should we characterize a demographic shock?
Does population size present an obstacle to resilience?
When it comes to size and population, is there a critical threshold below or above which a city can no longer be resilient? This question is usually asked about megacities with populations above 10 million or small to midsize cities caught within an overarching trend of urbanization.
From megacities…
For the former, the question focuses primarily on the environmental pressures exerted by such large populations and the resulting potential for destabilization. For example, Jakarta sinks a full meter into the ground every 10 years under the weight of its high-rises atop a vanishing water table, which it has overdrawn to provide clean drinking due to its heavily polluted surface water[2]. As a result, 40% of the city now sits below sea level. This situation has increased the city’s vulnerability at the same time as it faces heavy risks from torrential rains: since drainage canals can no longer absorb the high waters, as much as 1.5 meters of water can rapidly flood the city’s streets, as in January 2013 (20 people died and 30,000 lost their homes), February 2017 and February 2018 (4 dead, 6,500 evacuated).
Next, the question focuses on one hand, on cities’ capacity to develop a resilience strategy that matches the complexity and interdependence of their challenges, and the interconnection of their networks and infrastructure on the other. Analyzing the case of Los Angeles, Chiara Daraio, Domniki Asimaki and Steven Low from Caltech see this as the most important challenge facing all megacities[3]: here the challenge focuses less on compiling enough data to optimize infrastructure and networks in accordance with each risk, and more on coordinating the various strategies enacted by each party (including residents) so that the entire system can become resilient. The main concern is to gain a full understanding of how megacities function and the systems of interdependence they create, as well as to create a task force able to establish shared priorities among all parties. This function is currently headed in Los Angeles by Marissa Aho, Chief Resilience Officer in charge of the Resilience Assessment Overlay which champions a systematic approach to resilience by design.
… to smaller cities
“Requiem for subprefectures[4]?”: the question posed by Xavier Molénat offers a distillation of all the issues facing small and midsize cities in developed countries. Can they survive within the global movement of urbanization and globalism? These cities are often highly impacted by deindustrialization, the concentration of of service industry and white-collar jobs in the largest urban areas, as well as the shuttering of certain public facilities and administrations like hospitals and courts, which typically bring many jobs to regions. Small and midsize cities — both in developed countries and to an even greater extent in developing countries — present an acute vulnerability due, on one hand, to their poorer than average population (for example, in France, the poverty level rises to 17.8% in midsize cities, above the national average of 14.5%[5]), and, on the other, to limited resources (technical, financial, availability of data and qualified labor) for implementing a resilience strategy and coping with various shocks. Focusing on the example of Detroit in the United States, which lost thousands of industrial jobs in the wake of the 2008 subprime crisis, Jörn Birkmann affirms that, “size affects how cities respond to economic shocks […]. Lacking industrial diversity, they are less able than larger cities to attract new employment opportunities by taking advantage of new and growing economic sectors through national policies or international trade agreements. And they lack investment capital to retrofit older manufacturing systems[6]”. Certain counterexamples, such as the cities of Cognac, Châtellerault or Albi, call into question any determinism linked to size: these midsize cities, which recognized the economic transformations underway from an early stage and in turn harnessed their local skills systems, therefore succeeded in carrying out an economic diversification strategy which enabled them to become innovation hubs in their own right[7]. Small and midsize cities, notes Jörn Birkmann[8], hold a relative advantage in their size with respect to metro areas and megacities: they are easier to monitor, have fewer stakeholders which helps various parties coordinate actions, and resilience strategies can produce tangible results much faster and thereby ensure local acceptance with greater ease.
The case of small and midsize cities is especially interesting because it underscores the fact that a city’s size and population do not determine any specific outcome. The key consideration contains two parts: the relationship fostered between a region, its residents and their environment, as well as the capacity to analyze the changes taking place, anticipate their consequences and marshal local stakeholders and resources. For these reasons, though the idea may seem appealing, it is impossible to determine a critical threshold below or above which a city can no longer be resilient, as demonstrated very clearly by Géraldine Djament-Tran[9]. However, that does not mean the number of residents has no influence on a city’s resilience capacity. As shown by the small and midsize cities in developing countries, which will see the highest growth rates — +32% between 2015 and 2030, compared with +26% for metro areas and megacities[10] — it is less the stock and more the flow of population that constitutes a significant vulnerability factor.
Ebbing tides: the specter of decline
Population size often serves as a barometer of good health for regions: sustained growth ensures the area’s appeal and promises further growth and development. On the flipside, population loss incites worry by signaling economic decline, regional obsolescence and diminished appeal. The city in decline is a source of anxiety because it breaks with the paradigm that equates industrialized cities with constant expansion. Didn’t we move from 7% of people living in cities in 1700 to over 50% today? Doesn’t the UN estimate that more than 70% of people will live in cities by 2050? In this urban century, cities in decline stand apart as an anomaly. Even worse, in an era that champions Richard Florida’s argument that the cities which attract and concentrate skills and the creative class will innovate and therefore become the key engines of the economy, cities in decline seem doomed to continue their same downward trend. Within a context of competition in which a city’s image and positioning count for the most, we can understand why it seems so difficult even to recognize the phenomenon of degrowth, much less to place it on the political agenda (Nicolas Cauchi-Duval, Vincent Béal and Max Rousseau even mention the “silencing of urban degrowth” by French politicians[11]), due to the concern that naming it would only serve to compound the problem.
And yet, taking a long view of history first shows us that the phenomenon of degrowth cannot truly be called an anomaly in the development of cities. Cities are mortal[12]. Sylvie Fol and Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot[13] recall that urban degrowth has even been theorized on several occasions, citing several widely known examples such as the Chicago School, which conceived of cities as subject to a “life cycle ending in decline”, or Lewis Mumford, who describes the evolution of cities in the following terms: “the city, beginning as Eopolis becomes Polis and expands into Metropolis, initiates its decline by becoming Parasitopolis, then Pathopolis, potentially Tyrannopolis and finally Necropolis, ‘city of the dead’, the ‘final resting place’ of every civilization”. Avoiding the fatalism expressed in Mumford’s implicit criticism of urban expansion since the Second World War, Cheshire and Hay’s studies of 229 cities in Western Europe pointed to a trend of decline in urban areas impacted by suburbanization, without ruling out the possibility of a return to growth.
Degrowth is far from being the only phenomenon in this field. It was first theorized under the name of “shrinking cities” or “schrumpfende Städte”, describing trends of decline in America’s Rust Belt cities, as well as numerous German cities (notably in the country’s new federal states and Ruhr Valley) following the deindustrialization of the 1970s and 1980s and the demographic shift of the 1990s: to mention just a few examples in the United States, Baltimore and Philadelphia lost over 20% of their populations between 1970 and 2000, Detroit and Pittsburgh over 30%, and St. Louis 44%[14], while in Germany, Magdeburg lost 17% of its population between 1990 and 2015, Chemnitz 23% and Leipzig 4%[15]. The phenomenon now affects over a quarter of cities with over 100,000 residents and is not limited to developed countries alone. Some megacities in developing countries are also experiencing this phenomenon: Puebla, Havana, Montevideo and Seoul[16].
Finally, image and positioning are far from being the only issues in play. Cities in degrowth present many distinct vulnerability factors which not only make it dangerous to ignore the degrowth phenomenon, but also require equally distinct measures to account for these vulnerabilities. Population loss is accompanied by shrinking economic activity, reduced public finances limiting a municipality’s capacity for investment and action, impoverishment of the local population through a rise in unemployment and aging and, finally, an increase in social problems. Degrowth phenomena also lead to a rise in social vulnerability. Moreover, degrowth does not mean that cities get smaller. As residents flee, certain buildings or neighborhoods become deserted, creating what was referred to in Leipzig as a “perforated city[17]”. This regional discontinuity poses a major challenge to municipalities working to maintain a standard level of service with diminished budgets and no option to leverage economies of scale. We have already seen this in the case of Magdeburg’s water networks, which suffered in terms of safety and maintenance after a decline in water use. The same situation holds for other energy networks, public transit service, mail delivery and keeping schools or neighborhood facilities in operation.
“Ausbluten oder gesund schrumpfen?” (“Bleed out or shrink in good health?”): this question, asked by Marc Bose and Peter Wirth about the small city of Johanngeorgenstadt in Saxony[18], applies to every city facing degrowth. Responses vary because not everyone interprets the phenomenon of degrowth in the same way, which means they also have different understandings of resilience. However, we can distinguish three main trends:
- The stability strategy: degrowth is seen as a temporary crisis for cities to remedy. This resilience strategy consists in adapting to the new paradigms (notably economic and social) in order to combat degrowth, succeed in restoring the city’s appeal and return to growth. That is the aim of the “Cœur de ville” action plan announced by the French government on 27 March 2018 to benefit 222 cities: “the ‘Coeur de Ville’ action plan has two aims: to improve living conditions for residents of midsize inner cities and to reinforce their role as regional development engines. When a midsize city functions well, the entire surrounding region, including rural areas, perceives the benefits. […] The program aims to facilitate and support the work of local communities, incentivize housing, retail and urbanism players to reinvest in inner cities, encourage the continuation or establishment of activities in the inner city and improve living conditions in midsize cities[19].” The ambition does not stop at revitalizing inner cities. It also aims to regenerate growth engines for the surrounding region, just as metro areas do on a larger scale.
2. The improvement strategy: degrowth is seen as a temporary crisis that can be turned to profit. This resilience strategy sees degrowth as an opportunity to recreate a new model for a more sustainable city, though the long-term expectation is a return to growth. Russell Weaver, Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen, Jason Knight and Amy E. Frazier[20] provide a clear demonstration of this principle by analyzing two examples. In the first case, Hartford, Connecticut lost 30% of its population between 1950 and 2010, notably due to a strong movement of flight to the suburbs. In 2008, the city moved to reverse this phenomenon by revitalizing its downtown area according to “smart growth” principles: the new Constitution Plaza East project offered mixed-use buildings (residential, office, retail), while limiting car access to offer a sustainable alternative to suburbanization and to restore demand for downtown real estate. Along with the authors, we can question the example of eco-villages, such as those built in Cleveland, whose “smart growth” strategy can end up worsening the consequences of degrowth: by offering new eco-friendly neighborhoods that are easily accessible by public transit, they hope to promote a more sustainable living model. But can a city truly be called sustainable if it offers no solution for existing vacancies, but instead expands into the surrounding farmland and continues a process of suburbanization to build a green utopia, one that is built less for the area’s existing residents and more to draw in newcomers of higher socioeconomic status in a bid to regenerate value through gentrification?
3. The support strategy: degrowth is seen as a structural crisis to which cities must adapt. This resilience strategy consists not in combating degrowth, but instead in supporting it and capitalizing on the opportunities it offers to enhance quality of life for the local population. Three examples are particularly notable in this regard: Saint-Étienne, which initiated an active policy of de-densification in the late 1990s with the twin aims of improving the quality of the living environment and creating new open spaces (Franche-Amitié pilot site); Dessau in Germany, which published a guideline for its open plan corridor to prepare for long-term degrowth and lay the groundwork for a concept of the city as archipelago; or Detroit, where local players transformed an island into an urban farm to alleviate the food crisis and recreate a local agricultural economy. Each of these three cases attempts to propose an alternative to the model of constant growth[21] with the aims of improving quality of life and increasing resilience. However, for all the enthusiasm surrounding the new possibilities created by degrowth — “Toll — endlich Platz!” exclaims Thomas Straubhaar[22] — this potential often runs up against several major setbacks in practice, such as rethinking soil management[23] to escape the logic of competition and, above all, financial difficulties[24].
Taken together, these strategies merit one last remark: the phenomenon of degrowth emerges out of a set of relationships, interdependencies and domination within an increasingly complex urban system. In many midsize cities, for example, degrowth is inseparable from suburbanization. This dynamic compels residents to live farther and farther from downtown, to use amenities built in the suburbs and to identify over time with the nearest urban dynamic rather than the inner city, which is left at a disadvantage due to specific effects of size and specialization at work in urbanization[25]. Over time, these inner cities gradually lose all their activity. For this reason, some researchers[26] prefer to talk about “peripheralization” rather than degrowth. Taking this altered perspective on degrowth may help to further refine resilience strategies by adopting a relational point of view, in order to capitalize on the evolutions of the urban system and better harness local potential.
Managing surges
Within the horizon of expectations of today’s cities, urban growth stands as a desirable condition due to the association of demographic growth with economic development. However, urban growth is also a factor of vulnerability: in 2015, for the first time, the Global Risks Report published by the Davos World Economic Forum considered the risks of “rapid and unplanned urbanization”, notably in developing countries. “Urbanization creates opportunities but also exacerbates risks, and the speed at which it is happening challenges our capacity to plan and adapt[27].” One of the main challenges posed by urbanization involves its pace: is growth rapid or slow? Is it sudden and intermittent or continuous? Each scenario allows us to distinguish between different demographic shocks and underline the risks associated with each one. We have chosen three scenarios, which each raise vastly different issues: the heavy urbanization of developing cities; European cities accommodating refugees; and the impact of mass tourism on touristic cities.
1) Rapid and constant: the trend of heavy urbanization in developing cities
As the world’s urban population grows by an average of 1.84% per year, that rate climbs to 6.2% and 5.1% respectively in Abuja and Port Harcourt in Nigeria, 6.2% in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and 7.8% in Mbouda in Cameroon[28]. This strong urban growth, observed primarily in small and midsize cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, exerts major stress on natural resources, on agricultural lands — which are eroded by urban expansion — on the job and housing markets (40% of urban growth comes in the form of slums on the city’s periphery[29]), on all types of infrastructure (either saturated or nonexistent) and finally on communities (with a particular challenge posed by social integration). Faced with these stressors, each of these cities presents distinct vulnerability factors: on one hand, there is the demographic challenge posed by a young population lacking qualifications and perspective on its country and forming a fertile ground for different types of enrollment — 60% of Africans under 35, youths between 15 and 24 represent 20% of the population, 40% of the workforce and 60% of the unemployed (for an average rate of 44%); on the other hand, the inability of cities to control and plan for urban expansion, which occurs largely without governance and according to informal logics, and often takes place on lands exposed to elevated natural disaster or climate risks (flooding, earthquake, etc.); furthermore, intense use of agricultural lands aggravates food import dependence for a growing population; finally, time is running out to elaborate, test and approve an effective strategy for sustainability — with high social and environmental costs at stake in the short term.
In this case, these cities run the following primary risks: social instability, which can lead to widening social inequalities and the development of socio-spatial segregation; next, health risks tied to a rapid propagation of epidemics, as demonstrated by the recent Ebola crisis, as well as greater exposure to pollutants; finally, natural disaster and climate risks, whose consequences are intensified by the number of people exposed to these risks and by the difficulty of organizing emergency services due to deficient infrastructure. And yet, these growing cities continue to harbor a strong potential for their residents, notably through improved access to services and infrastructure, as well as a better chance to climb the social ladder.
Therein lie the stakes of resilience in this context of rapid growth: succeeding in unifying all stakeholders through a long-term strategy of adaptation, just as the sense of urgency encourages small corrective measures. Some cities manage to achieve this feat. The example of Addis Ababa[30] proves it: while 80% of the population still lives in slums, the government is investing in a massive real estate program coupled with the construction of a light rail transport system. In this way, it is leading a successful fight against slums and urban sprawl.
2) Sudden and in waves: European cities accommodating refugees since fall 2015
In 2014, 563,000 people requested asylum in a European Union country. In the second half of 2015, that number climbed to 1.2 million. Cities have had to cope with a considerable and sudden surge of people flooding into their region, which can be qualified as a demographic shock. In Hamburg, for example, 400 asylum seekers arrived each day during summer 2015. How should cities accommodate these new arrivals? National and local responses have varied dramatically across Europe. La Fabrique de la Cité, in its report published in January 2018 on “European Cities and Refugees: A Laboratory for Affordable Housing[31]”, compared the approaches taken in Sweden and Germany, the two countries that have respectively taken in the most asylum seekers per capita in the European Union and the largest total number of asylum seekers (890,000 in 2015) in the European Union, thus constituting two laboratories for studying the challenges posed by the massive arrival of new residents within a context of real estate scarcity and a shortage of affordable housing.
Germany has based its response on the following resolutions: first, a clear policy decision in favor of receiving asylum seekers. “Wir schaffen das[32]”, declared Angela Merkel on 31 August 2015. Second, its conviction that refugees are not simply waiting to return to their home country, but that policy should assume a long-term if not definitive stay in Germany. As a result, the challenge ultimately chosen by Germany in responding to this demographic shock is how to integrate refugees into German society. Third, a policy of distributing the flow of refugees across all cities in the country, instead of taking a laissez-faire policy. Dating back to 1947 and already tested in the country, this system known as the Königsteiner Schlüssel, consists in applying a distribution key that accounts for demographic and fiscal criteria when distributing asylum seekers to federal states. In turn, these federal states devise discretionary quota systems for cities within their borders. Finally, a thinking that soon moved from temporary to permanent housing for asylum seekers having obtained refugee status. This housing policy is segmented into three timeframes, accommodation types and housing types: first is emergency housing. Germany set a target of “no one left out”. To achieve this goal, it has adopted three strategies: first, reusing public buildings (gymnasiums, administrative buildings, etc.) or vacant private facilities (shopping malls, offices); second, booking hotel rooms; and finally, building cheap and easily assembled emergency housing units (Berlin’s Tempohomes). The primary challenges of this phase include identifying available buildings and land, as well as managing health, safety and security risks, while the comfort and integration of asylum seekers figure as secondary concerns. Emergency housing is used as a 6-month waiting period before moving to long-term temporary housing of higher quality, marking the start of the second phase in the housing process. Temporary housing, where asylum-seekers stay until they obtain refugee status, aims to promote social integration. Though this housing offers only limited comfort and privacy (these are shared homes), in exchange it provides higher construction quality, a careful design of exterior space, a connection to the city through proximity to public transport and social infrastructure and, finally, German language training with classes available to everyone and the option to attend the German school system. The challenges of this phase include locating available land and coordinating efforts with the local population to increase the acceptability of this social diversity. The last phase in the housing process is the transition to the regular housing market. Unfortunately, this phase has proven to be less streamlined than its planners originally hoped, with some asylum seekers stuck in emergency housing due to a lack of space in temporary housing, just as other refugees have remained unable to integrate the regular housing market — due to a lack of available housing, financial resources or landlords willing to rent to them.
The German approach is especially enlightening because it is distinguished by its resilience, though the country did not necessarily theorize its approach in this way. In what ways can we describe it as resilient?
- Neutralizing the shock: the strategy of distributing asylum seekers across the region in an organized way made it possible “to introduce certainty into uncertainty” (Cécile Maisonneuve) or control into the uncontrollable, and thereby to reduce vulnerability across the entire country. By transforming an undetermined flow into a stock (one that is still growing), the distribution system enabled German cities to improve how they organized their accommodation measures, scaled their facilities and planned for the arrival of asylum seekers, even just one or two days in advance. Policies also became more efficient over time.
- Despite the sense of urgency, favoring long-term actions: the goal of housing asylum seekers is underpinned by a more long-term goal than sheltering those in need, namely the integration of these new residents. So that temporary housing could function as a springboard for integration, its location, architectural layout, and social integration methods were designed to answer the following question: where and with whom should refugees live so they can (in terms of resources and capacity) access the job market, professional training or social structures they need? Should refugees be integrated with other population types (Dantebad project in Munich developed by architect Florian Nagler and offering 50 homes for refugees and 50 homes for students or the homeless)? Should officials accept or even organize the concentrated settlements of refugees that Doug Saunders, author of Arrival City[33], sees as an instrumental part of the integration process, due to the mutual assistance networks they enable? Or should authorities limit refugees to avoid stigmatization and rejection? None of these questions has a clear answer today, but they all demonstrate the dynamic thinking on the topic of integration.
- Mobilizing all of society and turning the demographic shock into a societal challenge that concerns everyone: accommodating refugees did not arise solely through the efforts carried out by administrations. Civil society, through associations, established NGOs and self-organized groups, played a strong role in organizing aid for asylum seekers, though the current challenge is to maintain this mobilization over the long-term, beyond the emergency phase. The private sector also contributed, sometimes with greater difficulty, to building homes by supplying materials at competitive rates. Some cities like Hamburg coordinated with residents in innovative ways to leverage their knowledge of the neighborhood and inform them of all the legal and regulatory constraints impeding the construction of new homes (“Finding Places” project in Hamburg).
- Boosting agility to cope with urgency: the process of receiving asylum seekers quickly ran into strict constraints imposed by federal building codes, as well as environmental codes, which made it impossible to secure adequate land supply or build homes quickly and at sustainable costs. Faced with this challenge, the federal government agreed to promulgate a law to accelerate asylum procedures and suspend the application of certain provisions of its federal building code for a specific period and for the exclusive purpose of hosting refugees, as well as its law promoting renewable energies in the heating industry and its decree on energy efficiency[34].
- Developing systemic thinking: the problems encountered by efforts to accommodate and house asylum seekers, notably the extremely slow integration of refugees into the regular housing market, sparked a global reflection on the mechanisms that led to these problems, beyond the temporary refugee crisis. The latter crisis revealed the existing affordable housing crisis already underway in Germany and helped trigger public and private action beyond the context of hosting refugees. Sophie Wolfrum, professor of urbanism at the Technical University of Munich, thus remarks: “This was a problem and everybody knew it, but now it is at the top of the city’s policy agenda [35].” In this sense, the “Making Heimat” project led by the Deutsches Architekturmuseum in Frankfurt is particularly revealing: first conceived as a catalog of best practices for housing refugees in Germany, it sparked and organized a lively public debate between municipal representatives, architects, associations and construction companies regarding ways to successfully produce affordable housing and lower construction costs for everyone. Furthermore, all of these stakeholders seized on long-term temporary housing as a testing ground for new construction solutions, new housing models and reflection into modular housing to respond to changing lifestyles. In this way, the construction type chosen for long-term temporary housing evolved from high-quality but temporary containers (cf. the Notkestrasse group in Hamburg) to building long-term housing reserved for refugees but later intended to become social housing.
Capitalizing on the experience? Will this approach improve Germany’s ability to prepare for future demographic shocks by capitalizing on the experience it has gained? This question takes on additional importance when we know that this type of crisis is likely to recur and even become more common in the future (political instability, climate refugees, natural catastrophes within the country, etc.). Certainly, this is a positive response, but it does require some nuance. Positive first of all because many German cities had no specific accommodation strategy for asylum seekers prior to 2015, as underlined by Karin Lorenz-Hennig, Director of the Housing and Real Estate Management Unit of the federal institute for research on building, urban affairs and spatial development (BBSR[36]). They now have a strategy and, with this in place, have set up a network of partners that can be mobilized in case of future crises. In addition, some cities have decided to keep their emergency housing, as well as their emergency supplies to anticipate future waves of migrants and accept the cost of caretaking and storage (Hamburg). Finally, these cities, which developed highly local strategies due to the urgency of the crisis, have now turned to discussion forums such as those organized by the Deutsches Architekturmuseum as a venue for dialogue concerning the policies put in place. However, no network of cities has formed at the federal level, and feedback sharing has progressed on a case-by-case basis to achieve an increasingly broad perspective that may eventually produce a guideline for action, without serving as a strict manual. Moreover, the feedback loops that can help evaluate projects (with stakeholders involved in design, construction and management, as well as refugees) and reflect on the still avenues of improvement remain limited — and may become even more limited as some of the administrations that were reorganized or created to respond to the crisis were shut down after the emergency phase. The goal for Germany is to leverage all its experience and stick to its resolutions and ambitions over the long term. Perhaps it is time to refer to this approach as a “resilience strategy”? Because naming confers reality onto actions, it unifies stakeholders around a common project and, finally, it engages people.
3) Seasonal and regular: the flow of tourists
The flow of tourists may seem like a minor issue compared to the vast human and social challenges posed by rapid urbanization and accommodating refugees. And yet, the flow of tourists involves substantial numbers: in 2017, according to the World Tourism Organization, 1.3 billion tourists traveled worldwide, a figure that is set to grow at a steady rate of 3% over 10 years to reach 1.8 billion travelers in 2030. Paris hosts 29 million tourists a year, Venice 20 million, while London and the Forbidden City of Beijing each receive 15 million visitors annually.
This surge of tourists is a contributing factor to three main types of vulnerability:
1. Environmental vulnerability. The massive number of visitors increases the stress on tourist sites and speeds up their deterioration: soil erosion, strained ecosystems (Galapagos Islands), excessive humidity in interior spaces (Lascaux Caves, Valley of the Kings), pollution (Mt. Everest, known as “the world’s highest garbage dump”), etc. All facilities built to welcome tourists magnify the pressure on a rare resource — water — due to the water-intensive hospitality industry and the maintenance of artificial agricultural or forest lands (Angkor).
2. Economic vulnerability. Tourism represents a tremendous economic force worldwide and constitutes a strong lever of local economic development by allowing regions to capitalize on a value that can never be outsourced: 10% of world GDP, 1 job in 10 worldwide, 2 million direct and indirect jobs in France, with 300,000 additional jobs expected between 2016 and 2020, $206 billion in tourism revenue earned in the United States in 2016, 60 billion in Spain, 50 billion in Thailand, and 34 billion in France[37]. However, beyond a certain threshold, an overreliance on tourism can lead to a state of dependence on this industry, weakening the regional economy. Widely known examples of this phenomenon include beach and ski resorts. The case of Venice offers another interesting example: the success of the city’s tourism industry has exhausted many of its other economic sectors. At the same time, today’s excessive consumption rates risk diminishing the quality of services offered to tourists in the long run, jeopardizing Venice’s status as a top tourist destination and thus putting the city’s primary economic resource at peril[38].
3. Social vulnerability: in Spain in 2017, the massive backlash against tourism amplified to such a point that Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy felt obligated to issue an official statement: “what we cannot do is kick those people who come to spend their money here, generating revenue and jobs for many in Spain. That seems crazy to me[39]”. The backlash is a symptom of the tensions stirred up by the massive wave of tourists, which can intensify the competition for assets, services and amenities in cities, without evenly distributing the costs: locals struggle to access Barcelona’s overcrowded beaches, spikes in emergency room visits stretch resources thin at hospitals not built to cope with seasonal influxes, housing shortages, etc. Berlin’s former Secretary for Housing and Construction, Engelbert Lütke Daldrup, estimated in 2016 that the city’s rental market had lost 10,000 homes since the creation of Airbnb, considerably reducing the German capital’s efforts to build new housing (12,000 in 2016)[40].
Tourism presents a two-sided characteristic in that it increases the vulnerability of regions just as it promotes their resilience: the often vital nature of this economic sector means that stakeholders in tourism must integrate sustainability objectives into their strategies. Problems such as deteriorating heritage sites, declining service quality and anti-tourist protests that contradict a culture of hospitality present direct threats to the industry, as it faces increasingly fierce competition since tourism products are hard to differentiate. Protecting tourism sites, promoting sustainable tourism and placing regulations on industry practices and certain new players in the sector (Airbnb at the top of the list) have thus emerged as some of the major trends in global tourism: but does this simply mean that resilience is now becoming a new form of regional marketing?
Conclusion
Population gains and losses each represent a clear source of disruption for cities. Not because there is an ideal threshold above or below which cities can no longer be resilient, but because demographic changes upset the fragile balance struck between a society and its region. The ensuing urban vulnerability concerns the increased hardship of accessing resources, the emergence of new socioeconomic fractures and the quality of life offered by the city.
Defining the conditions that will enable a region to absorb the ebb and flow of population requires a direct reflection on its ability to constitute a society over the long-term. The primary challenge here is to guarantee the resilience of communities, which means ensuring an enduring connection between residents and their region, as well as between all residents involved in any social project.
[1] William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar.
[2] Rosa Caroli, Stefano Soriani (2017) Fragile and Resilient Cities on Water. Perspectives from Venice and Tokyo. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
[3] https://caltechcampuspubs.library.caltech.edu/3220/1/2017-ENGenious14-MakingMegacitiesResilient.pdf
[4] Xavier Molénat (2018) “Requiem pour les sous-préfectures ?”, Alternatives économiques, 376, https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/requiem-prefectures/00082842
[5] CGET (2017) “Villes moyennes en France : vulnérabilités, potentiels et configurations territoriales”, En Bref, 45.
[6] Jörn Birkmann et alii (2016) “Boost resilience of small and mid-sized cities”, Nature, 537(7622) https://www.nature.com/news/boost-resilience-of-small-and-mid-sized-cities-1.20667
[7] Olivier Bouba-Olga, Michel Grossetti (2015). “La métropolisation, horizon indépassable de la croissance économique ?”. Revue de l’OFCE, 143(7), 117–144.// Ferru, M. (2009). “La trajectoire cognitive des territoires : le cas du bassin industriel de Châtellerault”. Revue d’Économie Régionale & Urbaine, December (5), 935–955.
[8] Jörn Birkmann et alii (2016)
[9] https://mastergeoprisme.wordpress.com/tag/resilience/
[10] Jörn Birkmann et alii (2016)
[11] Nicolas Cauchi-Duval, Vincent Béal, Max Rousseau (2016) “La décroissance urbaine en France : des villes sans politique”, Espace populations sociétés 2015/3–2016/1 http://journals.openedition.org/eps/6112
[12] https://www.franceculture.fr/sciences/nos-villes-sont-mortelles
[13] Sylvie Fol, Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot (2010) “Déclin urbain” and “Shrinking Cities : une évaluation critique des approches de la décroissance urbaine”, Annales de géographie, 2010/4 (674), 359–383. https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-de-geographie-2010-4-page-359.htm
[14] http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/glossaire/shrinking-city
[15] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article138060719/Das-Maerchen-von-bluehenden-ostdeutschen-Staedten.html
[16] Sylvie Fol, Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot (2010)
[17] Engelbert Lütke Daldrup (2003) Die perforierte Stadt — neue Räume im Leipziger Osten. Information zur Raumentwicklung (1)
[18] http://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/stadt-und-gesellschaft/75697/einblicke
[19] http://www.cohesion-territoires.gouv.fr/communique-de-presse-programme-action-coeur-de-ville-la-grande-transformation-pour-les-centres-villes-demarre
[20] Russell Weaver et alii (2017) Shrinking Cities: Understanding Urban Decline in the United States. Routledge.
[21] Examples detailed in Charline Sowa’s dissertation, (2017) Penser la ville en décroissance : pour une autre fabrique urbaine au XXIe siècle. Regard croisé à partir de six démarches de projet en France, en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis. Université Grenoble Alpes.
[22] “Great! At last some room!” Thomas Straubhaar (2004) “Toll — endlich Platz”. Brand eins (Rückbau)
[23] Charline Sowa (2017)
[24] Hélène Roth (2011) « Les « villes rétrécissantes » en Allemagne », Géocarrefour, 86/2 http://journals.openedition.org/geocarrefour/8294
[25] Sylvie Fol, Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot (2010)
[26] Matthias Bernt, Heike Liebmann (2013) Peripherisierung, Stigmatisierung, Abhängigkeit? Deutsche Mittelstädte und ihr Umgang mit Peripherisierungsprozessen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
[27] World Economic Forum (2015) Global Risks Report. http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2015/part-2-risks-in-focus/2-3-city-limits-the-risks-of-rapid-and-unplanned-urbanization-in-developing-countries/
[28] Robert Muggah, David Kilcullen (2016) “These are Africa’s fastest-growing cities — and they’ll make or break the continent”. World Economic Forum on Africa
[29] World Economic Forum (2015)
[30] Mark Swelling (2016) “The curse of urban sprawl: how cities grow, and why this has to change”. The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jul/12/urban-sprawl-how-cities-grow-change-sustainability-urban-age
[31] Marie Baleo (2018), Villes européennes et réfugiés : un laboratoire du logement abordable et de la résilience urbaine
[32] “We can do it”
[33] Doug Saunders (2011) Arrival City: how the largest migration in history is reshaping our world. Pantheon
[34] La Fabrique de la Cité (2018) p. 39
[35] La Fabrique de la Cité (2018) p. 54
[36] La Fabrique de la Cité (2018) p. 26
[37] 2016 WTO figures. http://media.unwto.org/fr
[38] Rosa Caroli, Stefano Soriani (2017)
[39] The tourism sector represents 11.2% of GDP in Spain and concerns 2.5 million direct and indirect jobs. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/08/14/l-espagne-dit-son-ras-le-bol-du-tourisme-de-masse_5172072_3234.html
[40] http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/04/26/airbnb-berlin-durcit-les-regles-pour-les-locations-touristiques_4909031_3234.html
