Francisco Madero’s grave mistakes
Francisco Madero was a serious challenger to Porfirio Diaz. Madero had amassed a vast personal fortune and was able to finance his impressive electoral campaign. Of Diaz and his insurgents would have nothing of this and basically sabotaged Madero’s campaign. Essentially, the votes for Madero were not counted. Madero, realizing it would be in his best interest to side with Diaz, offered him a deal — to run as Diaz’s vice President. Of course, Diaz turned this offer down and had Madero arrested. “On election day, the official count gave Porfirio Diaz more than one million votes, and Francisco Madero less than two hundred” (Gonzales, p.73).
Even though Madero was defeated, he received “support of numerous locally based revolutionary movements” (Gonzales, p.74). The common goal was to overthrow Diaz. Meanwhile, lower class participants kept the revolution alive over land rights and regular wages. Because Madero had initially championed land rights, he not only gained respect from rebels and new recruits from mountainous villages, including Pancho Villa, but also the lower-class villagers.
Madero finally gained victory and with that, established The Treaty of Ciudad Juarez on May 17, 1911. Sadly, and contrary to his original platform, Madero “favored only modest political reforms and affirmed that land reforms, the underlining causes of the rural tension, would have to wait” (Gonzales, p.80). This definitely would cause a division between Madero and lower-class participants. Madero appeared not to desire to handle land disputes and wanted those disputes settled in courts. “As a result, tensions ran high and sporadic outbursts of violence unsettled many rural areas” (Gonzales, p.83).
Emiliano Zapata, who promoted land reform butted heads with Madero. Madero had already aligned with Juan Carrion, a member of the local elite government and this angered Zapata by presenting a list of haciendas to be protected. Zapata insisted that the promises of the Revolution be fulfilled, and that all lands be returned to villagers at once. Despite this, “Madero reiterated his position that land reform was an issue of the courts” (Gonzales, p.84).
Madero continued to distance himself from those villagers whose military victories had brought him into power, by surrounding himself with form Diaz supporters and federal army officers, “with whom he felt socially and politically comfortable” (Gonzales, p.84).
Sadly, Madero continued to separate himself from those that had supported him. Madero worked with conservatives who held little esteem form rural masses. This was probably one of Madero’s greatest errors, since he “should have rewarded his revolutionary supporters and kept the conservatives at arm’s lengths” (Gonzales, p.87). Additionally, Madero’s failure to implement meaningful reforms and mismanagement of political appointments led to widespread discontent. These issues eventually led to a coup with intentions of overthrowing Madero. The coup consisted of Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz, who plotted conspiracies against Madero. Both of these conspirators were caught, but Madero decided not to bring them to justice. He should have had them executed, but he did not, and this decision hastened his overthrow.
Madero was eventually a target of U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson who aligned with General Victoriana Huerta, overthrew Madero and eventually assassinated him.
“Ultimately, Madero’s reliance on the federal army made him vulnerable to counterrevolution. Disgruntled elites, hedging their bets and sizing up the opposition, waited for the opportunity to overthrow him” (Gonzales, p.92).
Gonzales, M. J. (2002). The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1940. University of New Mexico Press.
