The two political camps in the Mexican revolution were the Constitutionalists and the Conventionalists. Constitutionalists believed in the basic principles of the Constitution of 1857, which included the establishment of individual rights, government authority broken into three branches (legislative, judicial and executive), separation of church and state, and personal property rights (Gonzales, p. 163). It was similar the the Constitution of the United States.
The primary objective for Constitutionalists was to form a liberal, constitutional democracy. Middle and upper class city dwellers, as well as large landowners, comprised the bulk of Constitutional followers, who were not generally willing to consider returning lands to peasants and indigenous villages, so meaningful land reform was absent from their platform Gonzales, p. 162).
On the other hand, Conventionalists weren’t as interested in political reform and just wanted major (some would say radical), economic and social changes, particularly in regard to land reform (Conventionalists) . In fact, they wanted lands returned to their rightful owners immediately. Decentralized government where individual states could maintain their autonomy, giving control of natural resources back to the Mexican people, and establishing an independent judicial system were also important to Conventionalists. Their membership consisted of primarily poor, peasant farmers whose lands had been confiscated, beginning with the Diaz regime, and often accomplished through illegal means (Conventionalists). Both groups initially worked together to oust Victoriano Huerta after he overthrew President Francisco Madero. But, after failing to agree on what direction Mexico should take for the future, the factions split, with Constitutionalists being led by President Venustiano Carranza, and the Conventionalists being led by Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata (Conventionalists).
Following the Convention of Aguacalientes, Carranza was deposed and fled to Veracruz, leaving his general Álvaro Obregón in charge of the troops. He then began a campaign of wooing peasants, workers and middle class citizens. This resulted in both sides having people of similar backgrounds as followers, despite the vast class differential in the two leaders (Gonzales, p. 141)
Militarily, Pancho Villa had the upper hand by far (Gonzales, p. 143). This could have given him a big advantage. However, he wasted precious time celebrating his occupation of Mexico City and conducting military actions to secure control over the provinces to the north instead of utilizing his opportunity to overtake Carranza’s forces (Gonzales, p. 143).
Both Villa and Zapata shared concern for the peasants of Mexico, but they had disagreed on some issues (Gonzales, p. 144). They decided to meet in Mexico City during Villa’s celebration to brainstorm on how to defeat the Constitutionalists. The meeting did not go particularly well, but they were able to agree that Zapata would occupy Puebla and Villa would provide Zapata’s army with artillery. The meeting did not result in a formal agreement however (Gonazales, p. 145). Meanwhile, their respective armies illustrated the difference in Zapata’s and Villa’s leadership. Zapata’s army, which consisted mostly of peasants, wandered around like “lost children”, but did not partake in looting or raping, and treated the middle class residents with respect. Villa’s army in contrast, who were used to raiding towns, robbed stores and residences, attacked women and shot people. This behavior cost Villa valuable supporters (Gonzales, p. 145).
Villa headed north and enjoyed a number of victories as he strove to secure the international border with the U.S. (Gonzales, p. 145). However, he met with fierce resistance in some states, such as Sonora. He also failed to secure the oil fields in El Ebano which were important. Meanwhile, Obregón spent his time retooling his army (Gonzales, p. 146). He traveled strategically east and west in the Constitutionalist territories, recruiting soldiers, mapping out transportation networks and building morale among his men before heading to Puebla, with plans to then continue on to Mexico City (Gonzales, p. 146).
Zapata and Villa had drifted apart and although Zapata’s army occupied Puebla, his troops felt uncomfortable outside of their home, Morelos.(Gonzales, p. 146). Rumors were spreading that Villa’s army considered Zapata a “savage” that needed to be eliminated. At the same time, Villa had delayed shipment of the promised artillery and Zapata’s political advisor had been assassinated by Villistas. This caused Zapata to evacuate Puebla and sever his ties with Villa. No more would he and his troops fight the big battles. He returned to his home in the state of Morelos and focused on protecting it, while leaving Villa to fight his own big battles (Gonzales, p.146). This left Puebla, and soon Mexico City, ripe for the picking for the Constitutionalists.
Carranza and Obregón continued to recruit ne followers throughout the country by promising labor reform, fair tax law and regulation of foreign companies (Gonzales, p. 147) Their political platform was very enticing to a widespread audience. Still, popular opinion had it that Villa was unbeatable in battle. Obregón was willing to test that opinion. He marched north to force a confrontation with Villa forces (Gonzales, p. 147). Villa then asked Zapata to intercept supplies on their way to Obregón forces. However, Zapata was not able to comply with that request and the supplies made it through (Gonzales, p. 148).
Over the next several months, the armies of Villa and Obregón clashed with Villa losing big battles in Celaya and León and Guanajuato. Even Obregó being shot didn’t slow the progress. His cousin General Benjamin Hill, took over and upon Obregón’s return to service, they were victorious at Aguacalientes and Villa’s army was reduced to stealing from villagers and were unable to recruit new soldiers because they lacked the funds to pay them (Gonzales, p. 150) By 1915, Villa had been deserted by his inner circle. Villa continued to fight, refusing to surrender and his raids became synonymous with Villistas (Gonzales, p. 153).
With the violence at the border, the U.S. closed their mines in Mexico, causing financial hardship on the working residents (Gonzales, p. 153). Villa was angered by this and proceeded to order traines to be stopped en route to the border. In one instance in Chihuahua, sixteen U.S. mining engineers were shot and killed. Then, Villa attempted to incite the United States into a battle by raiding the New Mexico town of Columbus, which increased his popularity (Gonzales, 154). Despite prolonged U.S. intervention and their efforts to capture him, Pancho Villa remained at large following the raid on Columbus for several years, while he continued with his raids. Carranza finally demanded the U.S. leave Mexico but they refused. Finally, Villa’s army, fatigued with war, was no longer able to maintain control over the towns they conquered. Villa, returned to Chihuahua and ceased fighting for control of Mexico.
Carranza overwhelming won the election for President of Mexico in 1917. While in power, he made policy decisions that shaped Mexico’s future. He ultimately limited foreign ownership of property, abolished special concessions for overseas companies, and increased taxes (Gonzales, p. 161). These moves provided an avenue for Obregón and his allies to grow their political base through promises that they would never deliver (Gonzales, p.161).
In 1920, Obregón succeeded Carranza for the Presidency. He had a job on his hands; he had to rebuild a shattered war-torn economy and reinvent Mexico as a country (Gonzales, p. 178). He began by offering amnesty for all insurgents and convincing Villa to retire on the Hacienda Canutillo. He held talks on land reform in Morelos. He provided generous financial rewards to army officers in exchange for their loyalty (Gonzales, p. 185). He forged alliances with labor forces, promising increased political power in exchange for their backing. These measures helped bring stability to his government, yet Obregón still faced challenges (Gonzales, p. 187). The territories where the revolution was born, were still at risk of a revival of hostilities. When Obregón was running for President, Villa was asked to support him against Carranza, but he declined. Villa believed that civil war would weaken both sides and strengthen his political influence. When Obregón won, Villa was on the defensive. Even with a government reward of 100,000 pesos, Villa evaded capture. He fled to Coahuila and robbed haciendas to survive. Interim President Adolfo de la Huerta stepped up and was able to come to a settlement agreement with Villa. If Villa would retire, the government would give him the Hacienda Canutillo, an escort of 50 men and land for eight hundred of his solders (Gonzales, p. 187). Villa agreed with never once mentioning land reform as a condition of surrender (Gonzales, p. 188).
Prior to the end of Obregón’s term, Villa began ruffling feathers again by declaring that his agreement to stay out of politics only applied to the end of the Obregón presidency (Gonzales, p. 200). He further declared that he was thinking of running for Governor of Durango. Villa claimed to be able to assemble a forty thousand man army in forty minutes. This alarmed Obregón and led to a plan to assassinate Villa. While attending a baptism, several men ambushed him with rifles as he arrived at his location. He was shot multiple times and died at the scene (Gonzales, p. 201).
The revolution came to an end during Obregón’s presidency. He had defeated a subsequent rebellion, led by Adolpho De la Huerta. De la Huerta ultimately fled to Los Angeles. Obregón then executed the rebellious generals to eliminate any risk of potential new rivals surfacing that could cause problems for him and his administration (Gonzales. p. 201).
References
Conventionalists (Mexico). Wikipedia. Wikipedia.org. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conventionists_(Mexico)#:~:text=The%20Conventionists%20were%20a%20faction,of%20October%20to%20November%201914.
Gonzales, Michael J. (2002). The Mexican Revolution 1910–1940. University of New Mexico Press.
