Exceptionalism in Foreign Policy
The belief that one’s country is exceptional can be the most unifying banner at a time of political and socio-economic divides. It is any politician’s talking point to incite emotions; and you can literally base any argument on it. The claim “America should be proud of its role in maintaining global peace” appeals to voters almost in the same way as the opposing slogan, “America first”. The obsession with the uniqueness of one’s nation, however, does not always help in decision-making.
The American Exceptionalism
President Obama is enjoying his highest approval rating as his 8 years of presidency is approaching its end. The most controversial part of his presidency was probably hesitance towards using military interventions. When Russia annexed Crimea and continued to support Eastern Ukraine’s secession movement, Obama took no major actions. His refusal to militarily protect Syrian civilians from the Assad regime’s chemical weapons was highly criticized. He also took a softer approach to the Iranian nuclear deal than many had hoped for. Some have concluded that Obama overlearned the lesson of the Iraq War. Two major harms could result from such foreign policy: first, a power vacuum in the most unstable region of the world; and second, the loss of global allies whose loyalty depends on the superpower keeping its defence promises.
Such criticism makes sense if you accept America’s global responsibilities to maintain peace and promote democracy. But Obama seems to have a different understanding of America’s role compared to the Bushes. He wants to turn away from meddling with Middle East politics and taking care of old allies across the pond. Collaborations with rising powers across the Pacific, such as the TPP negotiations, seem more beneficial to America in Obama’s opinion.
Of course, Obama’s withdrawal from America’s foreign commitments is not the same as Donald Trump’s denunciation of allegiance to NATO. Trump’s reasoning is “America first”, an inward-looking view of national identity mixed with some childish frustration with allies. On the contrary, Obama knows imposing democracy with boots on the ground does not work. Intervention has not fixed a single problem America attempted to solve — Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and not even the Libyan Civil War, where overthrowing Gaddafi did not bring stability either.
In the past, America’s moral duties to defend democracy against communism were enhanced by its military and economic strengths. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s further solidified its position as leader of the “free world”. Such world order and the corresponding foreign policy were nevertheless temporary. The President is very aware that America is no longer the leader and winner in everything. But patriotic pride resulting from such temporary reality lasts much longer. When white Americans lose jobs to immigrants and the working class are laid off due to foreign competition, they rally behind the pledge to “Make America Great Again”.
Faith in America
The problem with “exceptionalism” goes beyond Trump supporters’ nostalgic feelings and the US foreign-policy establishment’s reluctance to change. The solid belief in a liberal internationalist America also creates a false sense of security among developed countries in general. America does spend twice more on defence than European countries combined, even though geographically Europe faces higher security threats (from both Russia and groups such as ISIS). Japan, a key ally in Asia expected to help constrain China, has no intention of revising Article 9 of its constitution that prohibits the development of its own defense system. All is under the assumption that their big brother, the US, will protect them.
Such trust in the US looks increasingly questionable when it is not clear where its foreign policy is heading. Donald Trump is an advocate for the populist sentiment against NATO allies; and his almost equally unpopular rival, Hillary Clinton, is a liberal internationalist willing to actively assume the leadership role in NATO and use the military to promote peace and democracy. Foreign policy has always been about studying decisions in the past. The pressure to learn, but not overlearn, Iraq lessons, as well as the regret over non-intervention in Rwanda but intervention in Vietnam, etc, will continue to haunt Washington.
Not the only “exceptional” one
The West’s exceptionalism also assumes universal desirability of democracy and motivates actions to “liberalize” everyone else. This is particularly likely to cause deadlock when the West needs to confront someone else’s exceptionalism. The narrative of exceptionalism has demonstrated great versatility to be adapted by different political entities. You don’t need to be a developed democracy to claim to have historical achievements and unique institutions. Russia also plays the exceptionalism card with Putin’s aggressive foreign policy moves and domestic religious indoctrination.
What is interesting about a non-democracy’s exceptionalism is that it can be so well played against the West. The recent frustration of Chinese fans over the Sun Yang vs. Mark Horton drama was a snapshot of the country’s anti-Western patriotism: sensitive, defensive and mixed with a unique history of victimhood under Western imperialism. Much as the Chinese middle class dislike the corrupt communist party internally, when it comes to the Nine-dash Line, they prefer their official account of “historical rights” over an international tribunal ruling “under Western influence”. The communist party’s best-selling explanation is indeed that China’s “exceptional” economic and historical conditions require a “different political system from Western Democracy”.
So every time a Western policy-maker speaks of Chechnya or Tibet, it is more of a tale for their Western listeners who then acquire a sense of moral righteousness about championing democracy; their Chinese or Russian counterparts, however, just gained another chance to prove to their citizens that the West is persecuting or conspiring against them. This us-against-them ideological gap is widened by each side’s belief in their nation’s “exceptionalness”. To imagine that the Chinese or Russian people must be yearning for democracy is very naive.
