Is this the end of identity liberalism?
If you fall on the left half of the ideological spectrum, you probably have read numerous articles and posts calling for less identity politics and more conversation. Democratic representative from Ohio, Tim Ryan, also challenger of Nancy Pelosi’s minority leader position, plans to centralize a broader economic message in Democratic campaigns. Mark Lilla, a humanities professor at Columbia University, wrote an opinion piece for New York Times calling for the end of identity liberalism.
Identity liberalism, also identity politics, refers to the style of politics that emphasizes shared experiences within groups characterized by gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, etc. It gradually entered major political campaigns and policy-making in the 1990s, when Democrats realized they needed not only the votes of the traditional white working class, but also the support of fast growing immigrants and the rising millennial generation. Liberals have since considerably shifted their focus on class and economy. One of Obama’s legacies is various progressive legislation that he secured for women and minorities; Clinton ran a presidential campaign that specifically addressed these groups.
However, the loss of the election does not mean the end of identity liberalism. The Clinton campaign failed for a multitude of reasons that are beyond the scope of one single article. The failure of identity liberalism as a campaign strategy would lead you to two logical conclusions: either identity liberalism itself is problematic and overplayed, or it is downplayed. What I am trying to answer in this article is why we need more identity liberalism, not less.
The core idea behind identity politics is the recognition of how diverse lived experiences inform your worldviews and impact your socio-economic well-being. Please note this is not to say all blacks will have the same concerns and opinions, but that categorization purely based on class , or no categorization at all, is insufficient to capture a variety of concerns.
More traditional liberals with a strong populist tendency, such as Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn, tend to see economic issues as the most effective talking point and mobilization tool. Admittedly, it is easier to convince people that having a lower number on one’s bank statement creates insecurity and unhappiness; more so when identity liberalism requires voters to understand the unique experience of another group. But most of us would prefer a world where politics is not just about maximizing votes.
If domestic politics should aim to address any issue of concern for the population, then you cannot logically put economic issues ahead of all others. Most people would agree with the cliché that money is not the only thing important. Any educated person can list a series of non-economic issues that disproportionately affect minorities: fewer career advancements for women, higher exposure to violence for coloured women and sexual minorities, more police brutality for black and Latino men, less resources for children in segregated schools, etc.
The classic liberalism or leftism of unionization and striking for higher wages was catered towards the common experience after World War II, when manufacturing was the largest economic sector and most jobs required nothing more than physical labour and simple technical skills. But such socioeconomic reality no longer holds true. Now we have a service economy, with the talent-driven technology sector being the top growth driver; we also have a much larger immigrant population with zero exposure to the white working class culture; we see flatter family structures with working mothers; youths nowadays want a worldly experience, not stable jobs in their hometown and rock music in the local bar. It is only natural and justifiable that politics attempt to reflect such diverse experiences and needs, instead of lingering around the 1960s to 1980s working class nostalgia.
The case for abandoning identity liberalism is a largely utilitarian one, and became popular amid the panic about Democrats’ loss in the election. But the claim that you can unify more people and get votes with a common concern — economic inequality — may not be true. Surely everyone wants jobs and economic prosperity. But you cannot elevate everyone in the working class by the same margin if individuals’ ability to benefit from economic policies are not the same. For as long as inequalities based on identities factually exist, you cannot bridge the division by covering up the division.
So what do we do about the group that is left out by identity politics — white working class men? An evolving debate around their place in liberal politics is their economic grievances related to immigration and jobs. Studies give different results with regard to the impact of immigration on working class unemployment and wage rate. But for the sake of making stronger arguments, let’s assume the worst case scenario where white working class are losing jobs to immigrants and the rural Midwest and rust belt are left behind by coastal cities. Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders would jump at the opportunity to paint the system as “not working for everyone” and “disenfranchising the 99%”. They are, first and foremost, oversimplifying the 99% that in fact are not affected or concerned about the neoliberal economy to the same extent.
But more importantly, we should be more skeptical about any politician that fantasizes a system that would “work for everyone”. Not a single type of political or socioeconomic order has achieved that or has been theorized to be that perfect. Therefore, what we expect from a system, more realistically, should be the fairness in selecting who benefits most; any social change will require the group that are previously advantaged to give up some of that privilege. White working class losing jobs deserves political attention; but when they are losing jobs to immigrants who are better educated and perform the job better, it is fair because we can agree that meritocracy is a more desirable system of distributing economic opportunities.
An argument I have seen for prioritizing domestic workers is that they pay tax, as if all immigrants were not under the same tax laws. The only alternative left is to say your birth place matters. It is clearly a dangerous path to take nationality, something an individual has no control of, as legitimate ground for discrimination. You do not have to completely support neoliberalism and globalization; but when it comes to promoting freedom of movement and equal opportunity regardless of race and nationality, there is no better system to achieve this. Any form of liberalism should have consensus that using these factors is not justified. The incredible responsiveness to white Americans’ outcry, compared to blacks’ and immigrants’ history of underrepresentation and disenfranchisement, is hypocritical at best.
Another challenge to identity liberalism is that you would alienate those who are tired of “political correctness”. What level of “offensiveness” constitutes microaggression is entirely another debate; but if anyone votes Trump simply because they hate “political correctness”, they seriously need to reconsider their priorities. You do not have to believe that Clinton lost solely due to misogyny; many disliked that she was a quasi-incumbent and career politician, which, at face value, had nothing to do with being a woman.
The irony is, however, you cannot be successfully anti-establishment and simultaneously a women without a prominent family background. Unlike Trump, Hillary Rodham had to build her network with elites and donors from scratch because that was the realistic way to get close to the highest glass ceiling. This explains why, by the time a woman wins nomination of a major party, she would have had a long enough political career and a moderate enough stance for you to loathe. If even the liberals cannot agree on this, it only means we need more identity liberalism.
Finally, it is unclear how the new form of liberalism focusing on economic issues can heal divisions after all. The most dangerous division is not white rural Americans losing status to more deserving people of colour; but rather the wide populist refusal to work with elites, to the point of not caring about objective truths. The type of rhetoric Tim Ryan and Mark Lilla prefer will probably fuel such irrational anger and further divide America. Liberals should resist the temptation to brush identity politics as divisive or unimportant; we still have a long way to go.
