Marcelo Bielsa looks to the wings for Leeds to take flight
A few weeks ago, the YEP’s Phil Hay published an article detailing some of Leeds’ initial transfer plans ahead of the new season. Within that piece detailing their interest in Helder Costa and Ben White, Hay revealed that Bielsa would be open to as many as three wingers being added to his squad this summer; an important note when viewed through his tendency to aim for two players per position. Whether by an open admission that Leeds are short in that area — or whether they have prioritised the wings as their main point of remodelling — the club appear to have identified the position with the biggest margin for improvement externally.
The assessment of the playing squad over the past month will have been taken in good faith though, with few apparent red flags. Bielsa’s contract extension for a further season has blanketed any serious upheaval at club, leaving Leeds in a strong position to make their continuity a factor. But even though the Whites will require only light activity in the transfer window this summer, the importance of getting those deals right will be more important than ever. And going by Bielsa’s wish list, much of our success in this regard will be graded through the winger targets that the club can attract.
To understand the reasons behind Leeds targeting a makeover of their wing strategy, we must dig into the fact that — while the Whites were consistently among the Championship’s most active attacking teams last season — they also suffered from a severe under-performance in their overall output. Bielsa’s side were an historic outlier in terms of their possession dominance and shot production in the Championship, yet they still suffered from frequent breakdowns in potency at critical points of the season. They had 246 more shots than Sheffield United and still scored fewer goals than the Blades.
Much of the diagnosis on Leeds’ attacking woes was centred on a poor conversion rate — they had simply not taken their chances. This was true: Leeds had missed opportunities, sometimes it felt like an abnormal amount that could only be the product of some kind of curse, but it was not the entire story (as much as it could have masked everything).
Bielsa’s side created a large volume of chances in the majority of their games. The issue was that the quality of those opportunities varied wildly, and their struggles down the stretch of the season spoke to a team that had lost its attacking fluency. In those moments of resistance, Leeds racked up the shots but struggled to generate enough of meaning. By the end, Leeds’ xG per shot average (just over 0.1) — a measure of chance quality — ranked below that of a stuttering Middlesbrough side led by Tony Pulis.
The above image shows the most common shape which Leeds used in possession throughout the season, and how it morphed from the 4–1–4–1 we would see on lineup graphics.
In its most basic terms, Leeds covered themselves with three ‘defenders’ (two centre backs and a defensive midfielder), pushed their full-backs high and wide, let the right-sided winger drift centrally (Hernández) and stretched the pitch on the opposite wing. The two central midfielders would look to position themselves beyond the opposition midfield line, while the lone striker would occupy the opposition centre backs. Bielsa’s system relies on lots of movement and rotations within all of this, but this was the most frequent default pattern that we saw from Leeds in 2018–19.
The profile of this XI was heavily influenced by Pablo Hernández; the individual who played with the biggest variation from his fixed position (right wing), and whose movements would cause the biggest ripple effects throughout the team. The 34-year-old had an outstanding individual season operating from the right wing, even though most of his actions on the ball were more characteristic of an orthodox №10; both in the spaces he occupied and the types of passes that he made. Hernández was Leeds’ main creator — averaging 2.4 chances created from open play per 90, with the largest share of those being made from a central position in the final third.
With an extra player often occupying central midfield areas, this was a key aspect in allowing the Whites to impose their control of possession and build their play through the thirds of the pitch. Leeds frequently overloaded the right side of the pitch to aid Hernández and attract opposition players, while stretching the pitch on the opposite wing to allow the switch of play and ensure that they weren’t crowded out centrally. And for most of the season, Leeds were able to get by leaning heavily on Hernández’s production from this loose wing role. The problem was that they had little alternative.
The reality of Leeds’ squad — as was increasingly revealed throughout the season — was that they were short of players who could make decisive dribbling actions and provide a direct threat on the shoulder of opposition defenders. Of the four players who saw the most minutes on the wing for Leeds last season (Hernández, Harrison, Alioski and Clarke), the only one who performed above the league-average for wingers in successful dribbles per 90 and dribble completion rate was Jack Clarke (albeit on just 811 minutes played). In other words, Leeds’ group of wide players were neither effective dribblers, nor particularly active in their number of attempts per game. It’s rare that this can be said for a team managed by Marcelo Bielsa.
Without that variety to their attack, Leeds often wound up locked in a cycle of trying to create opportunities through extreme precision with their passing combinations. Of course, this suited Hernández at this stage of his career, and he did a remarkable job of making his intelligence and quality on the ball mask his diminished wing attributes. But Leeds were never able to find the solution to compliment the Spaniard elsewhere.
On the days when they lacked their collective rhythm, breaking down opposition teams was difficult to exact and too often left to Hernández to remedy with his passing. To lack consistent direct threat on one wing was feasible; to lack it on both wings eventually became an awkward obstacle.
Back when he played for Pep Guardiola at Barcelona, Thierry Henry revealed that the Catalan coach would profess the power of the “three P’s” — play, possession and position. This concept was centred around how Guardiola’s teams would create the conditions to establish attacking situations. After that, it was up to the players to find a solution in the final third. “He used to say to us the first time he took the team, ‘my job is to take you up to the last third, your job is to finish it’.” Leeds probably won’t be signing Lionel Messi this summer, but they will need assistance from somewhere.
Bielsa’s side were rarely afforded the respite of being able to generate danger in isolated moments, allowing for those unscripted pieces of play when a dribble could unlock all possibilities. Leeds had more shots, more crosses and more final third passes than any other Championship team, but were easier neutralised that the likes of Norwich; a team who used a similar style of play to Leeds, but one who could lean on dynamic wide play to a greater degree than the Whites.
In the below graphic focusing on Championship wingers, we can see how Leeds’ settled pairing of Hernández and Harrison compared around the league across open play goal production (goals and assists) and completed dribbles per 90:
As previously mentioned, Hernández excelled in terms of goal production out of his wing/central hybrid role, despite his modest dribbling numbers. Jack Harrison, meanwhile, ranked below average in both categories, with his struggle to sustain his goals and assists naturally a consequence of that lack of dribbling impact. Without being able to develop a consistent threat in 1v1 attacking duels and work himself into dangerous positions without the aid of the team’s play, Harrison’s opportunities to serve Leeds in the final third were short of what you would expect from a winger playing in a team as expansive as Marcelo Bielsa’s.
Again if we were to use Norwich as a reference, note how their wing pair of Emiliano Buendia and Onel Hernández both ranked among the Championship’s best across both categories. Where opposition teams could afford to weight their defensive attention on Leeds around Pablo Hernández and still not be too fearful of being exposed on the left side, the same could not be said for teams playing Norwich. Their combination of proficient dribblers off both wings meant they always retained a dynamic edge to their play in the final third, and forced opponents to have to defend in space more regularly than Leeds did.
It’s at this point that we have to recall that Leeds were seemingly hours away from signing Daniel James from Swansea back in January; a logical move even without the benefit of hindsight, and one that suggested that the club have been ready to act on the team’s wing deficiency well ahead of summer 2019. (Note: On the above graphic, James can be seen in the top-right quadrant, firmly amongst the league’s best dynamic dribblers and goal threats.)
It’s not the fact that Jack Harrison or Gianni Alioski weren’t competent for Leeds in 2017–18. They both performed good things in that left-sided role — making smart off-ball movements, pressing aggressively and showing defensive responsibility, to name a few — hence the fact that Bielsa persisted with them as starting options even when Jack Clarke emerged as a potential game-changer, and the winger in the squad who most resembled the type that Marcelo Bielsa has historically preferred.
The main flaw was that given Leeds were without natural wing play on the right side, it ideally required them to compensate on the left flank with a consistent direct threat, capable of commanding respect from the opposition in terms of 1v1 duels, and being able to provide a threat in behind. The two teams that were promoted who used wingers in their system (Norwich and Aston Villa) both had at least one starting-level wide player who could provide this function. Unfortunately for Leeds, they could have had theirs in the form of Daniel James too.
The irony of last season is that Bielsa’s grand creation was born of the collective raising the sum of their parts, yet they lacked the individualism in certain areas to be able to attack with more variation. This was a key factor in Leeds gradually descending from the formidable attack that opened the season, to one that lacked consistent knockout power and that were forced into quantity over quality in the closing months. Without Pablo Hernández humming at visionary levels, Leeds’ attacking play was rarely representative of a team with automatic promotion aims.
Leeds will also have to weigh up Hernández’s role going forward — a similar workload in 2019–20 seems unlikely, but the degree of strengthening the squad on the wings may allow Bielsa to use him more often as a №10, as he did on a number of occasions last season. If Leeds can add to their squad with more dynamic wing options, Bielsa will be able to make the most of Hernández’s craft by using him more selectively between the wings and the orthodox №10 position, as he did most notably at Villa Park in Jack Clarke’s cameo sub performance.
This was one of very few moments all season when Leeds were able to work the ball into a wide player, and not have to rely on further construction of play to create a good goal-scoring opportunity:
Throughout his career, many of Marcelo Bielsa’s teams have been notable by the profile of their wingers — specifically the forceful type, who look to get defenders on their heels and apply pressure on the opposition box. They have consistently been among the best features of Bielsa’s teams. And whether it’s Pablo Hernández making that pass or Jack Clarke doing the rest, the Whites will need much more of this type of play next season.
Between now and August, it’s up to Leeds to populate the squad with the players that will ensure this type of direct attacking play is part of their weaponry. Indeed, for as much as Marcelo Bielsa’s work at the club has drawn cult hero status and plaudits from elsewhere, Leeds still have the potential to find another gear under El Loco. The good news is it won’t take much.
With Bielsa’s future addressed and Leeds rebounding from a third-place finish; their squad requiring little by the way of construction, the club stand at the edge of a summer in which opportunity looks kindly attainable.
(Stats via Opta / clips via InStat)
