“Remember the Maine” — 1898
The First Investigation Led to War, and Wasn’t the Last
The USS Maine exploded in Havana Harbour at 9.40pm on 15 February 1898, killing 266 sailors. There have been many theories about how and why and several investigations, none of which pleases everyone. (From a longer essay; any questions answered.)
Cuba, Spain, and the United States
Spain officially colonized Cuba in 1511. The indigenous people fought bravely, but could not resist Spanish military strength, or diseases. Colonialism is inherently abusive. Eventually Cuban-born Spanish and others sought independence. Becoming known as “Mambises,” they fought the Ten Years´ War (1868–78) and Little War (1879).
The United States, a growing power, wanted Cuba for its nickel mines, plantations, and strategic position. Some US Presidents tried to buy the island from Spain, others sought to “justify” intervention.
The Monroe Doctrine (1823) described any European intervention in the Americas as “a hostile act.” The Ostend Manifesto (1854) advocated the US should seize Cuba. In these and other US-made documents, Latin American interests were ignored.
By 1898, Spain retained only Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba, where Governor-General Valeriano Weyler added to the Empire´s unpopularity by rounding up rural workers and forcing them into towns. Spain´s liberal Prime Minister Sagasta, whose predecessor was assassinated in 1897, replaced Weyler with General Blanco. Spain rejected President McKinley´s offer to buy Cuba for $300 million.
The Maine Explodes
By 1898, civil disobedience in Cuba was increasing. The US Navy was small then, but President William McKinley (R-Ohio) sent the USS Maine, with Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee, to Havana on a “friendly visit, to protect American lives and interests.”
The Maine was built in Brooklyn, and launched in November 1889. Described as an armored cruiser or second-class battleship, she cost over $2 million. Captain Sigsbee had fought for the Union in the US Civil War, later serving at the Naval Academy, becoming a pioneering oceanographer and hydrographer. He became a Rear Admiral in 1903, retiring in 1907.
When the Maine exploded Captain Sigsbee was in his cabin, writing. Tom Miller, 100 years later, describes the explosion: “At 9.40pm, the ship´s forward end abruptly lifted itself from the water. Along the pier, passers-by could hear a rumbling explosion. Within seconds, another eruption — this one deafening and massive — splintered the bow, sending anything that wasn´t battened down, and most that was, flying more than 200 feet into the air.”(1)
Of those on board, 266 were killed and only 11 survived. Captain Sigsbee sent a telegram to the Navy Base at Key West, informing them of the explosion, adding: “Public opinion should be suspended until further report.” A Washington Evening Star survey showed most naval officers believed the explosion was accidental. Their views were soon drowned out by louder voices.
The First Investigation
President McKinley set up a Naval Board of Enquiry, led by Captain William Sampson. None were naval engineers.
Captain Sigsbee described measures taken to ensure the ship´s safety; his theories about the incident all involved a mine. The investigation found a piece of green metal, bent inward, and interpreted it as proof of external cause.
After only five weeks, they concluded the cause was: “The explosion of a mine situated at the bottom of the ship at about Frame 18 and somewhat to the port side of the ship.” (2) They found no evidence Spain was responsible, but the US public soon believed the Maine was blown up by a mine, planted by the Spanish Navy.
This makes no sense with regard to motive. The two countries were still friendly. Spain was struggling against the Mambises, and would not want to bring a stronger adversary into the conflict.
They helped the Navy after the incident. The Spanish authorities investigated too. Their report states ships could enter or leave Havana with normal formalities. The weather was calm, so a mine would need electrical detonation but no wires were found.
Asking no pertinent questions, the US government soon adopted the slogan: “Remember the Maine.”
It Was Worse Than That
In 1898, William Randolph Hearst´s New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer´s New York World competed for circulation in New York City.
These publishers were founders of melodramatic, sensationalist writing of half-truths called “yellow journalism.” (Hearst, a mining heir turned newspaper tycoon became the model for Orson Welles´ Citizen Kane.) Experts suggesting alternative explanations were ignored.
On February 17, Hearst’s papers published a headline: “The Warship Maine was Split in Two by an Enemy´s Infernal Machine.” On 25 April, Congress demanded Spanish withdrawal from Cuba, declaring war had existed since the 11th. The full slogan was: “Remember the Maine. To Hell with Spain!”
The War
On 21 April, the US blockaded Cuba´s ports, later sending 20,000 troops. On 6 June, US and Cuban troops invaded Guantánamo Bay.
On 3 July, they sank Admiral Cervera´s Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba. On land, Spanish forces, weakened by illness, along with lack of reinforcements and supplies, capitulated. Casualty figures vary; however historians estimate around 90% of Spanish deaths were caused by disease.
The Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898) gave Puerto Rico, Guam, and Philippines to the United States. Cuba was nominally independent, but economically dominated by the US, which also gained several naval bases there, including Guantánamo Bay.
Second Investigation
By 1911, the Maine’s wreck was a shipping hazard. Before it was removed, President William Howard Taft (R-Ohio) ordered another investigation under the Vreeland Board, by the Army Corps of Engineers. Army Engineers built a coffer dam to expose the hull. Investigator William B Ferguson´s team took photographs, and drew detailed diagrams.
Their report was published on 14 December 1911, only 13 years after the explosion and war. They agreed “Section 1” — a metal part bent into a V-shape — was evidence of an external cause, and mentioned frames inside the hull, cautiously suggesting a new location for the alleged mine. The Maine was towed away and sunk in deep water on 16 March 1912.
This file is a work of a sailor or employee of the U.S. Navy, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, it is in the public domain in the United States
Third Investigation
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover studied at US Naval Academy and Columbia University, graduating in Electrical Engineering.
He ran the Navy’s Okinawa repairs section during World War II, then worked at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, developing nuclear reactors for the US fleet. Rickover became a four-star Admiral with many awards, retiring after 63 years´ Naval service in 1982.
He was interested in the Maine and, in 1974, assembled a team of historians to examine relevant documents. Then Hansen and Price, highly experienced naval engineers, examined Ferguson´s photos and diagrams. Their conclusion was that the explosion was “without a doubt” due to “spontaneous combustion in the ship´s coal bins.”(3) Displacement of frames 28 and 31 was evidence of internal explosion.
This fits eyewitness accounts; nobody saw a plume of water, or any dead fish. Hansen and Price saw no evidence of scars, tears, distortion, or powder burn radius, which also usually accompany a mine explosion. Engineer Otto P. Jons described Section 1 as looking: “in a way that a mine-damaged plate couldn´t possibly look.” (3)
The Committee concluded that spontaneous combustion of coal in bunker A16, beside the reserve magazine holding gunpowder and shells, caused the explosion. An experiment, heating the wall to 500 degrees, proved this possible. From 1894 to 1908, 20 coal bunker fires occurred on US Navy ships, including the Brooklyn, Oregon, Cincinnati, and New York. The Maine was built to a similar design.
This investigation was under no political pressure, the team were all qualified professionals, and their conclusion is convincing. But it infers the US government went to war because of lies and propaganda, and the Navy was using unsafe ships. The Rickover Investigation became the official version, but some still looked for other explanations.
Other Theories Include:
In 1995, Peggy and Harold Samuels published “Remembering the Maine,” using recently-released witness accounts.
They believe a mine was placed by radical followers of Governor-General Weyler. He was only Governor of Cuba for 22 months, being recalled to Spain in October 1897, and showed no animosity towards the United States. He became Captain General of Madrid in 1900, and served three times as War Minister. It seems Weyler moved on.
(Witness accounts are problematic; human memory is unreliable however certain we feel, and experienced interviewers can get replies they want, ignoring those they don´t).
In 1998, for the hundredth anniversary of the explosion, the National Geographic Society funded another investigation. Advanced Marine Enterprises used computer-based modelling systems to estimate the probability of internal and external causes of the explosion. They decided either were possible.
Response
In 1995, Rickover´s book was re-issued, with additional arguments to answer criticisms. In 2005, naval engineer Otto Jons published a short, detailed analysis, stating: “In this writer´s opinion, the Rickover book should have settled the argument, but with the centennial of the sinking in 1998, interest in the Maine revived.”(4)
His book demonstrates how easily the distortion of the much-debated Section 1 could have been caused by inrush of water after the explosion. This is convincing even if, like me, you don´t know much about engineering. He adds that a slow, smoldering fire in Bunker A16 can be difficult to detect, not necessarily producing smoke, flames, or raised temperatures.
Conclusion
Logically, only the Mambises had motive to want the US to join the war, but if Sigsbee´s guards were working, they had no opportunity. Spain definitely did not want more enemies. We can´t be sure everyone interviewed at the time was telling the truth. Although inspections and temperature checks were noted as carried out, it is not certain the work was done conscientiously.
I´d add that it´s possible the daily temperature check was not done with accurate equipment. Also, as this check was at 9.40 am, it had 12 hours to heat up before the explosion, suggesting more frequent checks were needed. The bunkers had temperature sensors, but her Engineer reported to Sampson these sounded even when empty.
Both the US government and the Navy had everything to gain by supporting the mine theory. This story is an example of how political pressures can influence expert opinion. Even now, careful analysis cannot compete with an exciting story, whether it´s true or not.
All analyses have agreed the Forward 6” Reserve Magazine, on the port side between Frames 24 and 30, was first to explode. The difference is in the interpretation of this fact, and whether the initial cause was a mine or bunker fire. The chaotic nature of the event complicates our understanding but, on a balance of probabilities, the bunker fire is more likely.
Maybe, like the Mary Rose, the Maine could one day be dug out of her resting place and examined with technology we cannot imagine now.
Sources
1 Tom Miller, “Remember the Maine”, Smithsonian Magazine, February 1998.https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/remember-the-maine-56071873/
2 Report of President McKinley´s Naval Board of Enquiry, quoted by Louis Fisher, Specialist in Constitutional Law: “The Destruction of the Maine 1898,” Law Library of Congress, 2009. He assesses all four investigations. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/Maine.1898.pdf
3 Admiral Rickover´s report, published January 1976. Now available online: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/NewPDFs/USN/USN%20Manuals%20and%20Reports/USN.HOW%20.THE.BATTLESHIP.MAINE.WAS.DESTROYED.Rickover.pdf
4 Otto P Jons, Remember the “MAINE”, 2005. https://www.witpress.com/Secure/elibrary/papers/MH05/MH05013FU.pdf
Peggy and Harold Samuels “Remembering the Maine” Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995.
National Geographic, 1998.
Cuban history from: Professor José Cantón Navarro, Historia de Cuba: El Desfío del Yugo y la Estrella, Universidad de La Habana, 1996.
