Latest Dabiq Magazine Gives Insight into ISIS in Libya
On September 9, ISIS released its 11th edition of Dabiq magazine, which featured an interview with Abul Mughirah al-Qahtani, who was identified as the “delegated leader for the Libyan Wilayat.” While the interview falls well short of lifting the veil on ISIS operations and leadership structure in Libya, it does shine light on what has previously been an opaque subject.
The first and most obvious revelation of the article is the designation of an actual leader for the Libyan front. The individual named is thus far unknown (although a single social media post by a Misrata militia reported the arrival of “the Emir al-Qahtani” on May 30), but the personality is less important than the post. Despite having declared three wilayats in Libya (Barqa, Tripoli, and Fezzan) this article seems to designate al-Qahtani as the leader of all three. The declaration of a leadership level above that of the wilayats indicates that the group is likely following the model developed in Iraq and Syria in which the wilayats serve as more of an organizational schema rather than a true tier of command and control. ISIS’ varying capabilities across Libya reinforce this argument as the command and control required is vastly different depending on location, demanding strong leadership at the city or district level. Thus the organizational functions would be largely duplicated between the wilayat level and the overall Libyan command.
Al-Qahtani goes on to discuss the activities of ISIS in Libya, dividing the operational areas into three groups. According to the article, the organization conducts operations in Tripoli, Misrata, Tobruq, Bayda, Sabratha, and Ajdabiya; has “some control” in Derna and Benghazi; and completely controls the coastal region from Abu Qarin to Bin Jawad (the area surrounding Sirte). These locations are unremarkable with the exception of Sabratha. While reports of ISIS training camps and transit points in Sabratha have emerged over the past several years, there has been no official or independent confirmation. While it is highly possible that ISIS maintains a presence in the city, those units are unlikely to contribute to ISIS operations in any major way. Sabratha is surrounded by cities controlled by Libya Dawn militias and any operation into Tripoli would require the attackers to either cross battlelines between LNA and Libya Dawn forces, or transit through Janzour, arguably the most loyal Libya Dawn stronghold. Furthermore, Sabratha’s alleged role in smuggling also seems improbable. Sabratha possesses no significant port facilities and is distant from any area which ISIS would seek to land personnel or material.
Finally, Mughirah al-Qahtani described ISIS’ position towards other Islamist groups in Libya. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) are constantly denounced throughout the interview. al-Qahtani claimed that after the Caliphate was declared in Libya, every group in Derna with the exception of the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade (ASMB) pledged bayah to the group. According to this narrative, ASMB then joined forces with LIFG elements to form the Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna, which currently controls the city. While most of these elements are plausible, it does not explain the continued independent existence of Ansar al-Sharia in and around Derna both before and after ISIS lost control of the city. With respect to that group, al-Qahtani takes a soft stance. According to him, most of the members of Ansar al-Sharia defected to ISIS, and the remaining are described as “wish[ing] to implement the Sharia,” but misguided in their efforts.
In short the interview with Mughirah al-Qahtani is far from groundbreaking, but reveals a few scraps of information that give us insight into ISIS operations and structure in Libya. Furthermore, the very fact that ISIS chose to devote space to Libya in its primary international publication testifies to the importance of the country in ISIS’ conception. Highlighting alternate theaters allows ISIS to continue its narrative of success regardless of events in Iraq or Syria. Additionally, ISIS’ sustained presence in Libya represents another argument in the organization’s claim to the leadership of global jihad.
