AP Research Literature Review- Neo- Soviet Film and the Significance of WWII
This is the literature review for my AP Research project which investigates the question: To what extent do Bondarchuk’s Stalingrad(2013) and Kott’s Fortress of War (2010) differ in the way they portray the Neo- Soviet myth surrounding WWII? It summarizes the extant research on the topic and identifies the gap my project seeks to fill.
On May 9th, 1945, Soviet Marshall Zhukov and German Field Marshall Keitel signed the German Instrument of Surrender, ending the ‘Great Patriotic War’ that took the lives of 1/7th of the Soviet population. This day and the preceding 4 years of struggle soon became one of the most important events in the USSR, second only to Lenin’s 1917 revolution that created the nation. As such, the government created a national myth around the war, portraying the victory as “the greatest in history” and proof of the USSR’s superiority (Carleton 138). Even Khrushchev’s destalinization didn’t minimize the importance of or ideas behind the myth, but rather divorced the myth from Stalin’s cult of personality, even allowing portrayals that depict some of the less heroic aspect of the war. For example, criticism of NKVD cruelty and the domestic impact of the war became increasingly accepted so long as the heroism of the USSR itself wasn’t attacked (Menache 27). Brezhnev’s revisionism brought increasing focus and government control over the myth. Brezhnev designated May 9th, now Victory Day, became a national holiday in all Soviet Republics and many of the satellite states and promoted cultural development surrounding WWII, which only intensified as the economy stagnated (Lassin 20). The production of “morbidly saccharine” films such Here the Dawns are Quiet(1972) and Hip Hup Soldiers Marching (1976) and censorship of films such as Peace to Those Who Enters (1961), too pacifist, and Trial on the Road (1971), too critical of the USSR, evidence the Brezhnev era expansion and promotion of the myth (Carleton 140).
With the fall of the Soviet Union, cracks began to form in the government created myths. The publication of soldier’s memoirs and declassifying of documents shed light on the previously hidden failures of the Red Army and Soviet government in fighting and managing the war. Cinema reflected this change. Films like Burnt by the Sun (1994) and The Thief (1997) offer scathing criticisms that buck the Soviet narrative of WWII as destructive but beneficial. Later films like The Cuckoo (2002) and The Last Train (2003) directly criticize the myth by humanizing aggressors and even demonizing the NKVD military police, a previously forbidden topic (Carleton 144).
However, the pendulum has swung back in recent years, with the development of a new “Neo- Soviet myth” around WWII that retains the “romantic patriotism” of the Soviet narrative while separating it from the USSR itself. As such, the “great victory” was no longer a “triumph of socialism” that confirmed the 1917 “creation myth” but rather a “narrative of unsurpassed unity” (138). This narrative, which transcends time and geopolitical changes, has played an increasing role in Russian politics. Domestically, President Putin has “made the commemoration of the war a key part of his policy” through “inclusionary politics” and creation of populist discourses to silence alternative narratives. This is exemplified by the “sheer size” of the annual Victory Day parades. Internationally, emphasizing the myth presents a stark reminder of Russia’s “global superpower past” and helps support an “us versus them mentality” in conflict, as evidenced in Putin’s controversial VE Day address in which he compared US unilateralism with the aggression of the Third Reich (Lassin 37).
The influence of the new myth extends beyond government propaganda into popular culture. The rise of WWII films with clear patriotic overtones demonstrates the prevalence of this phenomenon. Previous research has analyzed how Neo- Soviet films create a patriotic myth surrounding WWII and its significance. Gregory Carleton, professor of Russian Studies at Tufts University, identifies some unifying characteristics such as binary opposition between good and evil, presence of “heroic archetypes” and victory, often not immediate. In particular, Carleton focuses on the prevalence of annihilation narratives, in which a majority or all of the protagonists are sacrificed. Carleton argues that such narratives of sacrifice “create a positive outcome regardless of the result.” If portraying the defeated, there’s “redemption in death.” (Carleton 136) If portraying a victory, the sacrifice emphasizes the significance of the victory. Although the annihilation narrative is nearly universal, as demonstrated by the continued fascination with Thermopylae and the Alamo, the frequency in which Russian films employ it is “striking” and “out of proportion” (136). For Russia, the annihilation narrative allows even 1941 to be portrayed as a “good year” now that losses could no longer be denied. Instead, the dramatization turns sacrifice into inspiration and defeat into “necessary steps towards victory” (146). Within the overall annihilation narrative, Carleton further identifies a focus individual sacrifice and mythical abstraction of triumph that displaces memory with public ritual (145). Carleton ultimately argues that the use of such elements in recent Russian cinematic depictions of WWII contribute to a larger “myth” of WWII that transcends geopolitical changes to create national unity (138). Dr. Mark Lacy, senior lecturer of politics philosophy and religion at the University of Lancaster, agrees with Carleton’s assertion that about the role of war films, arguing that they “construct a sense of national identity, creating a visual history that nurtures the bonds of solidarity” (Lacy 615) In Russia’s context, WWII acts as a powerful common experience by which to “create identity.”
Beyond narrative, war movies use cinematic elements and techniques to advance a “political rhetoric”, especially given advances in digital technology. John S. Nelson, professor of political science at the University of Iowa, focuses on characterization of the event itself. He argues that each war has a “character” based on perceptions of the role and impact of the war itself (Nelson 151). For example, WWII in Russia takes the character of a “great patriotic war”. Characterization creates tangibility, thus improving the credibility of the rhetoric. This concept of characterization can also be applied to significant battles and events within a war to advance the overall political rhetoric (153). Technology further aids characterization through the creation of “virtual realities”, thus creating immersive experiences (155). Although Nelson’s work is based on analyses of American war films, his research focuses more on the conceptual cinematic elements rather than the specifics of US film. Thus, the implications of his research apply to “all cinematic experiences”, including Neo- Soviet film (159).
In Stalingrad Reimagined as a Mythical Chronotype, Anna Kostetskaya, chair of Russian at the University of Hawaii, applies the research of Carleton and ideas of Lacy and Levy to Fydor Bondarchuk’s 2010 movie Stalingrad, the highest grossing movie in Russia for 2013. Kostetskaya argues that the film advances the myth of Stalingrad as a “sacred battle” that exemplifies the “two interdependent scenarios” of devastating tragedy and unassailable victory” (Kostetskaya 2). This sense of sacredness is enhanced by the use of religious imagery throughout the movie. Stalingrad evokes the great flood narrative. Each of the protagonists “looses everything” as a result of the war. Katya is the sole survivor of the building that becomes the movie’s central focus. This makes her a “virtuous woman” meant to pass on the “seed of life” after the “apocalypse” (4). The movie’s fiery start further evokes “hell on earth” and subtly insinuates that the soldiers aren’t saving the USSR but humanity (7). IMAX further advances the myth by creating a “visceral impact” that immerses viewers into a virtual reality experience, thus. In addition, the visual IMAX “aestheticizes violence” thus minimizing the psychological difficulties and placing the focus on the impressive image which emphasizes the myth rather than the plot itself (6).
Although research conducted by Carleton, Kostetskaya and others have identified unifying characteristics of neo- Soviet film, no study compares the different ways in which Stalingrad (2013) and Brest Fortress (2010) manipulate cinematic elements to portray and perpetuate the WWII myth. Conducting in-depth content analyses on these two films, both representative works of neo- Soviet film, will help fill this gap and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of a sociocultural phenomenon, the impacts of which extend beyond Russia’s borders.
