The Nuclear Threats Myth — A Few Lessons from History

History shows that nuclear powers like the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and China have all been forced to withdraw from conflicts in non-nuclear countries without resorting to nuclear weapons, emphasizing that nuclear deterrence does not guarantee victory in conventional warfare.

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Marta FOR Europe

4 min readJun 22, 2024

Almost every discussion about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine comes to the point that conceding to Vladimir Putin’s demands is prudent simply because Russia possesses nuclear weapons. Here is a little note — history provides ample evidence that nuclear-armed countries have not always achieved their goals through intimidation or force. Shocking, right? Let’s have a look at several examples where nuclear powers were compelled to retreat from non-nuclear states, thereby debunking the myth that nuclear armament guarantees success.

A few Historical Lessons of Nuclear Retreating

The Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979–1989)

Despite its nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union could not secure a decisive victory in Afghanistan. The prolonged conflict, characterized by fierce resistance from the mujahideen, led to substantial Soviet casualties and a significant drain on the Soviet economy. Eventually, under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership, the Soviets withdrew their forces in 1989, acknowledging the unsustainable nature of the conflict.

The United States in Vietnam (1965–1973)

Similarly, the United States, another nuclear power, withdrew from Vietnam after years of intense conflict. The Vietnam War saw significant American military and economic investment but ultimately resulted in a withdrawal under the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. The conflict continued until the fall of Saigon in 1975.

France in Algeria (1954–1962):

France, also a nuclear-armed nation, faced a prolonged and brutal war in Algeria. Despite significant military efforts and internal political upheaval, including a coup attempt, France eventually conceded and granted Algeria independence in 1962. This defeat was so impactful that it necessitated the return of Charles de Gaulle from retirement to stabilize the country,

China in Vietnam (1979):

China, possessing nuclear capabilities, launched an invasion of Vietnam in 1979 but withdrew after a brief and costly conflict. The Vietnamese forces mounted a robust defense, resulting in significant Chinese casualties and a hasty retreat, with no substantial gains for China.

Actual Use of Nuclear Weapons

So many times, Nuclear countries didn’t come to use their nuclear arsenal and get what they wanted. But what is it about times when the weapon was actually used? Nuclear weapons have only been used in combat twice, both times by the United States against Japan in 1945. It’s important to note that the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred when the U.S. was already on the path to victory in World War II. The rationale was to expedite Japan’s surrender and minimize further American casualties, not to turn the tide of a losing battle.

The Real Effect of Nuclear Weapons

Looking back on history, it is impossible to ignore the empirical evidence showing that nuclear weapons are not tools for coercion in losing situations.

The decision to use nuclear weapons is heavily influenced by the political and military context. Leaders are aware that using such weapons can have severe repercussions. Thus, nuclear weapons are more likely to be considered when a nation is confident of its overall victory, providing a political cover for their use.

In the case of the U.S. in 1945, President Truman’s administration was not worried about domestic backlash or international condemnation because they were on the verge of winning the war, and the post-war occupation of Japan ensured no immediate repercussions. Nobody judges the winners?

A real fear of Nuclear Strikes

Interestingly, countries close to Russia’s borders, such as Estonia, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia, are among the top supporters of Ukraine. Estonia, for instance, has spent 3.6% of its GDP aiding Ukraine. These nations, despite their proximity to Russia and the potential nuclear threat, understand that a Russian victory would likely increase the chances of nuclear aggression rather than prevent it. Their support for Ukraine highlights their resolve and strategic understanding that keeping Russia on the losing side diminishes the risk of nuclear conflict.

Afterwords

The notion that appeasing nuclear-armed aggressors is the best way to prevent nuclear war is historically unfounded. Nuclear powers have repeatedly been forced to withdraw from conflicts where they faced resilient opposition, regardless of their nuclear status. The use of nuclear weapons is politically viable only when a nation is winning, not when it is losing. Therefore, the best strategy to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is to ensure that it remains on the losing side, demonstrating that any nuclear aggression would lead to severe consequences for its leadership.