Just How Popular is K-Pop?
Analysing the world-wide phenomenon to see just how it became so ‘popular.’
(Written Aug 2020)
Given the immense miscellany of idol groups, companies and varying levels of fan dedication to the genre, there needs to be careful consideration of the quality of a K-Pop text. That is, there are an immense number of variables that must be taken into account when discussing the popularity of K-Pop. Paradoxically, it is all these variables that are the conduit of any sustainable investigation into the genre. Popular culture in South Korea is unique in its government endorsements and therefore, the criterion in which we evaluate K-Pop’s ‘quality’ of popularity has already become complicated and convoluted. The factors that need to be considered (the aforementioned idols, companies, fans, etc) are amongst a magnitude of many more. Furthermore, given the unprecedented popularity of boyband BTS, 방탄소년단, this essay will primarily focus on their discography — with added focus on their recent release Dynamite — as well as considering other notable idols/K-Pop texts. These case studies will thus allow exploration into the factors outside a K-Pop text that provide reasons for its popularity.
A well-known fact about K-Pop is that its fans of are unlike any other genre, and this is perhaps the starting point for the popularity of any K-Pop song/group/individual idol. For many, the appeal of K-Pop can be likened to how Maltby describes pop-culture as a whole: to be “escapism that is not an escape from or to anywhere,” and that allows us to find “our utopian selves.” (1989, p. 14) For many K-Pop fans (or ‘stans’) it is not a stretch to say that the genre is their whole life and are willing to dedicate everything to it. As evidence, prior to the release of BTS’ Dynamite, ‘comeback goals’ had already started circulating around almost every single SNS platform — Twitter, Tumblr, reddit, personal blogs, etc — as fans of BTS (known as ARMY) collectively planned the number of streams, views and sales they hoped to reach. Within the first twenty fours of Dynamite’s release, fans had planned to get the video to a “minimum of 80M views, ultimate: 100M — based on Boy With Luv achievement” (refer to figure 1) and the song itself streamed “7M” times on Spotify, the latter perhaps a reference to the seven members of BTS. Albeit this isn’t the first the time the ARMY has done such a thing — and this most definitely not the first K-Pop fandom to do such a thing — it’s testament to the ‘planned popularity’ of K-Pop. That is, before a fan-base has even heard the song/album, they’ve already ensured its popularity and by extension, its success.
Ultimately, K-Pop is a “a music scene that is driven in particular by music videos, television shows, advertising and SNSs” (Maliangkay 2015, p. 103) for it is SNS — social network sites — that perpetuates this ‘planned popularity.’ SNS is key to and for any K-Pop fan as that is how them to both consume media regarding their favourite group, but also share their fan-made content. This includes, but not limited to, fan-art, fanfiction, YouTube compilations and Instagram edits. This fan-made content is spread through SNS, and thus a group such as BTS can see their popularity grow as more fans are ‘made’ through discovering fan-made content; as opposed to becoming a fan due to enjoying their music. Prior to SNS, fans rarely did “receive any communication directly from celebrities,” (Brown 2018, p. 255) whereas today this has drastically changed in that celebrity involvement has come to include “physiological, psychological and emotional dimensions.” (Brown 2018 p. 256). Not only this, as Malingkay quoted Kim (2012) “the importance of SNS to non-Korean fans of K-pop will be equally significant” for that is how ‘international fans’ are able to still feel included in the fandom and do their part to engage with the group and in a form of solidarity to support ‘the boys.’ Fan-made content can be viewed both as ‘celebration’ of an idol group, but also wish-fulfillment. This leads to Horton and Whorl’s (1956) idea of the ‘para-social relationships,’ a term which refers to how a fan might feel a close, intimate (one-way) relationship with a celebrity due to over-consumption of media regarding said celebrity. Accordingly, one K-Pop blog stated that “BTS seems to have mastered the art of creating and cultivating their parasocial [sic] relationships with their fans” through “passionately and regularly interacting with them through social media.” (A Lost K-Pop Fangirl 2019, n.p) Hence, it is unsurprising that there is a plethora of BTS shows produced by Big Hit Entertainment for the ARMY to consume. Watching episodes of BTS cooking, seeing their rooms and even attending their graduations all contributes to building a para-social relationship and the ARMY believing that they have something ‘truly special’ with BTS. Therefore, fans are willing to break records for them and ensure their music’s popularity. Furthermore, the language used between the idols and fans are that of an intimate relationship. In the WeVerse announcement of a recent online BTS concert, BigHit wrote: “BANG BANG CON The Live is an online live concert that will let BTS and ARMY continue to nurture their special connection together while keeping everyone safe and healthy!” This ‘special connection’ is furthered by the likes of members always making references of the ARMY being their ‘girlfriends’ which as one reddit user,BromineBacteriapointed out, creates a “boyfriend/girlfriend complex” which the “kpop [sic] industry as a whole sort of promotes” (2019, n.p) and can develop to drastic levels, as seen with crazed sasengs. One such example of this behaviour is Suga, a BTS member, announcing at a 2015 concert that “ARMYs who date their boyfriends are betrayers” and “Keep your ring fingers empty, ARMY.”This led to one Amino user, weirdo (2016), saying “Why am I single? Because of SUGA..” and “don’t date anyone!” asking fans, “Do you guys wanna looked [sic] betrayers to our boys. This all leads to what Cahyani cited Widjaja and Ali (2015, p. 167) that “the nature of celebrity worshipper (fangirl) is similar to the nature of addiction” for the more media fans are able to consume of an idol, “the higher the addiction to celebrity idols.” This ‘addiction’ is, arguably, largely perpetuated by companies who exploit the fan-artist relationship so as to seek capital beyond the merit of the actual music texts they produce.
Given the amount of media a company produces alongside/on top of a musical text, it is not a stretch to say that K-Pop companies are more concerned with other things than they actual music they are producing. To understand this, one may look at Appadurai’s concept of mediascape which deals with a “dense network of production distribution, reception and aesthetic conditions.” (Fendler 2019, p. 4) Firstly, the “distribution” of K-Pop media is a heavily crafted process designed to generate buzz and gain popularity. The aforementioned ‘comeback goals’ that the ARMY had assembled only came into fruition after Big Hit Entertainment released the ‘promotion schedule’ (refer to figure 2) which detailed the date and time of the release of photos, teasers and interviews. This reflects the claim that with “each cycle of cultural consumption” (i.e each comeback) fans respond and their “reception commentaries and reviews are fundamental” (Huat 2012 p. 13) in perpetuating the text/idol’s popularity and, in turn, company profit. Hence, music is made for the fans, as opposed to making music for the sake of music. Therein, Big Hit Entertainment saw to providing the “distribution” means for the fans to get started on ensuring the popularity of BTS’ ‘comeback’ (i.e Dynamite) — without anything to do with the actual song. And even if fans are displeased with a song, any criticism of a text still increases popularity as the idea of ‘bad press is still good press’ applies. Hence, instead of really bringing about changes and fighting for the idols as fans suppose they’re doing, they’re instead still playing by the companies’ rules and increasing the text’s popularity as there is more buzz in more people are talking about it — never mind whether positive or negative, the text is still ‘trending.’ This reflects what Willoughby stated in that the companies “are not simply an anonymous cog” of the system but are the “engine” and the “very core of today’s industry” (2006, p. 101) as we see just how much power a company has over the idols and the music they produce — as well as how they ensure fan reception. We also see K-Pop companies ‘planned popularity’ in the “distribution” of physical albums that are “packaged as collectibles” (Maliangkay 2013, p. 7) to include photo cards and other merchandise. The sale of the official hard-copies also links into the para-social relation as it is an “obvious incentive for fans” to purchase the product that will “support their idols” (Maliangkay 2013, p. 8) instead of purchasing the CD purely the sake of the music. Therein, companies are ensuring the popularity of their product in regard to criterion unlinked to the actual music.
The “reception” condition of Appadurai’s theory can be exemplified by BTS’s Dynamite being distributed through popular social media platform, TikTok and the new avenues of reception this provided. TikTok dance trends have seen to certain songs gaining widespread popularity and Big Hit Entertainment utilised this in having BTS film their own TikToks dancing to Dynamite. The videos included the ‘easier’ parts of the choreography, thus inviting fans to record themselves dancing to the song; therein increasing the ‘reception’ (and popularity) of the song. These TikTok videos, however, are merely ‘updated’ forms of the ‘dance rehearsal’ videos that an act usually publishes alongside the official M/V. Despite the idols’ lack of make-up and being dressed in training clothes (that are usually pieces of expensive hype-beast streetwear) the ‘practice’ is “always as perfect as in the official music video” (Maliangkay 2013, p. 6) and serves only to increase para-social rapport between fans and idols by providing more content to consume. These ‘dance rehearsal videos’ are clever marketing tactics unto themselves as “fans sometimes post videos of themselves dancing the exact same routine on YouTube” which helps “increase the act’s fandom” (Maliangkay 2013, p. 6) as aforementioned in how fan-made content helps create more fans.
In regard to ‘aesthetic conditions’ that boost a song’s popularity, one may consider the M/Vs (music videos) that accompany a song, as well as the visually appealing idols who perform in them. As one BTS fan remarked, “I don’t really like what BTS’ music is now but I still stan them because of the visuals” (Anonymous 2020) and this can be seen as how BTS member Jin was scouted despite having no background in singing or dance and therefore serves to be purely for ‘aesthetic’ — as opposed to anything to do with music. Not only this, M/Vs themselves are usually a “mosaic” of “storytelling, music, group dance, body performance and fashion show” which has the idols performing “acrobatics and runway acts” simultaneously. (Choi & Malinagkay 2015, p. 5) It is also not uncommon for there to be more than one M/V per song; demonstrated by 아낙네 (Fiancé) by YG’s Mino which has the official M/V, the ‘dance rehearsal’ video and a ‘performance version’ of the official M/V — all of which are aesthetically appealing and flawless. Thus, a song is marketed (“distributed”) by the company to ensure that a fan’s “reception” will entail popularity, with the failsafe of “aesthetics” to maintain fan appeal.
This ‘aesthetic’ criterion is dependent on the idols who act as both ambassadors of their products, but also as marketing tools for an array of socio-political ordeals that have nothing to do with their music or even K-Pop as a whole. It is not uncommon practice for idols to be used as the face of a certain brand or product, such as ‘Lemona Vitamin Powder’s Special BTS Edition’ (refer to figure 3) or Blackpink’s many endorsements with high-end brands, both in Korean and abroad. Both groups have also had collaborations with LG and Samsung as we see South Korean conglomerates utilize the soft power of K-Pop idols who, arguably, are key to the “soaring value of the nation’s cultural capital.” (Choi & Maliangkay 2015, p. 9) The notable collaboration with Samsung and BTS saw to Samsung releasing a ‘BTS version’ of their latest mobile model — complete with the purple ‘fan colour’ of the ARMY. Not only this, TV advertisements of Samsung’s latest device had Dynamite playing the song in the background as the phone on screen scrolls through BTS’s Instagram and shows the photos of the members. Furthermore, the ‘aesthetic’ pastel colour palette of the M/V is matched in the advertisement and thus, we have a reciprocal relationship as Samsung uses BTS — and Dynamite — to market their product, and Big Hit obtains further ‘distribution’ of their music product. It should also be noted that as Doré and Pugsley noted from Shim (2002), the South Korean government’s desire to develop its “cultural section as an exportable commodity” coincided directly with the rise of MTV (2019 p. 581) and hence, the government’s endorsement of Korean music is politically charged. It is unsurprising to see idols acting as political intermediaries, as seen in 2012 when artist Psy attended the birthday of Bhumibol Adulyadej, the king of Thailand, and also had dinner with the then US President, Barack Obama. In 2018, girl group Red Velvet performed in North Korea, the first group ever to do so and finally, BTS became UNICEF Ambassadors who, in 2018, addressed the United Nations. That same year, they also performed in Paris at a concert aimed to promote friendly relations between Korea and France. President Moon Jae In had been in attendance and the following day was scheduled to meet President Emmanuel Macron. All these are examples of what Choi & Maliangkay call a “entertainment–diplomatic complex” (2015, p. 6) as we see idols being used outisde the sphere of music and entertainment, with the music they make being used for political means. It must be noted that this is not the first time a popular artist has been used for political means, as demonstrated by England with The Beatles. However, unlike BTS, The Beatles were still allowed to openly speak about their own personal political views, as demonstrated by their comments at the time about the Vietnam War. BTS are unable to do such a thing, inhibited by a company who is not “obligated to work in the best interests of fans or even BTS themselves” (A Lost K-Pop Fangirl 2019, n.p) and that despite the members being UNICEF Ambassadors, performed a controversial concert in Saudi Arabia. The controversy of said show was due to many viewing the performance as both the Korean and Saudi Arabian government “using BTS as pawns to further their own agenda” and display themselves in a good light, despite how the latter is “tightly controlled country that oppresses women, minorities and homosexuals” (A Lost K-Pop Fangirl 2019, n.p) — everything that BTS announced themselves to stand against. Therein, much like how BTS get praise for writing their own lyrics but their music still gets commodified by the Appadurian mediascape employed by Big Hit, the same way that they would be used as political ‘pawns’ — even if against their will and moral value. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between an endorser/endorsee can be applied here with as the government’s funding has ‘paid off’ and now they’ve ‘come to collect.’
To conclude, BTS as the ‘current epitome of K-Pop’ allowed us to see that no, K-Pop’s popularity is not due to the music the genre produces. Instead, K-Pop is largely dependent on the fans and their (para-social) relation to the idols, something carefully crafted under the guidance of the company. On top of this, K-Pop companies seek various avenues of marketing, such as new innovative SNS technique and South Korea’s soft political power, to further the popularity of a text. All this middle work of marketing, promotion and emphasis on the visual hinders any genuine appreciation of the music as an isolated form, and have its popularity measured accordingly. Hence, a K-Pop song cannot, and seems unlikely to ever be, just be a song on its own — no strings attached.
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