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John Barclay’s “Paul and the Gift”: notions of grace

This past week I read John Barclay’s wonderful new book Paul and the Gift. Divine grace is central to Christian theology and preaching. Barclay challenged many of my assumptions in a good way. I’d like to sketch his framework for understanding interpretations of grace/gift.

First off, there is no single historic universal notion of “pure gift” or “pure grace”. Instead, notions of gift/grace can be “perfected” — i.e. carried to an extreme — in various independent ways. Here are the six potential perfections that Barclay identifies (quoted from 185–186):

1. superabundance: the supreme scale, lavishness, or permanence of the gift;
2. singularity: the attitude of the giver as marked solely and purely by benevolence;
3. priority: the timing of the gift before the recipient’s initiative;
4. incongruity: the distribution of the gift without regard to the worth of the recipient;
5. efficacy: the impact of the gift on the nature or agency of the recipient;
6. non-circularity: the escape of the gift from an ongoing cycle of reciprocity.

Barclay carefully stresses that these are independent perfections of grace. “To perfect one facet of gift-giving does not imply the perfection of any or all of the others” (75).

For example, just because one thinker perfects the priority of grace, i.e. they require that pure grace entails that the giver initiates the gift, it does not follow that they perfect the efficacy of grace, i.e. they may not believe that the perfect gift need have the perfect effect.

Another example: just because a thinker requires that a gift be given without regard for the worth of the recipient (incongruent), it does not follow that they do not expect those who receive the gift to reciprocate in some way (not-non-circular).

I find this framework very helpful.

First, I can see how theological debates about grace often amount to disagreement about the perfections of grace. For example, Barclay writes, “Augustine did not believe in grace more than Pelagius; he simply believed in it differently” (77). Pelagius taught the superabundance of grace without its incongruity; Augustine required incongruity. Neither party failed to teach grace, broadly construed. (Even Marcion taught a version of grace, namely one that perfected the singularity of grace.)

Second, within this framework the notions of grace that I grew up with turn out to be just that — notions and not essential definitions. I typically understand grace to be undeserved favour (incongruity), a free gift requiring nothing in return (non-circularity), and something given on God’s initiative (priority). Barclay’s framework allows me to read Paul with due caution lest I simply project my notion onto his letters (I have!).

Grace can mean different things to different people. When Paul preaches grace I need to ask myself, “what does he mean by grace?”. This is what Barclay’s book is all about.

Originally published at bennasmith.wordpress.com on October 31, 2015.