On the nature of theological mystery
Paul Moser writes, “What is intelligible for us can, we have seen, outstrip what is effectively answerable or testable by us” (Moser 1999, 57). He makes this remark in the context of discussing realism, idealism, and the skeptical challenge they face. My mind, however, immediately wonders how this principle applies to mystery in theology.
Theological discussion often concludes with an appeal to mystery, particularly when faced with a logical impasse. This is common when discussing Trinity or Incarnation, for example. This frustrates me. It seems arbitrary and unsatisfactory. People who otherwise carefully and passionately reason by appeal to consistency shift gears when the last piece of their puzzle won’t fit.
A few thoughts:
First, logical consistency is required for true belief. The truth is not self-contradictory. Everyone who has ever argued any point should concede as much. Argument is, after all, largely a process of encouraging one another to be consistent. That said, not every apparent contradiction is in fact a true contradiction. True contradiction, however, is the death of a theory.
Second, there is more to Christian faith than true (consistent) belief. People can have real communion with Christ and his church without having much else sorted out, theoretically or otherwise.
Third, there’s nothing wrong with just saying, “I don’t know.” Appeal to mystery is often a way to save face when we don’t know. It’s often a way to say, “I don’t know because no one can know.” Just own it and don’t know. Other people might know.
Fourth, and returning to Paul Moser’s point, not knowing is distinct from not understanding. I may be able to articulate possible answers to various theological questions yet lack the means to determine which answer is correct. That the truth is beyond what I can determine does not require that the truth is also beyond what I can conceive.
Fifth, I admit that there is likely a great deal of true theology that we are not be able to either conceive or determine. That hidden theology, however, is not marked by self-contradiction patched over with alleged mystery. Skeptics can help us detect counterfeits since they do not share the same purposes as those for whom an inconsistent theology must be true.
WORK CITED
Moser, Paul K. 1999. Philosophy after Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Originally published at bennasmith.wordpress.com on May 17, 2015.
