Do New Jerseyans Hate New Jersey?

Lyman Stone
In a State of Migration
10 min readAug 28, 2015

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Looking at Place of Birth and Migration Around the Nation

A few years back, there was a Gallup survey asking residents of each state about whether they wanted to leave their state. Connecticut, Illinois, and Maryland showed up as the states that the most residents wanted to leave, while Montana, Hawaii, and Maine were the least. Now, with American Community Survey migration flows data by place of birth, we can actually explore which states hang onto or lose their progeny the least. This is a separate question from migration generally. Rather, this question is about people who already have a tie to a given state through birth. People born in a given state are, on the margin, more likely to have other ties there, reducing the likelihood of migration to some other place.

But this effect may vary from place to place. And some places may be really abysmal at hanging onto locals, while other places may be better. By breaking out migration trends by place of birth, we can explore some key questions in migration.

Migration by Place of Birth

Winners, Losers, and the Diasporan Cycle

The above map shows the ratio of inflows of people born in a given state to outflows of people born in that state. Brown states lose local-born on net, blue gain. One thing should immediately stand out: most states are brown. In the long run, it’s actually a mathematical necessity that all states be brown. Because the Texas-born can only be born in, well, Texas, new Texas-born cannot be created in Oklahoma (even the children of the Texas-born in Oklahoma aren’t Texas-born for ACS purposes). In other words, it is impossible, in the long run, for inflows to exceed outflows, because all local-born inflows must have been outflows in some previous period. That’s an essential thing to keep in mind, because it tells us something really remarkable about the states in blue: they are experiencing “migration bubbles.”

For states with net inflows of local-born migrants like Utah, North Dakota, and Texas, these net inflows must eventually break even or even turn negative. Unless these gains from their diasporas are replaced by even higher inflows of non-local born, these states can expect their overall net migration rate to decline in the future. It’s simple math. Net diasporan inflows cannot persist forever.

States that gain from their diasporas are experiencing a “migration bubble.”

Now, how big an effect would it be if these bubbles popped, and net inflows turned into net outflows of the same volume? Honestly, the effect wouldn’t be that large. Texas’ total net migration would fall from 111,000 people to 107,000 people: a 4% decline. For Utah, the story is a little different. Inflows would fall from 86,000 to 79,000, causing net migration to shift from 5,300 a year to -1,700 a year. In other words, Utah’s positive net migration is a function of high inflows from the Utahn diaspora. This is itself almost certainly a function in part of the Mormon missionary diaspora and high birth rates in Utah. So, for some states, losing the diasporan bubble migrants would have little effect. For others, the effect would be fairly large.

Diasporan migration reflects historic opportunities and disasters.

Two other states stand out for diasporan migration: North Dakota and Louisiana. Both states are hallmarks of what I would call the “diasporan cycle.” Both states experienced high volumes of out-migration in the past. Louisiana lost hundreds of thousands of people from 2005–2006 in the aftermath of Hurrican Katrina. North Dakota has simply experienced persistent out-migration for decades. Whether lack of opportunity in North Dakota, or natural disasters in Louisiana, these states had unusually large diasporas (indeed, the North Dakotan diaspora is the largest, compared to its population, of any state).

So with large diasporas, they have high potential for diasporan inflows. If conditions in the home state change from whatever caused the diaspora formation, then diasporans are more likely, on the margin, to return home. And guess what? That’s exactly what happens.

Louisiana’s net gains among the local born (101% replacement rate) are almost certainly due to ongoing return-migration, even years later, of Hurrican Katrina migrants. Years later (this data is 2009–2013), Louisianans scattered to the four winds by disaster are still trickling back to their state in sufficient numbers to give the state an unusually high local-born replacement rate. North Dakota’s net gains among the local-born reflect an oil boom that is drawing heavily on the local labor force in surrounding states. I’ve written before about local labor market effects of the Bakken shale boom, especially in relation to Minnesota. But this place of birth data suggests that at least some of the oil migrants were born in North Dakota, moved somewhere else (probably Minnesota), then came back to North Dakota! The diaspora is a flexible and available migrant pool for local-area shocks to labor demand.

Migration by Place of Birth

Places the Locals Prefer

The above chart takes the replacement rate for non-local migrants, and subtracts the replacement rate for local migrants. One thing should immediately be obvious: the corrolary of the necessary long-run loss of locals is a long-run gain of non-locals. Thus, the non-local replacement rate is generally higher than the local replacement rate. But the size of this gap varies widely, from -12% it Utah (i.e. the replacement rate is higher for locals) to 66% in Colorado.

This chart shows us which states are disproportionately appealing to non-locals versus locals. So, for example, Colorado has a 143% replacement rate for non-locals, but just 77% for locals. In other words, Colorado does a much better job attracting non-locals than retaining locals. Other states with fairly high non-local relative replacement rates are Rhode Island, Virginia, New Hampshire, Missouri, and South Carolina. On the other hand, Utah does a much better job retaining locals and drawing in its diaspora than it does attracting non-locals. Other states that seem disproportionately able to retain locals relative to non-locals are Wyoming, Alaska, Louisiana, California, Michigan, New Mexico, Maine, and Oklahoma.

In case you can’t tell, there’s very little obvious pattern to where states fall on the non-local minus local replacement rate. Southern, western, and northern; rich and poor; liberal and conservative; all varieties of states show up on both lists. Indeed, Utah and Colorado are both states classically held up as good examples of states that are really “winning” migration, have good governance, etc.

I’m not going to make more of this graph than I need to. I think it’s interesting. I’d love to see further research into the question of what makes a locale have a given migration rate for local vs. non-local migrants. But that’s beyond my scope for today.

Migration by Place of Birth

Most Migration is Non-Local

Get the data and see the full visualization here.

The above chart shows the local-born share of inflows (i.e. people moving into the state of their birth divided by total inflows) and the local-born share of outflows (i.e. people moving out of the state of their birth divided by total outflows). Predictably, the local-born share is larger for outflows than inflows, going back to the basic mathematical necessity I’ve laid out before: in the long run, diasporan outflows must equal or exceed diasporan inflows. But what is notable is that the vast majority of migration can be classified as non-local to non-local: people moving from a state where they weren’t born to another state where they weren’t born.

About 75% of migrants in a given year have already migrated at least once before.

Migration begets migration. People living outside their state of residence are far more likely to migrate. The difference is remarkable. Consider outflows for a moment. Although about 70% of outflows are by non-locals, non-locals (i.e. people living in a state where they were not born) make up just 40% of the population. Meanwhile, the 60% of the population who are locally-born make up just 30% of outflows. That’s an enormous gap. There are essentially two “classes” as far as migration goes: the mobile, who are likely to move several times, and the “immobile,” who may never move, or move just once.

For perspective, from 2009–2013, the nationwide migration rate was 2.24%, according to the ACS data I have on hand. But for locals (on an inflow basis), it was just 0.85%. For non-locals, it was 4.21%. Depending on whether you use an outflow or an inflow basis, non-local residents have migration rates between 3 and 5 times larger than local-born residents. People living “close to home” tend to stick around.

However, as with the relative replacement rate of locals and non-locals, the local-born migration rate varies around the nation.

Migration by Place of Birth

Some Locals Are More Mobile Than Others

The above chart shows the total gross migration rate (inflow rate plus outflow rate) of the local-born in each state. Now a few caveats here: geographically large states and states with large populations will tend to have lower rates, simply because what would be interstate migration in Delaware is in-state migration in Texas. So, for example, Texas has very low local-born migration, while DC and Alaska have very high. This may be because Texans are uniquely immobile. Or it may be because Texas is uniquely appealing and has a comparatively small diaspora. Or it may just be that Texas is big, so a lot of the migration dynamics at work in other states are at work within Texas.

So, to get a sense of which states have really unusual local-born migration rates, we should look for states with a middling size. Like, for example, Kentucky, or Colorado. Colorado has over 3% local-born migration, while Kentucky has just 1.46%, the lowest in the nation. For reference the nationwide gross migration rate for local and non-local migrants is 4.48%. The only state that surpasses this number is Alaska. DC is also above it. So in general, local-born residents really do move way less.

But some states really do seem to be different. Those born and residing in western and eastern states move more, while the midwest and south move less. Why? It’s hard to say. Maybe Kentuckians and Mississippians and Ohioans have few opportunities to get out. Maybe these states are just really awesome for people born there. Maybe Kentuckians don’t move much because they have objectively the greatest basketball team of all time, so why leave? Maybe Coloradans move because they hate mountains. Or maybe they move because they receive a good education that provides them opportunities elsewhere. Distinguishing between these factors isn’t easy, and certainly can’t be done with just this data, but a study of variation in migration rates by state of origin would be very interesting in the future.

Migration by Place of Birth

Conclusion

I titled this post by asking in New Jerseyans hate New Jersey, because New Jersey has a low local-born replacement rate. By now, you should see just how hard to answer that question really is. Maybe the New Jersey diaspora just isn’t very big, maybe New Jersey schools prepare kids for opportunities elsewhere really well, maybe New Jerseyans tend to migrate to other states that they really love, or maybe they really do just hate New Jersey. But the point is, states vary widely in their ability to retain locals and attract their diasporas. For states experiencing positive net diasporan migration, this rate will decline in the future as the diasporan migration bubble pops. For some states, that will be a big change; for others it won’t. On the other hand, states losing locals now may have big diasporas in the future, so may see more positive local-born migration rates if local conditions become more attractive.

Some states are disproportionately attractive to non-locals. Other states are the opposite. It’s not clear what causes these trends: states at both ends of the spectrum vary widely by region and other categories. However, it is almost certain that different appeals to locals versus non-locals almost certainly impacts local culture, representing a possible tradeoff between rootedness and diversity.

Overall, local-born residents are much less likely to migrate than non-locals. Indeed, non-local migration is a disproportionately largeshare of all migration, implying that migration may have a “fat tail” in terms of lifetime number of migrations. Among local-born residents, migration rates vary widely by state. Some of this is simply due to geography. But some undoubtedly represents actual differences in mobility based on origins. The degree to which regional origins impact future migration rates remains unclear, but would undoubtedly be worth further study.

See my last post, on place of birth and migration in Kentucky.

Start my series on migration from the beginning.

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I’m a graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School with an MA in International Trade and Investment Policy, and an economist at USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service. I like to learn about migration, the cotton industry, airplanes, trade policy, space, Africa, and faith.

My posts are not endorsed by and do not in any way represent the opinions of the United States government or any branch, department, agency, or division of it. My writing represents exclusively my own opinions. I did not receive any financial support or remuneration from any party for this research. More’s the pity.

Cover photo source.

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Lyman Stone
In a State of Migration

Global cotton economist. Migration blogger. Proud Kentuckian. Advisor at Demographic Intelligence. Senior Contributor at The Federalist.