European Migration in Perspective
A Second Look at Human Mobility Across the Pond
Earlier this week, I took a look at migration within the Eurozone. I got some good engagement with that, and also some good feedback. I heard from readers that (1) I should look at Eurostat data as it may be more complete, (2) I should look beyond the Eurozone to the EU generally, or even the Schengen area, and (3) I should compare to the US. Your wish is my command.
As I will show, my OECD-derived data is similar to Eurostat data, but does tend to provide a lower estimate of gross migration alongside a higher estimate of net migration. Switching to Eurostate data exclusively, I show that net migration into non-euro EU countries is rising even as net migration int Eurozone countries is falling. However, the total volume of migration in the Eurozone remains much higher than in the non-euro EU, perhaps due to fewer geographic barriers within the Eurzone, its proximity to major migrant-sending areas like North Africa, and possibly even the deeper integration created by a shared currency. Finally, even though US migration has fallen somewhat in the last 20 years while European migration has risen dramatically, migration in the US continues to occur far more frequently than in the EU.
Changing European Migration
Non-Eurozone Countries Lead the Way
The above chart shows net migration for the Eurozone based on OECD-based vs. Eurostat based estimates, and also shows US net migration, and Eurostat-based estimates of net migration for the whole EU, and for the non-Euro part of the EU. All data are shown as a net percentage of population. So, for example, in 2013, migration into non-Eurozone EU nations added almost 0.5% to their population. That’s quite hefty.
In 1998, the United States had the highest net migration rate in this zone. It had the lowest rate by 2007. But today, it’s back in second place.
The US managed to swing from first, to last, to 2nd over the course of 15 years, despite virtually no no change in its net migration rate.
The real story here is erratic European migration rates. During the 2000s, net migration into the Eurozone rose rapidly, exceeding both non-Eurozone EU levels, and US levels. Non-Eurozone countries also saw rising migration, but not nearly as much. But then, when the crash came Eurozone migration fell dramatically. But here’s the weird thing:
When Eurozone migration fell sharply, non-Eurozone migration jumped up.
And it hasn’t stopped. Non-Eurozone countries are simply getting more and more positive net migration. I’m sure readers are curious about which countries lead the way. Fear not, I’ve made you another interactive tool so you can explore nation-level net migration rates on your own. But here’s the short version: rising net migration into the UK can account for part of the increase, but improving net migration in Romania accounts for just as much. Between rises in Romania, Sweden, and the UK, most of the region’s improving migration rate can be explained. Romania’s improving record is partly offset by worsening records for the Czech Republic and Poland from 2007 to 2011, but in 2012 and 2013, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Poland all posted improved net migration rates. In other words, either the Eurozone is looking less attracting for folks outside of it, or else the non-EU countries are looking better to people inside the Eurozone or outside the EU.
Changing European Migration
Different Inflow and Outflow Trends
Inflows into the Eurozone rose faster than inflows into the rest of the EU, at least until 2007. Then they dropped precipitously, while non-EU inflows rose. But since about 2009 or 2010, non-EU inflows have been roughly flat. And they’ve been identical to inflow rates in the rest of the Eurozone.
On emigration, the story is quite different. More and more people are leaving Eurozone countries every year. At the same time, emigration from the non-Eurozone countries is basically flat.
Eurozone countries are becoming less attractive for both locals and outsiders, while non-Euro countries are becoming more attractive for outsiders, with no new loss of locals.
These trends won’t continue forever. But they could continue for a while, especially if the Eurozone continues to limp from crisis to crisis, with most of its countries experiencing lackluster economic growth.
It’s worth noting as well that equal inflow rates in the Eurozone and the rest of the EU don’t mean the same things. Recall that the Eurozone includes Greece, Italy, and Spain: Europe’s classic border countries for moden flows of extra-EU immigrants. The largest non-Eurozone country is the UK. And while the next largest two, Poland and Romania, border potential migrant-sending countries in Eastern Europe, those flows likely don’t match the migrant inflows from Africa and the Middle East in most cases (recent crisis-related migration from Ukraine notwithstanding).
The Eurozone countries have what might be called a higher “natural rate of migration,” as they border more regions that, for various reasons, are simply likelier to send migrants. Plus, the Eurozone is mostly contiguous, so it has a large internal migration market that can boost its gross rate of migration. The non-Eurozone EU countries are much more scattered, with several not yet part of the Schengen area. For the non-Eurozone countries to be at all in the same league competitive in terms of migration is itself remarkable.
Changing European Migration
Different Inflow and Outflow Trends
I excluded the US from the inflow-outflow measures because it would have blown the scale out too much to be able to clearly distinguish trends in European migration. But for total gross migration, I’ve put the US back in the mix. Gross migration may take some explaining. If a person moves from France to Germany, that would count as an inflow and an outflow: so that’s “2” for gross migration. If a person moves from Algeria to France, that’s an inflow, so “1.” If they move from Spain to Argentina, that’s an outflow, so “1.” Simple enough, right?
Well for the US, I felt this wouldn’t be a fair comparison. European countries are somewhat larger than US states, have different languages, and more legal and institutional barriers remain. So, to be charitable, I decided, for the US, to count immigration from abroad as “1,” emigration as “1,” and any move across state lines in the US as “1.” That is, I essentially chopped US internal migration in half from what it would be if I defined it as I defined European internal migration.
Even with that handicap, migration in the United States is vastly larger than migration in Europe. US migration has declined over the last 15 years —ever so slightly. And European migration has indeed risen significantly, but it hasn’t caught up yet. In my last post, I suggested that Europe may someday get to enjoy the benefits to labor market flexibility that the US does if its migration rates continue to rise. That’s possible. But at the current trend, the EU won’t see that kind of integration for decades to come, if ever.
Some degree of labor market rigidity due to lower propensity to migrate in Europe is here to stay.
Changing European Migration
Conclusion
No matter what data source you use or how you cut it, the simple fact remains: the last 15 years have seen enormous volatility in European migration. Many countries have gone through striking boom-bust cycles, creating net migration rates that can easily generate secondary macroeconomic effects. Literally millions of Europeans (and immigrants within Europe) have been on the move, crossing borders in search of one thing or another. How European policymakers choose to deal with the continent’s migration question, both internal migration and external migration, will impact the region’s economic and cultural future. All the same, even as migration is growing, the reality is that migration in Europe remains small compared to major migrant countries like Australia or the US. Policymakers raising the specter of an overwhelming immigrant tide, either from within the EU or beyond it, are probably blowing the issue out of proportion. Many countries around the world have higher migration rates and do just fine. That said, different countries differ in their ability to absorb migrants. But if European countries find that they have low “absorptive capacity,” a better solution than restricting migration would be improved policies to integrate migrants.
See my last post, on Eurozone migration.
Start my series on migration from the beginning.
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I’m a graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School with an MA in International Trade and Investment Policy, and an economist at USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service. I like to learn about migration, the cotton industry, airplanes, trade policy, space, Africa, and faith.
My posts are not endorsed by and do not in any way represent the opinions of the United States government or any branch, department, agency, or division of it. My writing represents exclusively my own opinions. I did not receive any financial support or remuneration from any party for this research. More’s the pity.
